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ABSTRACT 
As from early 1 960s, the question of whether aid works has been a central theme in development 
economICS. The continued effort to analyse the effects of aid only now appears to be nearing 
consensus. A close examination of the literature suggests that there are certain aspects that are critical 
to this strand of studies that have not been fully addressed. In this thesis, we make a contribution by 
throwing light on three such issues that relate to the macroeconomic effectiveness of aid. 
Aid does not have a direct effect on growth; it operates via transmission mechanisms. Their role has 
not been given due consideration in the empirical literature. Our first objective is to revisit the question 
of aid effectiveness while taking into account the important effects through these mechanisms. Using 
generated regressors, we purge aid effect on these various mediators and obtain a coefficient on aid that 
gives a measure of the total effect aid has on growth. Our results consistently show that aid has had a 
positive effect on growth, largely through aid-financed investment and that Africa's poor growth record 
should not be attributed to aid ineffectiveness. 
Our second objective relates to the non-linear aspects that would seem to characterise the aid-growth 
link. This has consistently been represented by an 'aid squared' term and recently been referred to as 
the aid Laffer effect as proposed by Lensink and White (2001). Using a threshold model, we directly 
test the assumptions underlying this hypothesis. Contrary to an aid Laffer curve, we find that aid 
becomes effective beyond a certain critical level and human capital enhances its effects at higher aid 
levels. Hence, we find no evidence of diminishing returns in aid. Although, marginal impact of aid on 
growth does become weaker as human capital exceeds some high level. OveraU, it seems that an 'aid 
squared' term is not an appropriate representation of the non-linearity in aid-growth link. 
Finally, we contribute to the limited literature on aid and welfare of the poor. Our findings consistently 
show that aid is associated with increases in welfare indicators. We highlight the role of pro-poor 
public spending as the channel through which aid improves welfare. These indirect effects are 
captured using residual generated regressors. Quantile regression estimates suggest that aid effects on 
human development vary across the welfare distribution; effects are more significant in economies 
located at the lower end of this distribution. Finally, we find that improving welfare may just be 
anotller way to promote growth in developing countries. 
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CHAPTER! 
INTRODUCTION 
Since World War II, starting with the Marshall Plan, aid has been the mam 
instrument of development finance and the cornerstone of development policy. The 
issue of aid effectiveness has been of concern to donors and researchers. While 
findings from early studies varied on whether aid works or not, analysis conducted 
during the last few years is nearing consensus that 'aid works'. Yet, the question of 
aid effectiveness remains a recurring theme in development economics. The focus 
has recently inclined towards identifying factors that enhance or hamper the 
favourable effects of aid. 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, poverty remains a pressing problem in 
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). It is not only widespread across the region but severe in 
most countries. Slow growth is part of the explanation. Thus, it is desirable to 
achieve growth that is both sustainable and rapid. However, the continuous generous 
aid efforts offered by donor countries have not been matched by high growth 
performance in SSA. Not surprisingly, this is usually interpreted as a case where aid 
has failed. The accuracy of such an interpretation is however an empirical question. 
The publication of the World Bank report (1998) on 'Assessing Aid: What Works, 
What Doesn't, and Why' marked a watershed in perceptions of aid effectiveness and 
has had profound effect on donor aid policies. The World Bank view that has 
become the 'accepted wisdom' to many observers of aid effectiveness promotes the 
idea that aid works only if good policies are in place. This is principally based on the 
now famous Burnside and Dollar (2000) paper. Despite failing to withstand rigorous 
robustness analysis, this paper does contribute to improving understanding of what 
makes aid work. Several papers, which have not attracted the spotlight, have 
identified factors other than domestic policies (e.g, environmental factors in 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001)). 
However, the foremost question should be how does aid work. Only a good 
understanding on the workings of aid can allow advances on how to i m p r o \ ' t ~ ~ its 
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effectiveness. Theoretical work does provide some answers. Investment, imports 
and fiscal behaviour are identified as the routes through which the ultimate objective 
of speeding up the transition to self-sustainable growth can be achieved. Nonetheless, 
empirical work has not fully taken that into consideration. 
What has gained credence is the assertion that too much aid can do more harm than 
good. This permits donors to take a policy decision to reduce aid support to 
developing countries receiving large amounts of aid. Owing to this implication, 
which is of critical importance for the development of aid-dependent Third World 
countries, it is imperative to probe into the validity of this claim. The belief that high 
aid levels generate climinishing or negative returns has been incorporated in the 
empirical literature by a 'squared aid' variable. A significant negative coefficient on 
this quadratic term has been taken to support this hypothesis. What seems to have 
been neglected is how appropriate is this approach to introduce non-linearity in 
studies looking at the relationship between aid and growth. This becomes especially 
necessary given that the theoretical grounds on which it stands is not as incontestable 
as it may appear. 
In his well-known survey paper, White (1992) pointed out that 'the combination of 
weak theory with poor econometric methodology makes it difficult to conclude 
anything about the relationship between ... aid and growth ... ' (pg 121). Recent work 
has been marked with impressive improvements in both areas. Theoretical 
modelling of the macroeconomic impact of aid now is rooted on modem growth 
theory and econometric sophistication (Hansen and Tarp have made exemplary 
contributions in that direction). However, less has been done with regards to the 
objective of reducing poverty using aid flows. The empirical question of how to 
capture and influence the effect of aid on welfare is yet to be answered. 
OUTLINE OF THESIS 
In this thesis, we seek to contribute to the literature on aid by addressing the concerns 
raised above. Prior to that, in Chapter 2 we give an overview of the developments 
that have taken place in aid literature at the theoretical level. Using various gro\\1h 
frameworks - Harrod Domar, Neo-classical and endogenous - we assess how aid 
inflow is predicted to have a macroeconomic impact on the recipient economy and 
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what happens when the aid flow discontinues. This exerClSe provides helpful 
insights for our empirical investigation on transmission mechanisms. Useful 
information can also be drawn regarding how can aid be used to save poor countries 
from a low-level equilibrium trap. 
Chapter 3 presents an assessment of the empirical literature on aid and growth. 
Rather than reviewing the massive existing quantitative work on aid effectiveness, 
we focus on aspects of a few prominent papers (comprehensive reviews can be found 
in White (1992) and Tarp (2000)). A comparison of findings and methodology 
follows. This exercise principally serves to highlight treatment of issues we address 
in our empirical work. 
In Chapter 4, we conduct a preliminary data analysis. We first define alternative 
forms of capital flows before examining the trends in each component over the years 
1970 to 1997 (as our empirical work is based on that period). Questions with regards 
to source and destination of aid flows are also covered. This chapter further 
demonstrates why the focus of our first empirical study is on aid in SSA economies. 
Also discussed is the motivation behind the need for a measure of aid that is tailored 
to study the effect of aid on growth 
The next four chapters constitute the empirical contributions of this thesis. The 
significance of transmission mechanisms in determining aid effectiveness is given 
due consideration in Chapter 5 using a panel data set for SSA and seven four-year 
period averages over 1970 to 1997. Omitting these mechanisms (for example, 
investment) from the model results in misspecification, yet including them gives rise 
to an inaccurate measure of total effect of aid - for example, investment in growth 
regression would include part of the indirect effects of aid so that aid coefficient 
would underestimate its impact on growth. In this chapter, we shed light on the 
treatment of transmission mechanisms in aid-growth regressions and show how using 
generated regressors only non-aid financed part of the mechanism can be introduced 
in the model so that all indirect effects of aid on growth would be accumulated in the 
aid coefficient. Chapter 6 supplements this regression analysis, considering 
implications for individual countries and providing a sensitivity analysis of the 
findings. 
-CHAPTER I: Introduction 
The issue of non-linearity is addressed in Chapter 7. The validity of using an aid 
squared term, that has recently become a tradition, is challenged. We draw attention 
to the limitations of this practice - it imposes the number of threshold ( one) and 
form of non-linearity (inverted V-shape). A preliminary data analysis assesses its 
appropriateness. Also, we test the hypothesis of negative returns to aid as formalised 
by Lensink and White (2001) aid Laffer curve. Various alternative threshold 
identification procedures are discussed before selecting which one would be the best 
option. The threshold model developed by Hansen (2000) is applied to the aid-
growth relationship; this represents the novel feature of the chapter. It allows us to 
endogenise both the number and location of thresholds while uncovering the form of 
non-linearity and enables us to draw statistical inferences on the estimated threshold. 
To some extent, it also endogenises the explanatory variable that triggers a threshold 
in aid-growth link We apply this technique to a sample of all the countries for which 
Effective Development Assistance (EDA) data are available. 
Chapter 8 contributes to the limited literature on aid and welfare of the poorl. We 
use a panel of 57 countries over the period 1980 to 1998 to study the role of 
government spending in evaluating aid effectiveness against the criterion of welfare 
improvement. A vital component is the construction of indices that capture the 
degree to which government spending is 'pro-poor'. A brief attempt is made to link 
the two objectives of aid - growth and welfare improvement. We also allow for 
different effects of aid on recipient economies located at different quantiles of the 
welfare distribution by using conditional quantile regression. To our knowledge, this 
method of estimation has not been applied in the aid-welfare literature. As stressed, 
the need to expand on the literature (both theoretical and empirical) that looks at the 
link between aid and welfare cannot be overemphasised. 
A summary of the main findings is provided in the concluding Chapter 9. Based on 
what we find in this thesis, we draw some implications for policy as well as 
empirical work in the area. Finally, limitations of this study are discussed and 
suggestions are made for future research. 
lOwing to limited data on poverty, we use indicators of deprivation (Human Development Index and 
infant mortality rate) and therefore interpret our results as being effects on welfare of the poor rather 
than poverty. 
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AID AND GROWTH: 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
As Ruttan (1989) suggests, all donors have mixed objectives in providing aid to 
developing countries. No single motive is paramount at all times. Whilst some 
would refer to 'international aid doctrine' according to which advanced countries are 
under the obligation to assist poorer ones simply as a matter of moral principle and 
international solidarity. Others are governed by concerns of how efficiently recipient 
economies manage aid resources and whether aid works or not. This is where the 
contribution of empirical aid studies lies. 
Whilst significant amounts of aid is specifically directed at reducing poverty, donors 
have paid overwhelming attention to effectiveness of aid in promoting growth. 
Growth seems to be the objective of concern. In response to that, numerous studies 
examine the empirical link between aid and per capita growth. Aid allocation policy 
is increasingly reflecting donors' confidence in these findings. For example, in 
respect to the recent claim that aid is more effective in stimulating growth in good 
policy environment (Burnside and Dollar, 2000), donors are in favour of countries 
with stable policies. 
With regards to the emphasis on growth, we find it useful to review the various 
growth theories that have evolved. We also aim to evaluate the impact of aid in the 
context of each growth model. Early aid studies were based on the two-gap model of 
Chenery and Strout (1966). The empirical findings generally varied and in some 
cases were even pessimistic. With developments at the theoretical level, endogenous 
growth theory provided a new framework to analyse aid effectiveness. Resulting 
empirical studies have commonly reached more encouraging conclusions. Note 
however, that this change in findings is not entirely attributed to the new growth 
theory used as more advanced econometric techniques have been used as well. The 
latter is however not of direct concern in this chapter. 
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The logical starting point seems to 
be the Harrod-Domar growth model, as presented in Section 2.2. We then tum to the 
Neo-classical growth model, developed by Solow and Swan (1956), in Section 2.3, 
including some extensions. Section 2.4 looks at the recent endogenous gro\\1h 
theory. In Section 2.5, we consider models that allow optimisation behaviour to 
determine savings. The impact of foreign aid is explicitly considered in each model. 
Finally, we conclude in Section 2.6 with some observations. 
2.2 AID IN HARROD DOMAR GROWTH MODEL 
The dual gap model, as pioneered by Chenery and Strout (1966), is the traditional 
approach to examine role of foreign aid in growth process. It is based on the Harrod 
Domar growth model. National output is represented by a fixed-proportion Leontief 
production function, as given by: 
Y = F(K,L) = min (hK, cL) (2.1) 
Where Y is output ( equals income), K is capital, L is labour and the constants b and c 
represent capital and labour productivity respectively, such that b>O and c>O. If K 
and L are such that bK = cL, then all workers and machines are fully employed. 
Otherwise, the level of output is determined by whichever is less (bK or cL). If bK> 
cL then only (c/b).L units of capital is used and the remainder is idle. While if bK < 
cL, then capital is fully used whilst labour units used amounts to (b/C).K and the rest 
is unemployed. It is reasonable to believe that in developing countries, the latter 
possibility is the most likely to occur. In other words, rather than being labour 
constrained, bK is binding in low-income countries. Foreign inflows, aid, can relax 
this constraint by providing ( funding for) capital. An underlying assumption is that 
savings are too low to provide adequate investment. 
Savings (S) is given by some constant proportion (s) of national income such that: 
S=sY (2.2) 
Investment (1), as defined by a change in capital stock, can alternatively be expressed 
as a proportion of growth of output: 
6 
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I1Y = bM<. = bI 
=::} 1= IV1Y (2.3) 
Define the capital-output ratio l( = lib. 
I I1Y 
In terms of growth, - = l( - so that rate of growth is given as: 
Y Y 
1 I 
g=-.- (2.4) 
l( Y 
Based on the fixed-proportions assumption, we now formally obtain that investment, 
hence, capital is the binding constraint to growth. Furthermore, from the assumption 
that investment is determined by savings (that is ex ante investment is equal to ex 
ante savings (I=sY)), one can rewrite Equation 2.4 as: 
g=sll( (2.5) 
This is the fundamental relation of two-gap models. The growth rate is determined 
by two factors - savings rate (hence, investment) and productivity of capital. This 
would imply that economies that are capable of saving a higher proportion of their 
income would achieve a higher growth rate than those who save less, for given l(. 
Given Equation 2.5, a planner can identify the required level of investment to 
achieve a certain target growth rate, denoted by g*. If domestic savings are 
insufficient to finance that level of investment, there exists a savings-investment gap 
or savings constraint, as generally observed in developing countries. Traditionally, 
the role of foreign assistance is seen as a supplement to domestic savings to bridge 
the savings-investment gap. If a is the share of foreign aid in national income, then 
the targeted growth rate to be achieved is given by: 
g*= (s+a)1 l( (2.6) 
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And this target growth rate is higher than the one permitted by domestic savings 
only. 
Aid flows can also relax a foreign exchange gap if that is the binding constraint to 
higher growth (where export earnings are insufficient to finance imports of capital 
goods). Dual gap model, in some sense therefore, synthesise the traditional and 
modem views on trade, aid and development. On one hand, it recognises the 
traditional view that aid is an additional source of savings. On the other, it also 
embraces the modem view that aid resources assist developing countries in financing 
their imports, on which they rely heavily (especially imports of capital goods) to 
achieve higher growth rates. More recently, Bacha (1990) has proposed a three-gap 
model. Particularly in highly indebted developing countries, it is believed that 
government budget limitations is the main constraint to growth. By assisting 
economies with their fiscal constraints, aid can affect growth (directly) through 
public investment and (indirectly due to complementarity) private investment. This 
partly justifies foreign assistance in the form of debt relief. 
In this framework, it should be noted that aid flows are perceived as filling binding 
gaps and thereby helping countries attain self-sustaining economic growth. In other 
words, foreign aid is only a short run tool to realise a target growth rate. It would not 
increase long run growth rates. With time, it is expected that the recipient economy 
reduces its dependence on foreign assistance. This can be accomplished if it 
succeeds in increasing the savings rate (therefore investment potentially), 
productivity of capital and foreign exchange earnings capacity. Otherwise, once 
foreign aid stops flowing in, growth will revert back to its previous lower level. 
In some instances, it would appear that aid contradicts its purpose to enhance growth. 
One could think of cases where aid is not used for its intended purposes, that is, aid 
becomes fungible and consequently the intended positive effects are not seen. 
Additional foreign aid may also reduce the government's tax effort. Morrissey and 
White (1996) further recognise that tied aid is sometimes associated with imposition 
of inappropriate technology hence low capital productivity and increased reliance on 
imports to maintain the imported technology. This would reduce the effectiveness of 
aid and limit a country's ability to reduce aid dependence. 
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2.3 AID IN NEO-CLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL 
The distinguishing feature of the Solow and Swan (1956) growth model is the 
possibility of substitution between capital and labour as captured in the Cobb 
Douglas constant returns production function. As before, output is a function of 
capital and labour and the marginal propensity to save is s. Population grows at the 
rate n, and capital depreciation occurs at a rate 8. The fundamental equation for 
growth in this model is given by: 
L1k=s.f(k)-(8+n)k (2.7) 
Ignoring depreciation, one can see that rate of change in k (capital per worker) is the 
difference between savings per capita and per capita investment requirement (to 
preserve capital-labour ratio as labour force grows). Since O<s<l andf(k) is well-
behaved, at any point sf(k) lies below f(k) and is also well-behaved. The term nk is 
diagramatically given as a line that goes through origin with a positive slope n. 
Steady-state growth occurs where sf(k) = nk, such that equilibrium level of output 
and capital per worker are respectively given by y* and k* as shown in Figure 2.1. 
Consumption per capita is mn. If k>k*, then it would fall to k* since savings per 
capita would be less than the capital required to maintain the higher k ratio and vice 
versa if k<k*. Thus, the steady state in this model exists and is both unique and 
stable. 
Crouch (1973) examines the impact of foreign aid in this growth model. We start 
with the first case he considers where aid is given in the form of capital goods. The 
economy moves to a higher capital-labour ratio and income per capita as denoted by 
kak and Yak. Aid-supported per capita consumption is given by the distance op. The 
economy stays at this higher equilibrium point as long as aid flows in. As soon as it 
stops, the economy slumps back to k*, y* and mn. In the absence of foreign aid, the 
domestic savings per capita is too low to meet the investment per capita required to 
stay at kak. Now consider the case if that aid flow was disbursed in the form of 
consumer goods such that income per capita increases to Yo. The aid-supported 
production and per capita savings function shift to y' = f ( k) and s'f ( k). At k* , 
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FIGURE 2.1: Aid in Neo Classical Growth Model 
Yac .-.................................................................................................................................................. i,.. _. y'=f(k) 
--: 
....- : Yo .....•.....•...••..•...••.................•............••..••..••.••..••..•.••.••..•••.••..••..••..••..•..••..••.••• ./ I 
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nk 
s'f{k) 
__ ~ C - - - - r - r - - sf{k) 
~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - - ~ k k
k* 
savings per capita exceeds the required per capita investment, therefore the economy 
is able to reach a higher capital-labour ratio, kac . Income and consumption per capita 
correspondingly rise to yac and qr. This situation will also hold only as long as aid is 
received. As soon as it stops flowing in, the economy will revert back to its non-aid 
equilibrium. Hence, the recipient country finds itself in a low-equilibrium trap from 
where it can only temporarily move to higher equilibriums with the assistance of 
foreign aid. Thus, like Harrod-Domar model, the neo-classical model predicts that 
aid flows (whether in the form of investment or consumption goods) will have 
positive but only transitory impact on capital-labour ratio, income and consumption 
per capita unless the recipient country succeeds in increasing its domestic saving 
rate. 
Crouch (1973) attributes these pessimistic conclusions to the assumptions made with 
regards to 11 and s in the neo-classical framework. By introducing population growth 
as a function of income, a concept that has for long been asserted by demographers, 
10 
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Crouch (1973) shows that foreign aid can have permanent long-run benefits. The 
idea is that at subsistence levels of income, death rate soars whilst birth rate declines 
to zero so that population does not grow. As income grows, the discounted present 
value of raising children falls short of the discounted present value of the material 
benefits the latter would bring to their parents. Hence, population grows until it 
reaches a maximum. Population growth thereafter declines because at any higher 
level of income, having children is no longer a 'profitable' form of capital 
accumulation 1. The savings function changes as well, reflecting the pattern of 
population growth over various income levels. At income per capita below 
subsistence level, savings are very low. It stays low and may even decrease at above 
subsistence levels of income per capita, since population growth is high in that range 
of income. However, savings pick up once income per capita rises beyond the point 
where having a large family stops being 'profitable'. Finally, at very high per capita 
incomes and k, marginal physical product of capital declines and so does the 
propensity to save. 
With these modified functions, as illustrated in Figure 2.2, a steady state is reached at 
three different values of capital-labour ratio. Steady state growth at k; and k; are 
* stable whilst the one occurring at k 2 is not. Any disturbance that causes k to 
increase ( decrease) from k; will cause k to diverge to the steady state k; (k;) rather 
than converging back to k;. It is worth noting that it would not be unreasonable to 
believe that developing countries are most likely to be in steady state at k;. Taking 
that as the initial position of the recipient, we now examine the effect of aid flows. 
Suppose aid flows manage to boost the capital-labour ratio to k; in the recipient 
economy. As long as aid lasts, the economy would stay at that point and benefit 
from a higher income per capita, as given by y;. When the donor stops giving aid, 
* the economy will slump back in the low-level equilibrium trap with k = k]. 
I At these high income levels, it becomes more expensive to support children. At the same time, the 
material benefits (household and retirement support) expected from them declines. Owing to longer 
schooling years, they leave home or are mobile therefore become an lUlcertain source of support. 
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FIGURE 2.2: Aid in Neo-classical Growth Model under Alternative 
Assumptions for Population Growth 
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This is the type of temporary effects discussed earlier. However, if aid flows are 
generous enough and succeed in pushing the capital-labour ratio above k;, the 
recipient economy would enjoy the permanent benefits from aid. In this scenario, 
when aid is withdrawn, the economy would be able to reach the higher steady state 
* k 3 on its own since savings per capita exceeds investment per capita required to stay 
at the aid-supported position at some point above k;. These results are observed 
irrespective of whether aid is given in the form of capital or consumption goods. 
Hence, what is required in the context of neo-classical growth model to help 
developing countries permanently out of the low-level equilibrium trap is some 
minimum level of aid that is sufficient to give them a big push so they land outside 
the concave portion of nk curve, that is above k;. Once aid stops, the recipient will 
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converge to k; if sf(k»nk while aid lasts or revert back to k; if nk>sf(k) with aid 
support. Crouch adds that these permanent gains from aid can be improved if aid is 
given in the form of population control assistance as well. The idea is that n can be 
reduced so that the new n 'k has a lower slope and lies everywhere below nk. With 
this new curve, once aid (given for capital or consumer goods) is stopped the 
recipient can land in a steady state that would be to the right of k;, say k ~ p p
The Solow-Swan model with Technological Progress 
So far, in the neo-classical model it has been assumed that there is no technological 
progress. As a consequence, all per capita variables are constant once they reach the 
steady state. This feature is somewhat unrealistic. In particular, developed countries 
have experienced positive per capita growth rate over years. It is hard to imagine 
that this has been achieved only by accumulating capital per worker - presence of 
diminishing returns makes this implausible. Technological progress seems to be the 
explanation. It enables countries to counteract the effects of diminishing returns and 
achieve positive per capita growth rate in the long run. 
The neo-classical economists amended the Solow-Swan model and introduced 
exogenous labour-augmenting technology progress as given by A(t), that grows at the 
constant rate x. The production function therefore becomes: 
Y = F[K,L. A(t)] (2.8) 
And, 11 k = s. f [ k, A( t )] - ( 8 + n). k (2.9) 
It follows that ill the steady state s. f ( k) = (8 + n + x). k where 
k = k I A( t) = K I[ L.A( t)] and refers to the quantity of capital per unit of effective 
labour. 
Again assuming zero depreciation rate, one can notice from Figure 2.3 that the level 
of k at which the downward sloping curve s. f (k) I k intersects the line n + x shifts 
to the right. Hence, labour-augmenting foreign assistance would imply a higher 
13 
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FIGURE 2.3: Aid in Neo Classical Model with Labour-Augmenting 
Technological Progress 
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steady state than otherwise possible. Note that by definition, the steady state growth 
rate of k is constant. Because of constant returns to scale, this implies that k should 
grow at the same rate as technological progress which is equal to x. It also follows 
that both per capita output and consumption would grow at the rate x in the steady 
state. The level of these variables (capital stock, consumption and income) which 
were growing at the constant rate n, in the absence of labour-augmenting 
technological progress, would now be able to grow at a higher rate n+x. Though 
once again with the end of aid disbursement, the economy will go back to its original 
position unless the basic assumptions on behaviour of n and s are modified or aid-
financed technical assistance had some permanent positive spillovers in the recipient 
economy. This in turn depends on the capability of the recipient to learn and adapt 
the new technology. 
2.4 AID IN ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODEL 
In response to the dissatisfaction regarding exogenous technological progress as an 
explanation of productivity growth in the neoclassical model, there emerged new 
growth theory, mainly stemming from Romer (1986). The latter explained gro\\th 
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within the model, hence the name endogenous growth. The key chararacteristic of 
this new class of models is the absence of diminishing returns to capital, the 
fundamental reason why per capita growth could not be sustained once in the steady 
state in the Solow-Swan model. The common and simplest version of a production 
function that does not exhibit diminishing returns is of the AK type (first used by von 
Neumann (1937)): 
Y=AK (2.10) 
Where A reflects the constant level of technology such that A>O. Note that in this 
context, average and marginal products of capital are constant and are given by A. 
With the assumption of an exogenous and fixed saving rate (s), one can write 
f(k)/k=A and the fundamental equation for growth (Equation 2.7) can now be 
rewritten as: 
!Jk 
-=s.A-(8+n) (2.11) 
k 
The downward sloping curve, s J(k)/k, IS now replaced by the horizontal line 
corresponding to the level sA. 
FIGURE 2.4: Aid in Endogenous Growth Model 
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Consequently, as Figure 2.4 depicts, growth rate in k is obtained as the difference 
between the two lines, sA and n (again ignoring depreciation). Also, growth in k 
would be constant (since these two lines are parallel) and is independent of the level 
of k. As long as sA>n, the economy will attain positive per capita growth, in terms 
of capital, output and consumption. Unlike the neo-classical model, the AK 
formulation of endogenous growth predicts that the economy would display positive 
long-run per capita growth even in the absence of labour-augmenting technological 
progress. The outcome of these two models differs mainly due to the assumption of 
diminishing returns in the neo-classical model and its absence in endogenous growth 
model. Note however that if diminishing returns set in slowly then the convergence 
period in the former model is long. In these circumstances, an increase in saving rate 
affects growth for a long time and this would approximate to the AK model in the 
short run. 
If the parameters in an economy satisfy the condition sA>n, then with aid 
disbursement it would be able to achieve an even higher growth rate, say as given by 
(sA) '-no On the other hand, if this condition does not hold (that is, sA <n) then aid 
flows can potentially raise the line sA such that it lies everywhere above n. Foreign 
aid can achieve these positive effects either by supplementing domestic savings and 
therefore raising the savings rate (s) or if granted in the form of technical assistance 
by affecting the parameter A. Alternatively, if foreign aid flows in the form of 
population control assistance then n can be reduced and higher growth rates are 
attainable. With the end of aid flows, one can imagine that the line sA would revert 
back to pre-aid level and so would the temporarily higher growth rate. However, it is 
interesting to note that the tendency for ciiminishing returns has been eliminated from 
this growth model by the introduction of the notion of learning-by-doing (Arrow, 
1962). This concept is closely linked to a process of spillovers of knowledge. 
Hence, if aid succeeds in improving the level of technology in the recipient country, 
then the potential spillover effects would stop the economy from slumping back to 
pre-aid levels. In other words, aid can potentially have permanent positive effects on 
per capita growth rate. 
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2.S AID IN GROWTH MODELS WITH CONSUMER OPTIMISATION 
One shortcoming of the class of models discussed here is that savings rate IS 
exogenous and constant. Subsequent growth models have endogenised savings by 
allowing for optimising households and firms to interact on competitive markets. 
One of the popular growth models in this category was constructed by Ramsey 
(1928) and refined by Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965). Infinitely lived 
households is among its key components. In this set up, households determine 
consumption and saving such that their dynastic utility is maximised subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint. Recent empirical work on aid effectiveness is 
rooted in this growth framework. Allowing for consumer optimisation, we 
reconsider the impact of aid on growth by making specific reference to a few 
prominent cases in the empirical literature. 
2.5.1 Aid in Neo-Classical Growth Model 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) use a one-sector neoclassical model to motivate the use 
of an aid-policy interaction term in their empirical growth equation. They assume 
that production is undertaken by each (infinitely lived) household which combines a 
single unit of labour and technology as given by J[ = AKjl , where A>O and 
0< a :::; 1. Their lifetime utility is given by 
where 0 < ~ < 1 1 is the discount factor and y>0 is the coefficient of relative risk 
averslOn. C t and C represent consumption at time t and subsistence level, 
respectively. Households receive income from production process and government 
in the form of lump-sum transfers (Tt). This income is taxed at the rate 'to Hence, 
assuming no international private capital mobility, the household faces the budget 
constraint Ct + It - 8Kt :::; ( 1- r )(J[ - 8Kt ) + It while the government budget 
constraint is Gt :::; r(Yt - 8Kt ) - Tt + Ft where F t represents foreign aid. Assuming 
different values for a and C , Burnside and Dollar (2000) analyse the effect of aid. 
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First, they consider the case where a =1 and C =0, that is, marginal product of 
capital is constant and subsistence consumption plays no role in the model. Under 
these circumstances, the authors show that initial consumption is 
00 
R - g ~ ~ -t 
Co =(R-g)Ko+ R LJR (F{-Gt ) where R = A - £5 + 1 
t=O 
And, consumption growth is constant at 
~ ~Ct+ 1 = g = ( f3R;1 / r 
Ct 
where R = (1-7:)( A-£5)+1 
In the absence of aid, Co = (R - g )KO and growth rate of GDP equals to g in every 
period (assuming Gt=O for all t). If a lump-sum aid is received at t=O, then 
Co = ( R - g )Ko + ( R - g )Fo / R . It can be seen that households consume 
( R - g )Fo / R share of aid and the rest gFo / R is the additional investment 
induced by aid. As a result, the aid-supported growth rate is higher though it returns 
to its lower pre-aid level (g) when aid stops. An interesting point noted by Burnside 
and Dollar (2000) is that output growth (g) depends not only on size of aid inflow but 
also on level of distortionary taxes. The higher the tax rate, the lower is aid 
effectiveness, other things held equal. 
Allowing the subsistence consumption to be non zero, Burnside and Dollar (2000) 
again find that aid raises output directly, an effect that depends on how much of aid 
is invested rather than consumed. Aid also has an indirect effect - it moves the 
country onto a higher transition path with higher growth rates. Both of these effects 
are found to be a negative function of distortions. Similar observations are made 
when diminishing returns to capital is assumed (a<l). This finding motivates the 
introduction of an aid interaction term such that aid effectiveness depends on the 
quality of policies (that would capture market distortions). 
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2.5.2 Aid in Endogenous Growth Model 
Model with Infinitely Lived Individuals 
Lensink and White (2001) study the implications of aid using a simple endogenous 
growth model that allows optimising behaviour to determine savings. Households 
decide the fraction of their income to consume and save such that they maximise 
their dynastic constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CrES) utility as given 
by 
-at e -1. . 00 [1-0 } U = [e 1- (J t subject to the budget constramt 
Where (J' stands for the rate of time preference, e for consumption, e for the inverse 
of the elasticity of substitution, z for the net assets owned per household, w for the 
real wage rate, r for the rental price of capital and a for assets2 . The solution to the 
optimisation problem faced by household, is given by the intertemporal Euler 
de 1 
condition: - = - ( r - (J' ) 
e e 
(2.12) 
Firms are assumed to be driven by a Cobb-Douglas production function as given by: 
Y = ALI-a KaG I- a ; ex <1 where Y is the output produced, A is a measure of total 
factor productivity, L is the size of labour force, K is the capital stock and G is 
government purchases3 . The profits earned by a representative firm at any point in 
time is expressed as: 1! = ALI-a KaG I- a - (r+ 8)K - wL where 8 and w refer to 
the depreciation rate of capital and the wage rate. Profit is maximised where 
marginal product of capital equals the rental price and marginal product of labour 
equals the real wage rate. This former first order condition is given by: 
(2.13) 
2 It is assumed that households are indifferent to the composition of their wealth, so that all assets pay 
the same real rate of return, r. 
3 This fonn of the production function implies that public services complement private inputs in the 
sense that an increase in G would raise the marginal products ofL and K. Note also that the exponent 
on G exactly equals I-a, so that the economy faces constant returns to K and G for fixed L and hence 
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Government provides public infrastructure to private investors rather than getting 
engaged in the production process itself. It purchases the goods produced by private 
investors and provides them as free public services. Foreign aid is introduced as a 
source of finance for the government. For simplicity, foreign aid flows, F, are taken 
to be the only way to finance government purchases, G. Hence, G=F or G=</>Y 
where <I> represents aid disbursement as a fixed share of the output produced by the 
recipient firm. Substituting the Cobb-Douglas production function, this can be 
rewritten as G = (</> A)Ila L(l-a)la K 
The first order condition, Equation 2.13, can now be respecified as 
a A I I a (L</» ( I-a) I a = r + 8 . Consumption, capital stock and income will all grow 
at the same rate. This growth rate, g, can be obtained by substituting the equality 
condition of marginal product of capital and its rental price (Equation 2.13) in the 
intertemporal Euler condition which maximises consumer's dynastic utility 
(Equation 2.12). Hence, 
We take the first derivative of growth rate with respect to aid as a share of recipient 
output to evaluate the effect of aid flows on growth rates, as given by: 
>0 
Drawing from this result, Lensink and White (2001) make the observation that an 
increase in foreign aid unambiguously promotes growth rate of recipient country. 
They then endogenise the level of technology in their model such that it given by 
A = (1- f3</> )Ao where AO is the level of technology with no aid and 0 < f3 < 1 . 
Impact of aid on growth can now be assessed using: 
endogenous growth is possible. If it were less than I-a, then diminishing returns would apply and 
these would rule out endogenous growth. 
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dg =(l-a f3 J. ~ ( ( ( 1 1 f3JAO)lla (L</>(l-a)la) d</> a 1- f3</> e 
=(1- f3</>(2-aJ-a J. i(((l-f3JA )lla (L</>J(l-a)la) 
( 1 - f3</> J </> e 0 
Whether aid flows affect growth positively or negatively now depends on the first 
term in the expression above. Note that since its denominator is always positive, it is 
the numerator which will effectively determine the sign of the derivative. For small 
values of <1>, it will be positive, that is, aid flows will promote growth. However, if <1> 
exceeds a certain level, the derivative will turn negative, that is, negative returns to 
aid set in. Based on these findings, Lensink and White (2001) believe that existence 
of an aid Laffer curve is a possibility. 
Model with Finite Horizons 
Recently, Dalgaard et al (2002) provide some further theoretical discussion of how 
aid may affect growth in the context of an endogenous growth model that allows for 
consumer optimising behaviour. For this purpose, they use a two-period growth 
model rather than making the traditional assumption of infinitely lived individuals. 
Hence, they shift from the frequently used Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model to the 
overlapping generations Diamond framework to study aid effectiveness. Whilst 
individuals live over two periods only in this set up, activity still extends infinitely in 
the future. The standard Cobb-Douglas production technology is applied: 
y{ = Qa K'( (EtL/-a where same definitions as before apply to all variables other 
than Q and E t. Q is a time-invariant constant that captures productivity differences 
attributed to country specific factors like climate (Sachs, 2001) and institutional 
environment to cite a few. E t is an index of labour efficiency, which owing to 
learning-by-doing effect4, increases over time as output per worker rises (Kaldor, 
1957). Hence, formally Et = Yt. Substituting this expression, the production function 
can be rewritten as Yt = QKt . The equilibrium factor prices, which is conventionally 
4 It is assumed that finns do not intemalise the productive effects oflearning. 
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reached when marginal product of capital and labour equals real rate of interest (r) 
and wage rate (Wt) respectivell, are given as: 
r=aQ Wt =(1-a)Q kt (2.14) 
Firms engage in this production process for an infinite length of time. Consumers 
receive wages and an equal amount of aid per capita (ft)6 during their youth (the first 
period). They spend part of this income on consumption and save the remaining. In 
the second period, they earn interest on the savings and continue to receive aid which 
is allowed to grow over time such that /t+l =(1 +lP) /t The budget constraint for 
period 1 and 2 are respectively: 
It 1S assumed that a representative young individual has 10 garithmic 
1 2 1 1 2 preferences, U ( C t ' C t+ 1 ) = In ( C t ) + --( C t+ 1 ) Consumers aim to maxnmse 
l+p 
discounted lifetime utility subject to the budget constraints faced in the two periods. 
The solution to this optimisation problem is given by: 
St = SW+S(l_l+ P (l+a))rcft 
l+r 
(2.15) 
where the savings rate S is equal to 1/(2+p). Note that the savings in the first period 
of life is used to accumulate capital stock, i.e, Kt+l = St L. Hence, substituting for 
St,W and r using Equations 2.14 and 2.15, we obtain the growth rate of capital per 
worker: 
5 The real rate of interest is assumed to be constant over time so that rio = ,. for all t. While, real wage 
rate is positively related to capital per worker. 
6 To take into account the share of aid flows diverted to unintended uses, it is asswned that i n d i v i d u a l ~ ~
receive only the fraction 1t E (0,1) of aid whilst (1-1t) is put to other uses. 
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kt+ 1 = S n ( 1 _ a) + s (an - p - a ( 1 + P ) ) lift 
kt 1+an kt 
(2.16) 
From this equation, we can now find the implications of foreign aid for gro\\1h. 
Suppose aid inflow in successive periods stays constant, that is, ct>=O. In this case, 
restating Equation 2.16 in terms of output growth using Yt = n kl , we obtain: 
Yt+ 1 = s n (1- a) + s n (an - p ) lift 
Yt 1+aQ Yt 
It can be seen that aid is likely to spur growth if aQ >p. This underlines the vital 
importance of country specific structural characteristics - they have a positive 
influence on marginal effect of aid on growth. This point is reiterated when allowing 
for growing aid (ct»O). Hence, theoretical support is obtained for the recent practice 
of aid interaction terms in empirical work. Moreover, the model implies that 
although government rent-seeking activities dampens aid effectiveness, as long as 
some fraction of aid flows into consumers' budget (that is, n>O), aid will stimulate 
growth provided an >p. The higher the share of fungible aid, the lower will be aid 
effectiveness. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
Under the assumption of exogenous savings, the neo-classical model predicts 
positive per capita growth in the transitory period. Once in the steady state, then the 
economy grows at the constant population growth rate to keep per capita ratios 
constant. Endogenous growth model on the other hand predicts perpetual positive 
per capita growth at the same rate as technological progress in the steady state. Our 
basic conclusion is that despite the different implications reached on growth in 
steady state, both models commonly identify a number of ways in which aid can 
effectively impact on development process in a temporary or permanent fashion. 
Aid has been modelled to help growth performance in developing countries by 
adding to domestic savings and foreign exchange earnings. This in turn stimulates 
investment and increases their capacity to import the required capital goods. Aid, if 
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given in the form of technical assistance (or imported capital goods), enhances the 
level of technology in the recipient country; for example, through labour-augmenting 
technological progress. Hence, foreign aid not only aims at assisting with (human 
and physical) capital accumulation but it also contributes to improving productivity 
of capital. Economies should aim to increase their domestic savings rate and absorb 
technology if they intend to enjoy permanent benefits from aid. This would be a 
necessary step to achieve the long term goal of self-sustaining growth. It is clear 
that theoretical growth models treat aid as working through indirect routes to 
promote growth. These routes are what we refer to as 'transmission mechanisms'. 
They include investment (savings), imports and technology. Accounting for the role 
of these mechanisms when studying the relationship between aid and growth is 
important. 
Since foreign aid largely enters the economy through the government budget, fiscal 
behaviour becomes an equally important matter. To some extent, this has been 
conceptualised in Bacha's (1990) three-gap model. Note that the recent theoretical 
contributions have commonly introduced aid in the model as a source of funding for 
government sector (Burnside and Dollar (2000), Lensink and White (2001)). 
Additionally, they highlight factors that are believed to be of significance in 
determining aid effectiveness - Burnside and Dollar (2000) emphasise on the quality 
of policies while Dalgaard et al (2002) draw attention to structural characteristics. 
These papers seem to suggest that other than promoting domestic savings and 
absorbing technology transfer, recipient economies should also try to change 
structural factors and quality of policies as aid alone is unlikely to ensure 
convergence. 
Another interesting point that emerges from this review of growth theories relates to 
a minimum requirement of aid. It would seem that aid disbursement is not the 
answer to poverty. Adequate aid finance is more likely to hold the key. What 
developing countries need is aid flows that are generous enough to give them the 
push needed to escape from low-equilibrium trap. Only then can these economies 
stand on their feet. This gives interesting insights to those who argue that aid has 
failed. If aid is unsuccessful in pulling countries out of the poverty trap then in some 
sense aid has failed. The beneficial effects are temporary and the recipient is no 
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closer to a self-sustainable position. Based on the theoretical review, it would seem 
that suspending aid, as some may argue for, would only exacerbate the situation. 
The appropriate solution would tend to be more generous aid flows. However, 
Lensink and White (200 I) conclusions contradict this observation. Careful thought 
should thus be given to validate their argument that too much aid can be harmful. 
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SELECTIVE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge about the effectiveness of aid is a matter of major interest to both donors 
and recipients. It provides important insights about how far aid is worthwhile. Also, 
informed donors are more likely to make better decisions about aid allocation. Of 
course, record of successful cases of aid are encouraging. That may be reason 
enough to incentivise donors to help today's low income nations. Nonetheless, 
donors are increasingly seeking information from empirical literature. 
First, we want to note that the definition of aid effectiveness is not an objective one. 
It is subject to the criteria against which aid impact is evaluated. Most commonly, 
when referring to the term aid effectiveness, the instinctive assumption is that it is an 
indicator of how helpful aid is in rendering performance of an economy more 
efficient in terms of per capita income growth rates. However, allocation of aid 
reflects multiple objectives. For instance, aid agencies have displayed much concern 
for reducing poverty in developing and underdeveloped countries. In this case, it 
would therefore be more appropriate to focus on how effective aid is in bringing 
about poverty reduction. Even if a recipient country has not performed well in terms 
of per capita income, aid will still be judged effective if it has succeeded in reducing 
infant mortality rates or brought improvements in some other poverty indicators. 
These alternative definitions of aid effectiveness are not entirely separate issues. 
Success in improving living standards may make further aid flows more growth 
inducing - for example, more skilled/healthy population will make aid more 
productive. Similarly, improvements in growth rates may increase national income 
and thereby help a country reduce poverty. 
Nevertheless, we here concentrate on the empirical literature that looks at the 
relationship between aid and growth for two main reasons. First, few studies 
examine aid effectiveness in reducing poverty (but see Section 3.4). This is in part 
owing to limited availability of data on poverty, especially time series data. Also, a 
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theoretical framework to examine this link is yet to be strong. Second, this collection 
of essays on aid effectiveness predominantly looks at growth rate as the objective. 
Empirical studies on aid effectiveness in promoting growth have undergone several 
rounds of development (See Hansen and Tarp (1999) for a detailed review). Early 
studies were mainly based on cross-country regressions within the Harrod-Domar 
growth framework. They concentrated on an aggregate foreign inflow indicator. 
Only in a few cases was aid treated as a separate source of finance. Corresponding to 
the development of Solow neo-classical and endogenous growth theory, there 
emerged a second and third generation of aid studies which allowed for aid as a 
separate explanatory variable. Also, the latter group of studies breaks new ground as 
it makes room for work using panel data and advanced econometric methods of 
estimation. For this reason, we here want to concentrate on studies belonging to the 
last generation of empirical work in aid literature. We make reference to a few 
prominent studies (Hadjimichael et al (1995), Boone (1996), Guillaumont and 
Chauvet (2001), Burnside and Dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Dalgaard-
Hans en-Tarp (2002)). From an analytical perspective, this generation of work have 
very commonly allowed for non-linearity, almost as a tradition, though the rationale 
for this approach differs across studies. The various explanations offered for this 
practice relate to diminishing returns, quality of policy, political regime, vulnerability 
to shocks and climatic conditions. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 elaborates on the 
numerous reasons that motivate non-linear aid effectiveness studies. An evaluation 
of some of the pertinent results in aid literature is provided in Section 3.3. We 
briefly comment on the empirical results regarding aid and poverty reduction in 
Section 3.4 before concluding with some final observations in Section 3.5. 
3.2 RATIONALES FOR NON-LINEARITY 
To our knowledge, the first paper that triggered the discussion of a non-linear 
relationship between aid and growth is by Hadjimichael et al (1995). Their argument 
is that aid may enhance growth unless the recipient country has surpassed the 
capacity of absorbing aid and using it productively. In other words, diminishing 
returns to aid is likely to set in at high levels of aid owing to limited absorptive 
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capacity of recipients. This notion, which is introduced as an aid squared term at the 
empirical level, is later formalised by Lensink and White (200 I). Reference is made 
to the concept of an aid Laffer curve. 
The impact of aid has subsequently often been recognised to be non-linear, though 
the motivating reasons are other than diminishing returns to aid. Often, this has 
been expressed in terms of an aid interaction term in the empirical literature. The 
papers we now mention are therefore similar in terms of the methodological 
approach to incorporate non-linearity in their model. 
Boone (1996) argues that public choice of how well aid funds are used is conditional 
on the type of political institution. He considers three distinct types of regimes: an 
elitist, egalitarian and laissez-faire government. Aid inflows allow the former two 
governments to increase transfers so they maximise welfare of the ruling coalition or 
a fixed group of citizens with low endowments respectively. The laissez-faire 
government uses aid to reduce tax distortions (and therefore encourage investment) 
by the same amount as the increase in their transfers. Hence, this framework predicts 
that as the government becomes more egalitarian, aid is transferred to the poor and 
can be more effective in promoting poverty reduction and capital accumulation 
(hence growth potentially). This gives rise to an interaction term between aid and a 
proxy for political regime. 
The work done by Burnside and Dollar (1997 and later revised in 2000, henceforth 
BD) has attracted substantial speculation. Consistent with Hadjimichael et al (1995) 
and other recent growth studies, BD do include a range of economic policy variables. 
However, they take one step forward by suggesting that aid effectiveness is not only 
enhanced but conditional on a good policy environment - hence the use of an aid-
policy interaction term. While other studies can support that aid works even in 
presence of less favourable policies, BD do not. The idea is that if recipient 
economies have poor policies, they tend to divert aid from growth-conducive 
projects to government consumption. 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) appreciate the step taken by BD to allow for a 
heterogenous response of growth to aid depending on specific features (in their case 
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policy) of the recipient country. However, they are not convinced that public 
management of funds provides unequivocal grounds for aid to work only in a good 
policy environment. Their concerns are twofold. First, even in the presence of 
fungibilty, the quality of aid-financed projects is superior owing to the transfer of 
knowledge through 'aid dialogue'. Second, they argue that the poorer the initial 
public allocation of resources, the more room for improvement by aid hence the 
higher would be its effectiveness. Instead, they propose an alternative factor that can 
potentially influence aid effect on growth. Their hypothesis is that aid is not only 
more in need in countries vulnerable to shocks (mainly external and exogenous) but 
also more effective in that environment. There is more scope for aid to improve the 
situation in vulnerable economies by dampening the negative effects of shocks on 
growth. They test this hypothesis by interacting aid with a vulnerability indicator. 
Recently, Dalg aard-Hans en-Tarp (2002) take a fresh look at the role of vulnerability 
in explainIDg non-linear effects of aid on growth. Their focus is on the geographical 
position or to be precise climate-related features that affect the extent to which aid 
can be effective. One of the possible explanations they identify as to why climate 
matters is linked to mortality rates. Drawing from Sachs (2001), they are inclined to 
believe that individuals in temperate climate zones live longer than those in non-
temperate climate zones (after income is controlled for). Hence, the high mortality 
rate in the latter environment limits the benefits to be derived by investing aid in 
human capital accumulation. On these grounds, the regression includes aid 
interacted with a measure for exposure to tropical climate. 
3.3 OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Motivated by these various rationales, each of the above papers allow for non-
linearity in studying the aid-growth link. Table 3.1 and 3.2 summarises their results l . 
Hadjimichael et al (1995) use a panel of 39 countries over the period 1986 to 1992. 
Boone (1996) employs a panel of 96 countries and ten-year averaged data over the 
period 1971 to 1990. Guillaumant and Chauvet (2001) construct two twelve-year 
averages for the 66 countries in their sample covering 1970 to 1993. Over the same 
period, BD paper is based on a panel of 55 countries and six four-year periods. 
1 We only present the aid coefficients from Boone (1996) as the coefficients on other regressors are 
not reported for all regressions in that paper. 
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Finally, Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp (2002) obtain data from BD to construct a panel of 
54 countries over five four-year epochs from 1974 to 1993. As can be noticed, all of 
these papers are based on post-1970 data and use a panel data approach. Not only 
does this increase their sample size but it also allows studying several countries over 
a long period of time. Period averages have been commonly computed in an attempt 
to reduce correlation and endogeneity concerns. 
In a generation where most obtain results in favour of aid, Boone (1996) concludes 
that aid is not effective. Aid enters with a significant positive sign in consumption 
regressions but not in investment regressions, as shown in Table 3.2. Boone (1996) 
interprets these findings as an indication that most of the aid in that period has fed 
consumption and thus had little impact on investment. Moreover, an insignificant 
response of investment to aid has been assumed to imply aid is not growth-
promoting. While this way of carrying over the results regarding effect of aid on 
investment to growth is quite natural, it should be noted that Boone (1996) has not 
explicitly examined the impact of aid on growth. Also, it is generally ignored that 
aid does have a significant effect on investment when the full sample is considered. 
These findings do not change when a differential impact of aid depending on type of 
political regime is allowed for. The interaction term between aid and type of regime 
enters with an insignificant coefficient and is robust across FE and IV estimates 
(using population, strategic interests and lagged aid alternatively as instruments for 
aid). In other words, contrary to their prior belief, the findings suggest that a liberal 
political regime does not use aid any differently from a repressive regime. 
The remaining papers all commonly agree on one point: aid works. Each paper is 
built on a model that explicitly specifies policy variables. It seems to be widely 
acknowledged that the quality of policies matters in determining aid effectiveness. 
However, it is less clear how to model the impact of aid and policies on growth. 
While BD is the first and only paper that contends that aid is significant only when 
interacted with policy which has an effect on its own as well. Others estimate aid 
contribution by allowing for both aid and policies to have an independent effect on 
growth. 
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Table 3.1 : Aid-Growth Regressions in Third Generation Studies 
Aid Variables 
Aid 
Aid2 
Aid *Political 
Aid*Policy 
Aid2 *Policy 
Aid *Tropics 
Aid *Vulnerability 
Policy Variables 
Budget 
Inflation 
Real Effective Exchange Rate 
(% change) 
Terms of Trade 
Financial Depth 
Policy Index 
Openness 
Government Consumption 
Investment Variables 
Private Investment / GDP 
Government Investment/ GDP 
Education 
Other Variables 
Political Instability 
Ethnic Fraction 
Assassinations 
Ethnfl< Assassination 
Institutional Quality 
Fraction ofland in tropics 
Hadjimichael et 
al(1995) 
0.098 (2.22) 
-0.002(2.57) 
-0.168 (4.61) 
-0.034 (1.94) 
-0.045(2.94) 
0.029 (1.99) 
0.014(0.53) 
0.178 (3.43) 
Burnside and 
Dollar (2000) 
0.49(0.12) 
0.20(0.09) 
-0.019(0.01) 
0.016(0.01) 
0.78(0.20) 
-0.42(0.73) 
-0.45(0.26) 
0.80(0.44) 
0.67(0.17) 
Guillawnont and 
Chauvet (2001) 
0.303 (0.003) 
-0.05 (0.004) 
0.043(0.027) 
2.66(0.003) 
-3.28(0.036) 
-1.109(0.211) 
Low Vulnerability 1.071(0.00) 
Dalgaard-
Hansen-Iarp 
(2002) 
1.480(3.61) 
-0.018(0.76) 
-1.402(3.29) 
0.047(l.23) 
-1.139(2.65) 
1.968(3.89) 
0.021(0.03) 
-0.365(1.46) 
0.725(1.66) 
0.701(3.64) 
-1.101(2.06) 
Observations 186 275 95 231 
Notes: Figures in brackets are absolute value of t-ratios except for BD and Guillaumont and 
Chauvet (2001) who report standard errors and p-values, respectively. Coefficients in bold are 
significant at least at 10% level. 
Source: Hadjimichael et al (1995, Table 25), BD (2000, Table 4), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001, 
Table 2) and Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp (2002, Table 2) 
Table 3.2: Summarised version of Boone's results 
Estimated Aid coefficients in 
Public & Private Investment Regression Iotal Conswnption 
Independent Variables include: 
No Political Regime Proxy 
Political Proxy * AIDGNP 
Note: I-statistics reported in parentheses. 
Source: Boone(1996, Tables 4 and 7) 
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0.030 (0.17) 
-0.055 (0.09) 
Regression 
1.016 (4.83) 
0.583 (0.81) 
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Hadjimichael et al (1995) obtain a significant negative coefficient on their innovative 
aid squared tenn, in support of their argument for diminishing returns to aid. This 
result has been robust across numerous studies. Likewise, BD attempts to break new 
grounds by constructing a policy index and incorporating an aid-policy interaction 
tenn in aid-growth regressions. The index2 , which is based on regression 
coefficients, is a composite measure of three economic policies - budget deficit, 
trade openness and inflation rate. This allows them to study the interaction between 
aid and economic policies without losing degrees of freedom which would result if 
each policy variable were interacted separately with aid. From Table 3.1, it can be 
seen that aid on its own enters with an insignificant coefficient (this holds in all the 
regressions they report) whilst a significant positive coefficient is obtained on the 
aid-policy interaction (though it turns insignificant in two out of the eight regressions 
it appears in). BD also include an interaction tenn between aid squared and policy 
which enters with a negative sign and is attributed to diminishing returns. In general, 
BD conclude that making aid systematically conditional on quality of policies IS 
likely to increase its effectiveness in developing nations. 
This result, which forms the basis of World Bank (1998) recommendations, has been 
subject to much controversy. There are two main concerns. First, it is quite unclear 
as to how to interpret an aid-policy interaction tenn. Does a positive coefficient 
suggest that policy makes aid effective or does it imply that aid makes policies more 
effective (through refonns for example)? Another interpretation issue is highlighted 
by Hansen and Tarp (1999: HT hereafter). They argue that an aid-squared and aid-
policy interaction tenn are likely to be proxy for each other. This is based on their 
assertion that a BD type policy index is made up of two components: 
policY=Kaid+(policy/aid), where the first part is correlated with aid as given by factor 
K and the second part is uncorrelated with aid. Appropriate substitution results in: 
aid*policy=Kaid2 + aid*(policy/aid). Hence, it would appear that a significant 
coefficient on aid-policy interaction tenn may simply be capturing the effect of an 
omitted aid-squared tenn. 
2 Policy Index = 1.3 - 1.4 inflation + 2.1 openness - 5.4 budget surplus w?er,e, the c o n s t ~ t t is the 
impact of all the omitted variables when they are at their mean value. The relIabIlIty of thiS mdex has 
been questioned by HT. 
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Second, BD results have yet to be regarded as robust. The aid-policy interaction 
term is insignificant in most of the regressions reported by Guillaumont and Chauyet 
(2001) and do not withstand the rigorous re-assessment by HT. Using almost the 
same data set
3 
and exact specification as BD, they find aid-policy interaction term to 
be insignificant unless five observations are excluded. Hence, it would appear that 
BD results rely heavily on these five observations which they deem as outliers (those 
observations with extreme residuals) but are more likely to be leverage points (those 
which have an above-average influence on the fitted value) according to Dalgaard 
and Hansen (2000). Of course, this distinction still allows them to delete these 
observations but it does not justify why they limit this deletion rule to aid variable 
only. Also, there are other observations with higher leverage points, as identified by 
Dalgaard and Hansen (2000), that are retained in the sample. BD conclusions are 
also sensitive to the estimation method used. Although, BD findings hold even 
where they endogenise aid and use 2SLS (population, infant mortality rate and arms 
imports as a share of total imports (proxy for donor's interest) are used as 
instruments, inspired by Boone (1996)), they disappear in the GMM estimates HT 
provide. Interestingly, aid squared is statistically significant in all HT regressions. 
Overall, results regarding aid squared tend to be robust while aid-policy does not. 
This might justify why aid squared now appears very commonly in aid-growth 
empirical models. It tends to be a rule rather than an exception in recent studies. 
The interaction terms included by Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) and Dalgaard-
Hansen-Tarp (2002) can be seen as being at an early stage of development. They 
mainly explore the hypothesis that vulnerability and climate exert some influence on 
how effective aid is in promoting growth. They both find evidence in support of 
their belief that aid is more effective in vulnerable and temperate climate zones. 
Their results are robust across estimation methods that account for endogeneity 
through instrumenting (and differencing for Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp (2002)). At the 
outset, these two papers would seem to be equivalent as they both focus on 
vulnerability of an economy as an influence on aid effectiveness. However, their 
3 BO used newly constructed data on foreign aid (EOA) where grant component of each c o n c e s s i o ~ a l l
loan is added to outright grants. Also, different measures of GOP have been used when expressmg 
aid, on one hand, and fiscal variables on the other, as ratios. HT in their turn choose to rely on GOA 
flows instead and they also treat the relevant variables relative to a common GOP measure - as 
provided in World Bank database. 
33 
CHAPTER 3: Selective Empirical Literature Review 
motivation for this focus is quite distinct from each other and this becomes clear as 
we take a closer look at their measure of vulnerability. Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp (2002) 
concentrate on climatic features and use fraction of land in tropics as an indicator. 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) compose an index, using same methodology as BD, 
made up of two components - climatic or ecological and trade shocks. Unlike 
Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp (2002), they use instability of agricultural value added 
(weighted by GDP) as a proxy for climatic shocks. Terms of trade and other trade 
related variables are used to measure trade shocks. The rationales in these two papers 
for a non-linear relationship between aid and growth are more like promising 
avenues for future research especially for Africa as its overall poor economic 
performance has been partly attributed to disadvantageous geography and heavy 
dependence on primary sector that makes it susceptible to shocks. 
3.4 NOTE ON EMPIRICS ON AID AND POVERTY 
Despite limited availability of data on poverty, there have been a few studies that 
concentrate on poverty reduction rather than growth as an objective of aid allocation. 
Boone (1996) makes some propositions regarding what mediates effect of aid on 
poverty. First, he recognises that capital market imperfection, which according to 
early literature imposes a limit on the number of profitable investment projects poor 
countries undertake, does not seem plausible in the light of recent high capital 
mobility. Second, he suggests that aid reduces poverty through fiscal policy. The 
planner compares the social cost of higher taxation to the benefits of more public 
goods in order to choose an optimal tax rate. As a result, proxies for political regime 
together with aid are included in poverty regressions. No significant results are 
however obtained. 
The role of public choices again becomes the central focus in Ranis et al (2000) as a 
mechanism to reduce poverty. The former conclude that high social public 
expenditure, especially through female education, improves human development. 
However, they use a restrictive definition of social expenditure and human 
development such that a more precise interpretation of their findings is that for e\'ery 
percentage point increase in share of GDP invested in education and health, life 
expectancy shortfall decreases by about 1.75 % points. An interesting feature of 
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their paper is that they attempt to show how improvement in human development is 
good for growth. They find significant estimates indicating the beneficial effects of 
both literacy rate and life expectancy on growth. Dollar and Kraay (2001) is yet 
another paper that looks at how faster growth benefits quality of life of the poor. 
Evidence in support of positive effect of health and education on poverty is again 
obtained in Verschoor (2002). Kalwij and Verschoor (2002) extend this analysis by 
looking at a wider definition of public social expenditure that includes spending on 
health, education, housing, social security among several others. Also, they use both 
monetary and non-monetary poverty indicators. Most importantly however, they 
include an aid measure in poverty regressions. Surprisingly, their estimates suggest 
that on their own aid and social expenditure are associated with higher poverty. 
However, in accordance to their hypothesis, they find that both aid and social 
spending increases the elasticity of poverty to growth. It would appear that growth 
can mediate effects of aid on poverty level. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
This brief survey of the empirical literature in aid studies consistently emphasise the 
importance of accounting for policy environment, though the nature of its interaction 
with aid is an unresolved issue. Equally important seems to be the issue of non-
linearity which is a recurring theme in addressing the relationship between aid and 
growth. We limit attention to these studies to highlight the issues to be addressed in 
our empirical analysis (Chapters 5-8) 
Notice that a dummy for SSA is significant in BD as well as in the broad aid 
literature. Ethnic fractionalisation and assassination which are quite predominant 
characteristics of this region have also been very consistently used in the empirical 
literature in the hope to account for some of the features specific to SSA. It would 
appear that there is empirical evidence suggesting that SSA is a region that warrants 
a case study. The fact that it has been receiving a large share of foreign aid, as we 
show in the following chapter, makes such a focussed study of more value. 
Based on growth theory discussed ill preVIOUS chapter, we identify 
investment/savings as an important transmission mechanism for aid to impact on 
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growth. Note however, not much effort has been devoted to explore these indirect 
effects. In fact, only one of the papers reviewed here includes an investment variable 
in their model. In general, investment does not appear as an explanatory variable in 
most papers in aid literature. Rather, aid is used as a proxy for investment - an 
approach that creates problems of its own (we elaborate on these issues in Chapter 
5). In this volume, we want to explore these indirect mechanisms and pay particular 
attention to their treatment in aid literature. 
Overall, evidence supports aid effectiveness. This is in contrast to earlier generations 
of aid studies. Estimated coefficients on aid were insignificant, negative and 
positive. Recent work has the merit of not only nearing consensus but also attempts 
to identify factors that affect how effective aid is, policies being only one of them. 
Interestingly, research is now demonstrating how the objectives of aid with respect to 
higher growth and poverty reduction are not as distinct as it may first seem, although 
theoretical justification for this link is yet to be developed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS: 
DEFINITIONS AND TRENDS IN CAPITAL FLOWS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In general, developing countries are unable to generate sufficient resources to fuel 
their aspirations for economic growth. They have historically sought finance from 
other countries to supplement domestic savings. Foreign capital has flown in 
recipient economies in more than just one form. Each category has very distinctive 
features. In an empirical study of effectiveness of capital flows, there are therefore 
two issues that arise: which type of capital flow is relevant and how to measure it? 
We here want to give an overview of the range of capital flows and make some 
observations on the recent trends. For this purpose, we use data from the OECD 
Development Assistance Committee (DAC) which is widely recognised to offer the 
most comprehensive and internationally comparable data on financial flows. We look 
at how various types of capital flows have evolved over 1970 to 1997 both at world 
level as well as for Africa. In the process, we pay particular attention to SSA 
countries as this is the sample under study in the next chapter. This exercise 
identifies the type of foreign transfers of more relevance to SSA economies, 
strengthening the case to concentrate exclusively on foreign aid when studying the 
effect of capital flows in developing economies. 
Importance of foreign aid can be captured in numerous ways and this can affect the 
probability of getting a significant or insignificant coefficient on aid. Choosing an 
appropriate aid measure is consequently of crucial value. We here highlight the need 
to construct an aid measure tailored to capture its effects on growth. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 offers a brief oven'ie\\' of 
alternative forms of foreign savings and highlight their distinctive characteristics. 
We look at the evolution of each type of capital flow at global and regional level in 
Section 4.3. In Section 4.4 and 4.5, we address questions with regards to where does 
aid come from and where does it go. The motivation behind the aid measure we 
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construct, that will form the basis of the empmcal work in the following chapter, is 
presented in Section 4.6 (Appendix 4 provides the constructed data). Finally, Section 
4. 7 summarises this chapter. 
4.2 DEFINITIONS 
Foreign flows can be decomposed into two components: private and official. Private 
transfers comprise transactions undertaken by individual entrepreneurs, whilst 
official flows involve the government. We look at each of these two categories in 
tum. Figure 4.1 summarises the different types of capital flows that fall under these 
two headings. 
FIGURE 4.1: Types of Capital Flows 
FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOWS 
I 
I 
Private Flows 
I 
FDI Portfolio Commercial Export 
Investment Bank 
Lending 
Credits l 
Official Flows 
I 
Concessional N on-Concessional 
(Foreign Aid) 
Capital 
Assistance 
I 
Technical 
Assistance 
Official foreign transfers is partly made available on concessional terms. They are 
issued either as grants which are outright gifts or as 'soft loans'. There are two ways 
in which the concessionality or 'softness' of a loan can be measured. First, in terms 
of the benefits accruing to the recipient as a result of the difference between the 
interest charged by donors and prevailing rate in the private international capital 
I Export credits may be extended by official and private sector. If extended by private sector, they 
tend to be supported by official guarantees (GEeD 1999). 
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market. Second, the opportunity cost to donor as given by the expected returns on 
the next best way of investing that capital is an alternative indicator. The latter 
approach is employed by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
Technically, concessional flows are referred to as official development assistance 
(ODA) but more popularly known as foreign aid. A formal definition of aid would 
be resource flow ' ... to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by 
official agencies ... administered with the promotion of economic development and 
welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and it is concessional in 
character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent' (DAC, 1985, pp. 
171). Other official flows (OOF) include those transfers whose main objective is 
other than development or if development-motivated are on commercial tenus, 
known as 'hard loans'. 
We now tum to foreign private flows. They consist of four elements. Foreign direct 
investment (FDI) , which is becoming popular, is made by non-residents in the 
enterprises located in host countries. The large amounts of finance, management 
expertise, new technology and access to world markets are the features which make 
this type of capital transfers attractive. FDI implies either full or partial management 
control by foreign entrepreneurs. On the other hand, portfolio investments which 
refer to the purchase of host country bonds by foreigners, have no implications on 
managerial control. Two other sources of private capital flows are commercial bank 
lending and export credits. 
4.3 TRENDS IN CAPITAL FLOWS 
The trend in total net receipts flows in the period 1970 to 1997 is depicted in 
Figure 4.2 At the global level, the observed trend in net resource flows may be 
classified into three distinct episodes. During the 1970s and beginning of 1980s, 
there have been extensive capital flows from both multilateral and bilateral sources. 
The two oil price shocks during this period created a temporary surge in savings in 
oil-producing countries. These surplus funds contributed to the massive increase in 
resource flows from US$ 15171.6 millions in 1970 to reach its peak, US$ 98931.6 
millions in 1981. The first half of 1980s (post 1981) can be recorded as a second 
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FIGURE 4.2: Nominal Total Net Receipt Flows 
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period where aggregate net receipts plunged to US$ 45895.4 millions in 1985, 
corresponding to an approximately 53.6 % decline from 1981 values. This downfall 
in foreign resource flows has been associated with the debt crisis which hit the 
world in early 1980s. Anti-inflationary macroeconomic policies in industrial 
countries led to a rapid increase in nominal interest rates. At the same time, falling 
oil prices drained the savings surplus in oil-exporting countries. The combination of 
rising debt service and cuts in lending led to the observed reversal of net resources 
flows, both in real and nominal terms, during this period. The final stage is marked 
by the end of the international debt crisis. Aggregate net resource flows re-embarked 
on an increasing trend and by early 1990s they surpassed the nominal pre-debt crisis 
peak level in 1981. What is interesting to observe is that the flow of nominal net 
total receipts to African countries displays a fairly smooth increasing trend 
throughout the period. Inflow of foreign savings to this region did experience a 
decline in the debt crisis period but the effect was not as dramatic as at the world 
level. This is not surprising given that Latin America was the most importantly 
affected economy by this event. 
We now focus separately on the different types of (nominal) net resource flows. 
Figure 4.3 and 4.4 give a visual presentation of the trends in the period 1970 to 1997. 
Table 4.1 provides additional information. 
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Table 4.1: Trends in nominal capital flows (in US$ millions) 
WORLD SSA 
1970 1997 1970 1997 
(A)OFFICIAL FLOWS 
Concessional : 
• aDA Grants 4098.5 40968.4 871.2 11886.8 
-Multilateral Donors 667.7 9550.4 230.5 3409.5 
-DAC Donors 3068.1 31192.6 640.8 8468.7 
• aDA Net Loans 2710.3 9162.4 281.9 3163 
N on-concessional: 
• Other Official Flows (Net) 1762.3 17228.1 80.1 -218.3 
TOTAL OFFICIAL FLOWS (NET) 8628.4 67540.5 1233.3 14848.2 
(B) PRIVATE FLOWS 
• FDI 9205.8 442131.9 427.5 7734.1 
• Portfolio Equity Investment 1510 
TOTAL RECEIPTS 15171.6 203341.9 1680.4 21747.6 
Source: OEeD (1999) 
As Table 4.1 shows foreign direct investment (FDI) , the major category of foreign 
private investment, has been expanding in spite of very short periods of decline in 
late 1970 and early 1980 and 19902 . In fact, an impressive rise in FDI has been 
witnessed towards the end of the century. However, it seems that this burst in FDI 
flows has not been especially directed to SSA countries, although they did receive a 
share of the rising FDI. In fact, as shown in Table 4.1, while at world level FDI was 
48 times higher in 1997 than in 1970, for SSA countries FDI increased by about 18 
times only. This recent surge in FDI can be explained by the fact that official 
lending has recently helped developing host countries with the implementation of 
2 We do not plot the time series ofFDI in Figure 4.3 because the overwhelming increase would 
graphically swamp the trend in other capital flows. 
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structural and stabilisation projects, thereby improving the potential for profitable 
FDI. Portfolio equity investment is another form of foreign private saving. This was 
a very important form of supplementary saving in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century but it dropped in the post World War II period. However, developed country 
investors are nowadays showing interest in emerging stock markets. SSA countries 
have attracted about US$ 1510 millions of portfolio equity investment in 1997. 
CHAPTER 4: Preliminary Data Analysis: Definitions and Trends in Capital F70H'S 
though the main source of private savings remains FDI, about US$ 7734.1 millions 
in 1997. 
From Figures 4.3 and 4.4, it can also be noticed that in contrast to FDI, the 1990s is 
characterised by a mild declining trend in (net) total official flows. SSA countries 
seem to be experiencing an especially sharp reduction in official flows. On 
aggregate, there has been about 7.2% decrease in official flows between 1994 and 
1997. However, this corresponds to an important 25.2% decline for the SSA 
countries in nominal terms (even more in real terms). The data series therefore tend 
to suggest that the last decade may be signalling a preference for private transfers 
over official transfers from donors' point of view. In fact, whilst the share of official 
flows in total net receipts was about 56.9% in 1970, it dropped to 33.2% in 1997, at 
the global level. The time series graph also reveals that although FDI has generally 
been more important than official flows globally, SSA countries have relied more 
heavily on official foreign transfers throughout the period 1970 to 1997. Its official 
transfers as a share of net total receipts was about 73.4% in 1970 and in spite of the 
sharp decline at the global level in 1997, it still remains an important source of 
foreign resources, at about 68.3%. 
Having identified official transfers as the vital source of foreign resources in SSA 
countries, we now take a closer look at the trends in its different components, as 
identified in Figure 4.1. It can be seen from Table 4.1 that concessional foreign 
resources represent a substantial share of total official flows - in 1970, it accounts for 
about 78.9 % of aggregate net official flows at the world level and nearly 93% for 
SSA countries. In the period 1970 to 1997, though concessional flows continue to 
dominate net official flows, its share has reduced by about 5% at the world level. 
This however is not reflected in SSA countries where this ratio increased (by about 
8%) over the same period. This suggests that foreign aid flows may be 
disproportionately allocated to SSA countries. Furthermore, as one can notice, aDA 
grants seem to be the most important element of foreign aid. They accounted for 
60.2% and 75.6% of net aDA (sum of grants and aDA net loans) flows in the \vorld 
and SSA countries, respectively, in 1970. In 1997, their share in foreign aid 
respectively increased to 81.7% and 79%. 
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Drawing from Figures 4.3 and 4.4, we can also make some observations on the trend 
in ODA grants and net loans during the past three decades. The latter displays a 
reasonably smooth pattern whilst sharper fluctuations have been experienced with 
regards to grant allocations. After the end of the debt crisis, ODA grants resumed its 
increasing path to reach its peak in 1990 amounting to US$ 14509.5 millions. 
However, subsequent years have been characterised by a declining trend, both in 
nominal and real terms. ODA grants and net loans in SSA countries fell by about 
US$ 2.62 billions and US$ 0.25 billions or 18.1 % and 7.4% in nominal terms 
between 1990 and 1997. This is equivalent to a 62.5% and 57.7% decline in real 
terms
3
. At the aggregate level, there was a decrease of only 9.5% and 28.2% in 
nominal terms, corresponding to 54% and 63.6% decline in real terms. It would 
therefore seem that SSA countries have suffered more sharply from this decline, as 
opposed to the debt crisis period when they were almost unaffected. One is led to 
believe that aid flows will decrease further in real terms, perhaps substantially, over 
the next decade. O'Connell and Soludo (1999) cite 'continued absence (since the 
late 1980s) of the traditional strategic and ideological props to bilateral aid, the 
cumulative effects of fiscal stringency in the donor countries, the deepening 
recession in Japan, and the resource pulls exerted by the transition economies and the 
Asian financial crisis' as possible reasons (pg 2). However, Department For 
International Development has recently been taking actions to concentrate on helping 
both African and Asian countries, an example which the United Nations is 
encouraging others to follow. This suggests that aid to SSA will rise. 
4.4 WHO ARE THE DONORS? 
Depending on its source, foreign aid can either be bilateral (given directly from one 
government to the other) or multilateral (from an international agency which collects 
contributions from member countries). Table 4.1 conveys some indication on this 
aspect as well. A substantial share of grants has been disbursed by members of 
DAC. They contributed to about 74.9% and 73.6 % of total ODA grants flowing 
across the world and to SSA region only, in 1970. Though this share slightly declines 
in 1997 for SSA countries, DAC remains the main donor. On the other hand, 
multilateral agencies increased their share in total grant disbursement between 1970 
and 1997. Nevertheless, they still represent only about one fifth of globally available 
3 We use consumer price index (1995=100) to deflate the nominal flows. 
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ODA grants. It would seem that multilateral agencies are taking initiatives to be a 
more important supplier of foreign aid. 
Given the significant contribution of DAC members to foreign aid flows in SSA 
countries, we take a closer look at this group of donors. Figure 4.5 and 4.6 
demonstrate the individual contributions of member countries. In the early post-war 
period, the United States, the United Kingdom and France were the most important 
contributors. As the other industrial countries recovered, they became more 
generous (most particularly, Japan) and coordinated their aid disbursement programs 
through the DAC. While DAC has 21 members, it should be noted that 64% of aid 
flows in 1997 is accounted for by four countries: the United States (16%), Japan 
(21 %), Germany (12%) and France (15%) (Figure 4.5). The United Kingdom has 
become a less important donor with a share of 6% of foreign aid flows. From 
Figure 4.6, we observe that in spite of being the dominant DAC donor of foreign aid, 
Japan becomes less important in SSA countries by contributing to only a 10% share 
of ODA flows. On the other hand, it would seem that aid flows from France are 
concentrated in this region, amounting to about 25% of aid disbursements from DAC 
countries. This however represents only 0.16% of its GDP in 1997 and its aid efforts 
have decreased from 1970 when it dispensed 0.20% of its GDP as aid flows to SSA 
countries. The importance of France as a donor seems to be consistent with the 
belief that its colonial past plays a significant role in aid allocation decisions. In fact, 
Alesina and Dollar (2000) find that being an ex-colony is relatively more important 
than political freedom and openness of an economy. In the same paper, they also find 
that the United States and the United Kingdom strongly respond to degree of 
democracy. This may partly explain why the share of foreign aid from United States 
to SSA countries amounts to only 10% (strategic interests might be a more important 
alternative explanation). It also sheds some light as to why in contrast to France, the 
United Kingdom disburses only 8% of the aid flows to SSA countries, despite they 
both had 18 past colonies in that area. This has however changed since 1997 - UK is 
now as impOliant a DAC donor as France and Germany, also about 55% of British 
bilateral aid is to SSA. 
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FIGURE 4.5: Foreign Aid Flows from DAC donors to All Recipients in 1997 
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FIGURE 4.6: Foreign Aid Flows from DAC Donors to SSA countries in 1997 
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4.5 WHO ARE THE RECIPIENTS? 
The need for aid varies across recipients . At one end of the spectrum are the newly 
industrialised and upper middle income countries which can also borrow from 
international capital markets at the prevailing rate. Such countries may need some 
technical assistance. At the other end are the poorest developing countries which 
need aid to survive. They lack the basic infrastructures needed for development. In 
between these two types lie the lower middle income country who have the basic 
requirements for development but need access to official assistance to complement 
them. The bar chart in Figure 4.7 provides some information on the distribution of 
foreign aid across different regional recipients . 
FIGURE 4.7: Regional Distribution of Foreign Aid Flows 
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First we find that the disbursement of net ODA flows increased successively from , 
1970 to 1980 and 1990 both at the global and regional level. The only exception is 
Middle East countries who experienced a decline in aid flo ws from 1980 to 1990. In 
contrast, all regions received less aid flows in 1997, although America witnessed a 
slight mcrease (exclusively to South America) . Figw'e 4.7 shows that Africa and Asia 
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received the largest shares of aid flows throughout the last three decades. Prior to 
1990, donors favoured Asia in allocating foreign aid resources. However, by 1997 
they have started to direct larger share of disbursement to Africa and most especially 
to SSA countries. One possible explanation is that the success of some Asian 
countries may have reduced their need for aid in the period covered here. 
In general, our discussion has shown that SSA countries receive a large share of aid 
flows to African countries. It is however worth noting that there are major 
systematic variations within this group. There (understandably) seems to be a strong 
tendency for low income countries to receive more aid flows than middle income 
countries, both in absolute terms and as a fraction of GNP. Whilst for the middle 
income countries aid flows averaged less than 1 % of their GNP in 1997, low income 
countries received an average of 9%. This suggests that donors are inclined to issue 
concessional aid in favour of the poorest countries, other things being equal. Aid 
studies often tend to believe that donors show a preference for less populous nations 
as recipients (Burnside and Dollar, 2000:850). Consistent to their belief, we notice 
that though both Rwanda (less populous) and Senegal are in the low income group, 
they respectively received US$ 63 and US$ 30.2 aid per capita in 1997. However, 
aid per capita was US$ 49.4 in Madagascar, in spite of its larger population than 
Senegal4 . Consequently, we cannot clearly identify population as a criterion for aid 
allocation. 
4.6 AID MEASURES 
Based on this examination of trends in capital flows, we find that foreign aid is the 
most important component of foreign savings, especially in African countries. This 
lends further justification to our focus here on foreign aid when studying the effect of 
capital inflows in SSA countries. Note that, for the purpose of estimating growth 
regressions, we shall use disbursement flows rather than commitments. Commitment 
is just the promised flow whilst disbursement represents the actual transfer of 
financial flows. The difference between these two flows can be either positive or 
negative. For example, in 1987 grant disbursed to Botswana outweighed grant 
commitment, whilst in 1988, the reverse occurred. 
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It can be seen from Table 4.2 that throughout 1970 to 1997, SSA countries have 
received over half the share of ODA grants and net loans directed to African 
countries. It is worth noting that a general measure of net ODA (sum of ODA grants 
and net loans) has one important limitation. It includes technical cooperation (TC) 
grants. These comprise flows in kind which essentially involve supply of human 
resources financed by the donor. There is some debate over its inclusion in 
calculation of foreign aid owing to some doubt over its developmental value. A close 
inspection of Table 4.2 shows that large amounts of grants are directed to technical 
cooperation 
Table 4.2: Computation of Foreign Aid Measure 
1970 1980 1990 1997 
SSA 010 a SSA 0/0 a SSA 0/0 a SSA 
ODA Grants 871.2 66.8 5355 84.5 14509.5 68.7 11886.8 
ODA Net Loans 281.9 71.9 2171.9 53.3 3416.2 76.5 3163 
AID (Net ODA) 1153.1 68 7526.9 72.3 17925.7 70 15049.8 
Technical 507.1 76.6 2240.5 80.1 3960.6 71.2 4021.7 
Cooperation (58.2) (41.8) (27.3) (33.8) (% of ODA Grants) 
Food Aid 490 58.9 732.9 60.5 445.6 
(% ofODA Grants) (9.2) (5.1) (3.8) 
TAID 646 62.5 4796.4 70.7 13232.2 70.3 10582.5 
(%ofGNP) (1.15) (2.02) (4.71) (3.21) 
Per Capita 2.24 12.6 26.0 17.3 
a Percentage offlows to Africa allocated to SSA countries. 
T AID is equal to net ODA minus technical cooperation minus food aid. All values are expressed in 
millions ofUS$. 
In absolute terms TC to SSA countries has increased between 1970 and 1997 from 
US$ 507.1 millions to US$ 4021.7 millions. Our objective is to determine the 
effectiveness of foreign aid in promoting growth, we therefore want a measure of 
financial flows that, in principle, makes a measurable contribution to growth 
(effective TC may build institutional capacity and contribute to human capital but it 
would take some time for this to translate into growth). Hence, we deduct TC grants 
from net ODA. The large share of TC in ODA grants suggests that their inclusion in 
our measure of aid flows creates an upward bias. In the study of growth regressions, 
the aid measure should preferably also exclude food aid as this contributes to 
4The reliability of population as an instrument for aid in empirical work may be questionable. 
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consumption rather than to growth (see Appendix 4 for aid data). Failure to deduct 
food aid grants will again inflate the aid measure and thereby increase the probability 
of obtaining an insignificant coefficient or bias the coefficient. Food aid would be of 
more relevance when assessing effectiveness of aid in enhancing welfare - an issue 
we shall explore at a later stage (Chapter 8). 
Analysing the efficiency of aid flows requires a measure of the importance of foreign 
aid in each recipient country rather than simply aid volume. Two alternative ways to 
capture this feature are aid per capita and aid as a share of GNP. The latter measures 
the real value of aid resources available to a country. We can notice from Table 4.2 
that both measures indicate an increase in aid intensity in the last three decades 
before a decline in 1997. In spite of this recent downfall, aid is still more important 
than in 1970 and 1980. Also, aid in per capita terms points to a much higher degree 
of aid dependence than indicated by aid as a ratio of GNP. The choice of indicators 
is therefore critical. In our study, we choose to rely on aid as a percentage of GNP 
for the following reasons. First, it is inherent in the notion of aid per capita that 
foreign aid resources are distributed equally among residents. With regards to the 
increasing levels of inequality, this measure would not adequately reflect the true 
picture. Second, donors issue aid to governments who then invest in projects which 
should benefit the population as a whole. Aid is unlikely to be invested based on 
how much is available per head. Third, aid per capita may reflect changes in 
population with aid flows constant, rather than changes in aid itself. Though, aid 
share in GNP suffers from the same limitation, it has got the merit of defining 
importance of aid relative to an indicator of overall economic performance rather 
than the demographic features. Consequently, this definition of aid seems more 
appropriate given that we aim to assess effectiveness of aid in promoting economic 
development. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
In this chapter, we have provided a general outlook on the various forms in which 
international capital flows to a recipient country. They range from official to private, 
concessional to non-concessional and bilateral to multilateral. We describe each of 
these aspects before drawing observations on the recent trends. 
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Several facts emerge from this preliminary data analysis. First, we notice that 
despite the declining tendency of official flows, overall capital flows are on the 
increase both at global and regional (Africa) level. This is mainly attributed to a 
surge in FDI. That might be indicative to an improvement in world environment 
such that it is conducive to profitable FDI projects. We also find (as one could 
expect) that Africa, especially SSA economies, compares favourably to other regions 
in terms of aid receipts. This lends support to the emphasis on SSA as a region and 
foreign aid as a source of capital inflow for our empirical study in the next chapter. 
Finally, this exercise sheds some light as to where does most of the aid comes from. 
United States, Japan and France are the main donors. Aid effectiveness studies that 
would give consideration to donor-specific cases may be insightful. Related to this 
issue would be donor interests. Developed countries disburse aid for a whole 
spectrum of reasons that includes moral and humanitarian aspirations as well as 
motives like ties with ex-colonies, commercial benefit, military and strategic 
advantage among others. No single motive is however paramount at all times. 
Rather, donors have mixed objectives. Donor-specific aid effectiveness studies 
would help find out more about a possible linkage between source (and possibly 
objective) of aid and its chances to be successful. This provides scope for future 
research. 
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APPENDIX 4: DATA 
Table 4A: Aid Data (expressed as a % of GNP) 
COUNTRY YEAR AID GRANTS TAID 
Benin 1970173 7.280 6.237 4.516 
Benin 1974177 8.831 5.912 5.885 
Benin 1978/81 8.333 6.305 6.046 
Benin 1982/85 7.789 4.963 5.207 
Benin 1986/89 11.704 7.884 8.573 
Benin 1990/93 14.145 9.841 11.263 
Benin 1994/97 14.014 10.144 10.532 
Botswana 1970173 20.615 9.819 16.469 
Botswana 1974177 15.850 11.015 11.040 
Botswana 1978/81 15.514 16.428 9.307 
Botswana 1982/85 10.032 9.048 6.126 
Botswana 1986/89 10.506 9.701 6.445 
Botswana 1990/93 4.020 3.689 2.224 
Botswana 1994/97 2.177 1.821 1.098 
Burkina Faso 1970173 9.279 9.069 6.235 
Burkina Faso 1974177 14.864 11.879 10.025 
Burkina Faso 1978/81 15.986 13.850 10.848 
Burkina Faso 1982/85 13.065 10.378 8.366 
Burkina Faso 1986/89 12.897 9.939 8.405 
Burkina Faso 1990/93 15.345 12.026 10.711 
Burkina Faso 1994/97 18.957 15.012 13.886 
Burundi 1970173 9.105 8.923 4.054 
Burundi 1974177 10.846 10.178 5.492 
Burundi 1978/81 13.039 9.701 8.048 
Burundi 1982/85 12.442 7.879 8.356 
Burundi 1986/89 16.757 8.876 12.270 
Burundi 1990/93 24.180 18.098 17.926 
Burundi 1994/97 24.135 23.005 20.185 
Cameroon 1970173 4.588 3.743 2.811 
Cameroon 1974177 4.672 2.905 2.902 
Cameroon 1978/81 4.111 1.696 2.914 
Cameroon 1982/85 2.049 1.202 1.294 
Cameroon 1986/89 2.711 1.896 1.730 
Cameroon 1990/93 5.291 3.283 4.091 
Cameroon 1994/97 6.612 4.362 5.206 
Central Africa 1970173 9.617 9.640 4.738 
Central Africa 1974177 12.061 11.211 7.271 
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Central Africa 1978/81 12.535 10.119 7.935 
Central Africa 1982/85 14.427 10.315 9.864 
Central Africa 1986/89 18.402 11.304 13.208 
Central Africa 1990/93 15.863 11.413 11.389 
Central Africa 1994/97 14.942 13.914 10.854 
Chad 1970173 8.557 8.822 4.772 
Chad 1974177 12.639 10.290 8.737 
Chad 1978/81 10.844 9.329 8.029 
Chad 1982/85 15.985 15.338 12.546 
Chad 1986/89 25.283 19.865 19.343 
Chad 1990/93 22.629 16.042 16.881 
Chad 1994/97 22.786 16.298 17.557 
Congo Dem 1970173 2.785 2.471 1.359 
Congo Dem 1974177 3.066 2.358 1.559 
Congo Dem 1978/81 3.731 2.393 2.222 
Congo Dem 1982/85 3.197 2.009 2.038 
Congo Dem 1986/89 7.271 3.630 5.262 
Congo Dem 1990/93 5.651 4.407 4.416 
Congo Dem 1994/97 3.171 3.378 2.305 
Congo Rep 1970173 5.849 6.020 2.539 
Congo Rep 1974177 7.816 5.589 4.582 
Congo Rep 1978/81 7.425 4.668 4.673 
Congo Rep 1982/85 4.227 2.505 2.737 
Congo Rep 1986/89 5.678 2.869 3.550 
Congo Rep 1990/93 6.165 3.946 4.177 
Congo Rep 1994/97 17.288 13.662 15.088 
Cote D'Ivoire 1970173 3.233 2.633 1.649 
Cote D'Ivoire 1974177 2.715 1.991 1.287 
Cote D'Ivoire 1978/81 1.903 1.154 0.970 
Cote D'Ivoire 1982/85 1.866 1.020 1.015 
Cote D'Ivoire 1986/89 3.435 2.329 2.476 
Cote D'Ivoire 1990/93 8.335 4.205 6.798 
Cote D'Ivoire 1994/97 12.782 7.108 11.473 
Ethiopia 1970173 2.453 1.467 1.178 
Ethiopia 1974177 4.427 2.692 3.246 
Ethiopia 1978/81 4.746 3.414 3.720 
Ethiopia 1982/85 8.457 6.722 6.726 
Ethiopia 1986/89 13.034 10.769 9.882 
Ethiopia 1990/93 16.047 13.185 12.922 
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Ethiopia 1994/97 14.500 10.877 11.697 
Gabon 1970173 2.463 2.070 1.634 
Gabon 1974177 1.159 0.952 0.554 
Gabon 1978/81 1.272 0.959 0.438 
Gabon 1982/85 1.843 1.510 1.055 
Gabon 1986/89 3.111 1.700 1.990 
Gabon 1990/93 2.526 1.762 1.596 
Gabon 1994/97 2.941 3.213 1.945 
Gambia 1970173 6.787 4.702 4.580 
Gambia 1974177 9.772 6.789 7.363 
Gambia 1978/81 23.798 15.706 18.572 
Gambia 1982/85 25.163 20.083 16.469 
Gambia 1986/89 60.320 44.199 43.961 
Gambia 1990/93 30.203 21.412 22.084 
Gambia 1994/97 13.801 11.481 8.099 
Ghana 1970173 2.309 0.966 1.631 
Ghana 1974177 2.837 1.452 1.942 
Ghana 1978/81 3.780 1.692 2.807 
Ghana 1982/85 3.767 2.146 3.061 
Ghana 1986/89 9.489 3.760 8.549 
Ghana 1990/93 10.953 7.017 9.549 
Ghana 1994/97 10.340 5.250 8.634 
Kenya 1970173 3.739 2.586 1.875 
Kenya 1974177 4.323 2.908 2.456 
Kenya 1978/81 5.803 3.792 3.997 
Kenya 1982/85 6.583 4.348 4.742 
Kenya 1986/89 9.163 5.966 7.013 
Kenya 1990/93 13.394 10.057 9.955 
Kenya 1994/97 7.480 5.203 5.162 
Lesotho 1970173 10.968 11.103 8.369 
Lesotho 1974177 9.825 8.578 6.582 
Lesotho 1978/81 13.475 11.777 9.053 
Lesotho 1982/85 13.613 11.191 8.981 
Lesotho 1986/89 17.006 13.768 10.213 
Lesotho 1990/93 12.598 9.494 8.635 
Lesotho 1994/97 9.042 6.742 6.225 
Madagascar 1970173 5.086 5.028 2.818 
Madagascar 1974177 4.018 3.072 2.379 
Madagascar 1978/81 6.348 2.997 4.860 
Madagascar 1982/85 5.983 2.738 4.753 
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Madagascar 1986/89 11.691 5.986 9.383 
Madagascar 1990/93 14.023 12.117 10.913 
Madagascar 1994/97 13.422 11.752 9.862 
Malawi 1970173 9.501 4.571 6.637 
Malawi 1974177 9.479 3.808 6.919 
Malawi 1978/81 12.454 10.115 9.396 
Malawi 1982/85 10.770 6.235 7.801 
Malawi 1986/89 24.797 16.918 18.616 
Malawi 1990/93 28.126 19.767 21.814 
Malawi 1994/97 29.237 19.308 23.798 
Mali 1970173 9.401 8.862 6.872 
Mali 1974177 15.772 12.432 12.747 
Mali 1978/81 14.668 11.428 10.858 
Mali 1982/85 23.520 13.983 18.703 
Mali 1986/89 23.559 15.660 18.288 
Mali 1990/93 17.149 12.409 12.445 
Mali 1994/97 21.065 15.100 15.474 
Mauritania 1970173 7.034 5.802 4.547 
Mauritania 1974177 29.316 20.723 26.524 
Mauritania 1978/81 31.645 19.589 27.454 
Mauritania 1982/85 25.407 15.632 20.848 
Mauritania 1986/89 25.776 16.574 20.191 
Mauritania 1990/93 25.277 17.353 19.983 
Mauritania 1994/97 24.812 19.297 20.056 
Mauritius 1970173 3.456 2.654 2.451 
Mauritius 1974177 3.593 2.510 2.610 
Mauritius 1978/81 3.774 2.045 2.795 
Mauritius 1982/85 3.249 2.008 2.417 
Mauritius 1986/89 3.568 2.272 2.442 
Mauritius 1990/93 2.109 1.319 1.371 
Mauritius 1994/97 0.607 0.967 0.023 
Niger 1970173 6.734 5.688 4.875 
Niger 1974177 11.872 9.763 9.272 
Niger 1978/81 8.530 7.092 6.048 
Niger 1982/85 12.861 10.424 9.037 
Niger 1986/89 17.726 12.774 12.861 
Niger 1990/93 16.137 14.679 10.953 
Niger 1994/97 17.602 16.490 12.203 
Nigeria 1970173 0.898 0.575 0.558 
Nigeria 1974/77 0.211 0.144 0.093 
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Nigeria 1978/81 0.057 0.073 
-0.009 
Nigeria 1982/85 0.042 0.052 
-0.005 
Nigeria 1986/89 0.467 0.320 0.300 
Nigeria 1990/93 0.930 0.707 0.590 
Nigeria 1994/97 0.698 0.398 0.408 
Rwanda 1970173 11.899 11.607 5.612 
Rwanda 1974177 16.222 13.685 9.501 
Rwanda 1978/81 12.950 10.810 8.463 
Rwanda 1982/85 10.429 8.106 6.838 
Rwanda 1986/89 11.288 8.050 7.414 
Rwanda 1990/93 18.199 14.516 13.226 
Rwanda 1994/97 59.960 57.317 50.712 
Senegal 1970173 5.649 5.849 3.023 
Senegal 1974177 7.744 6.175 4.601 
Senegal 1978/81 11.769 7.251 7.562 
Senegal 1982/85 12.353 7.967 8.355 
Senegal 1986/89 16.908 8.851 13.481 
Senegal 1990/93 11.951 10.258 8.646 
Senegal 1994/97 13.156 12.004 9.306 
Seychelles 1970173 26.671 25.551 22.744 
Seychelles 1974177 17.438 17.475 12.354 
Seychelles 1978/81 19.094 12.927 12.959 
Seychelles 1982/85 11.383 9.308 7.060 
Seychelles 1986/89 10.867 7.053 6.750 
Seychelles 1990/93 6.388 5.213 3.701 
Seychelles 1994/97 2.935 2.993 1.244 
Sierra Leonne 1970173 2.346 1.527 1.212 
Sierra Leonne 1974177 2.774 1.877 1.463 
Sierra Leonne 1978/81 6.367 3.595 4.518 
Sierra Leonne 1982/85 5.139 4.085 3.581 
Sierra Leonne 1986/89 9.708 7.784 6.492 
Sierra Leonne 1990/93 17.738 12.469 13.981 
Sierra Leonne 1994/97 24.011 12.195 20.904 
South Africa 1970173 
South Africa 1974177 
South Africa 1978/81 
South Africa 1982/85 
South Africa 1986/89 
South Africa 1990/93 0.060 0.060 0.029 
South Africa 1994/97 0.307 0.292 0.143 
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Swaziland 1970173 4.959 3.541 2.626 
Swaziland 1974177 7.011 4.581 3.666 
Swaziland 1978/81 10.609 5.931 7.004 
Swaziland 1982/85 5.094 4.655 1.968 
Swaziland 1986/89 6.847 6.609 2.285 
Swaziland 1990/93 5.956 5.621 2.552 
Swaziland 1994/97 3.849 3.579 1.807 
Tanzania 1970173 4.483 2.696 2.510 
Tanzania 1974177 9.900 6.469 7.393 
Tanzania 1978/81 12.566 11.252 9.395 
Tanzania 1982/85 9.208 6.984 6.590 
Tanzania 1986/89 21.563 17.470 16.862 
Tanzania 1990/93 37.592 30.263 30.351 
Tanzania 1994/97 21.883 17.254 16.120 
Togo 1970173 6.737 6.556 3.439 
Togo 1974177 7.708 5.999 4.881 
Togo 1978/81 9.465 4.566 6.781 
Togo 1982/85 12.728 10.878 9.105 
Togo 1986/89 15.870 9.188 11.645 
Togo 1990/93 12.982 9.564 9.447 
Togo 1994/97 12.475 9.187 10.103 
Uganda 1970173 1.558 1.025 0.826 
Uganda 1974177 1.012 0.719 0.696 
Uganda 1978/81 2.733 2.358 2.020 
Uganda 1982/85 5.972 3.756 4.565 
Uganda 1986/89 7.966 4.634 6.409 
Uganda 1990/93 21.198 12.920 17.629 
Uganda 1994/97 14.442 9.170 11.768 
Zambia 1970173 1.362 1.334 0.298 
Zambia 1974177 3.025 2.058 1.648 
Zambia 1978/81 8.002 4.079 5.738 
Zambia 1982/85 8.774 5.281 6.401 
Zambia 1986/89 20.834 15.280 15.543 
Zambia 1990/93 26.482 22.120 21.957 
Zambia 1994/97 30.610 13.945 26.178 
Zimbabwe 1970173 0.044 0.044 0.003 
Zimbabwe 1974177 0.136 0.136 0.003 
Zimbabwe 1978/81 1.831 1.773 1.035 
Zimbabwe 1982/85 4.000 2.715 3.180 
Zimbabwe 1986/89 5.020 3.882 3.405 
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Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe 
Source: Computed 
1990/93 
1994/97 
9.451 
6.767 
6.746 
5.256 
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CHAPTERS 
AID AND GROWTH: ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSMISSION 
MECHANISMS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Whilst foreign aid programs were launched in the post World War era, prior to any 
sturdy evidence in its favour, the last decades have been marked by a large number 
of studies on aid effectiveness. Nevertheless, whether aid works or not is indeed still 
a persistent question in development economics. While addressing this issue in 
'Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn't and Why', World Bank (1998) 
recommendations are driven by Burnside and Dollar (2000, hereafter BD). They 
argue that aid stimulates growth only in good policy environments. However, this 
result does not withstand the rigorous assessment conducted by Dalgaard and Hansen 
(2000) and Hansen and Tarp (2001, hereafter HT). Using the same data set as the 
original study, Dalgaard and Hansen (2000) demonstrate that BD conclusion relies 
heavily on the exclusion of a few observations, which they deem as possible leverage 
points but are treated as outliers by BD. Using different specifications and 
estimators, HT also find that aid makes a positive contribution to growth and this 
result is not conditional on policy. While the jury is still out on this matter, the 
majority of recent studies find evidence of aid effectiveness (Morrissey, 2001). 
This chapter is not an attempt to resolve disputes in the literature. Rather, we want to 
focus on a particular issue - the treatment of investment in an aid-growth 
specification. BD argue that aid adds to investment whereas policy determines the 
productivity of investment and therefore include an 'aidxpolicy' interaction term but 
exclude investment. While acknowledging that the implicit growth theory will have 
investment and not aid as an argument, HT include both variables in some 
regressions. In general, aid is not significant in those cases. However, they do find 
that aid is a significant determinant of investment. 
It is therefore not very clear how to approach investment when aid and gro\\1h is the 
link under study. This represents a deficiency in the existing aid effectiveness 
literature. Studies recognise that aid can affect growth \'ia its effect on investment, 
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but few include an investment term. If one excludes investment, the regression is 
misspecified and the estimated coefficient on aid is biased. However, not all aid is 
intended for investment, and not all investment is financed by aid. If one includes 
aid and investment, there is double counting (as some aid is used for investment), 
and the coefficient is again biased (clearly downwards in this case). We propose the 
technique of generated regressors to address this problem. 
The analysis is conducted for a sample of 25 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries 
over the period 1970 to 1997. There is considerable evidence in the empirical growth 
literature that SSA countries are different. It is generally the case that in cross-
country growth regressions an 'Africa' dummy is negative and significant. 'Africa's 
slow growth is thus partly explicable in terms of particular variables that are globally 
important for the growth process but are low in Africa' (Collier and Gunning, 1999: 
65). Furthermore, they tend to be major aid recipients. Despite large aid inflows, 
SSA countries on average experienced only 0.7% growth in real per capita GDP per 
annum over the period 1970 to 1997, and only six of the 25 in our sample have 
managed to 'upgrade' to the group of middle income countries. l A priori, this may 
appear to be a case of aid ineffectiveness. If aid has been misused and ineffective, we 
should find evidence of this in a sample comprising SSA countries. 
Whilst our specific focus is on the treatment of aid and investment, it is clear from 
the aid effectiveness literature that any effect of aid on growth is indirect. Section 5.2 
presents a brief discussion of the various factors that mediate the effect of aid on 
growth, what we refer to as the transmission mechanisms. The data used and 
econometric methods are discussed in Section 5.3 (with further details in the 
Appendices). Section 5.4 presents the empirical results and discusses the 
implications. Section 5.5 concludes with some final observations. 
5.2 TRANSMISSION MECHANISMS 
The conceptual underpinning of the link between aid and growth is traditionally 
rooted in the two-gap model pioneered by Chenery and Strout (1966). The analytical 
framework is grounded in a Harrod Domar growth model where aid flows are 
I Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland according to World Bank 
(2000) classification. 
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perceived as filling in the gaps which otherwise act as binding constraint on the 
target growth rate. Poor countries lack sufficient resources to finance investment and 
a need to import capital goods and technology. Aid for investment purposes can fill 
the savings-investment gap (directly) and the foreign exchange gap (indirectly, as it 
is in the form of hard currency). As official aid is issued to government, it can also 
fund government spending. In fact, Bacha (1990) demonstrates that government 
fiscal behaviour represents an important channel through which aid flows can 
influence growth. Finally, recent studies highlight the potential importance of 
government policy as a determinant of the effects of aid. Figure 5.1 summarises the 
potential linkages between aid and growth. 
FIGURE 5.1: Transmission Mechanisms from Aid to Growth 
... Investment 
... Imports 
.... 
FOREIGN GROWTH 
AID RATES 
... Government • ~ ~... 
Fiscal behaviour 
... Government Policy 
1------1 .... "
A proper framework to study how aid works should address all of these interactions. 
The analysis here focuses on the effect of aid on growth taking into account the 
transmission mechanisms of investment, trade (imports) and fiscal behaviour 
(government consumption spending). Aid can contribute to gro\\1h through 
investment, conditional on the productivity of investment (which may of course be 
related to policy). Also, low income countries often face low and volatile export 
earnings, hence an uncertain source of finance for imp0l1 (capital goods and 
intermediate inputs). Aid can finance necessary imports, so this is a potential 
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transmission mechanism. If funds intended for investment are diverted to recurrent 
expenditures, that is aid is treated as fungible, its effectiveness should be reduced. 
This is addressed by considering government consumption as a (constraining) 
transmission mechanism. The basic approach is to identify if aid determines the 
transmission variables. If it does, this effect is accounted for in estimating the aid-
growth relationship. 
The transmission mechanism via government policy is however not as simple as it 
may first seem. The nature of this mechanism and how to model it is not well 
understood. The conventional view, at least in the context of cross-country growth 
regressions, is that it is difficult to establish that aid affects policy (BD; World Bank, 
1998). We would therefore expect this mechanism to be weak in cross-country 
regressions2 . Also, it is an empirical question as to whether one can identify an 
effect of aid controlling for policy variables, or an aidxpolicy term is required. 
Owing to these ambiguities, we do not pursue this mechanism. However, in 
accordance with recent work on aid effectiveness, we incorporate policy indicators as 
control variables. 
Another issue we do not address is the tendency for SSA countries to be subject to 
economic and political instability. Relative to other regions, SSA is especially 
susceptible to climatic and agricultural risk and vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, 
famines, political conflict, droughts and, more recently, floods. Empirical evidence is 
supportive of this distinct regional feature. Guillaumont et al (1999) acknowledge 
that compared to other developing country regions, these instabilities (political, 
climatic and terms of trade) are higher in SSA and reduce growth by distorting 
economic policy. Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor (1999) find that political 
instability has a direct negative effect on growth and also an indirect effect via 
discouraging investment. Such vulnerability is a source of 'economic uncertainty' 
that may reduce growth rates and help to explain aid ineffectiveness. Recently, 
Lensink and Morrissey (2000) control for uncertainty in the aid-growth regression by 
2 The point is that the way in which aid affects policy is complex and will d ~ ~ d d on specific, usually 
unmeasurable features of the recipient. Furthermore, aid may affect some POhCIes and not others, and 
may affect poiicies over varying time spans (often of five and more years). This is a complex research 
topic in its own right, beyond the scope of this chapter. 
62 
CHAPTER 5: Aid and Growth: Accounting/or Transmission lvfechanisms in sub-Saharan Africa 
using an aid instability measure for a sample of SSA countries. They obtain a 
positive and significant coefficient on aid whereas aid instability enters with a 
significant negative sign. Note that they also find that the principal (positive) impact 
of aid is via its impact on investment, a result corroborated by HT. As discussed in 
the next section, by including policy indicators (notably inflation), a political variable 
and investment in our specification we hope to pick up some of these effects of 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, our specification is likely to omit some factors that explain 
the poor growth performance in SSA countries. 
The specific aim of this paper is to account for the transmission mechanism of aid on 
growth. Although we concentrate on a sample of SSA countries, we want to relate 
the results to the recent contributions on aid effectiveness (BD and HT). 
Consequently, we choose a specification close in spirit to that used in these studies. It 
is well known that there are many variables that might be significant in cross-country 
growth regressions, but degrees of freedom considerations and data constraints 
require choices to be made. The data used here and the estimation techniques are 
discussed in the next section. 
5.3 DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES 
Estimation is conducted in a panel of seven four-year periods over 1970-97. Our 
dependent variable (GROWTH) is (period) growth of real per capita GDP (data 
definitions and sources are provided in Appendix 5A). Real GDP per capita in the 
year preceding the period (GDPO) is included to capture initial country specific 
effects3 . The percentage of population aged 15 or above who have completed 
primary education (PRIC15) and investment as a share of GDP (INV) are included as 
indicators of (additions to) human and physical capital. We use two measures of aid, 
both expressed as a percentage of GNP and taken from OECD (1999).4 The first is 
simply the total of grant aid (GRANTS) while total aid (TAID) is net ODA (the sum 
of ODA grants and net loans) excluding food aid and technical cooperation (see 
3 Many studies, such as BD, use lnGDPO rather than GDPO, essentially as the log specificatio.n . i ~ ~ a 
test for convergence. As our sample is restricted to SSA and initial GDP is used to c o n ~ o l l for InItlal 
country conditions rather than to test for convergence, we use GDp'0. The t r a n s ~ o n n a t l o n n GDPO to 
lnGDPO reduces the variance of the series. We did include lnGDPO m the regresSIOns and the results 
are similar although significance levels on all variables are reduced. . 
4 BD use the World Bank EDA aid data, that adds the grant element of concessIOnalloans to pure 
grants. However, HT demonstrate that GEeD and EDA data yield similar results. 
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Chapter 4 for a discussion of aid measure). Squared aid terms (GRJLYTSQ and 
TAIDSQ) are included to account for diminishing returns. Most studies of aid 
effectiveness posit a non-linear relationship and therefore include a squared term (see 
Morrissey, 200 l). 
We include a number of indicators of political and economic policy features of the 
countries. Alesina et al (1992) construct a democracy index DEM taking values 
between 1 and 3 based on information on electoral systems5 . Higher values indicate 
weaker political rights. Three policy variables are included: the inflation rate 
(INFL) , government consumption as a share of GDP (GCON) and imports as a 
percentage of GDP (MGDP) as an indicator of openness.6 The latter two variables 
also represent potential transmission mechanisms. As we report and discuss later, 
however, the effect of aid on growth is not mediated by these variables. Hence in the 
regressions, all three can be interpreted as policy indicators. 
The base specification in general terms is therefore (suppressing country and time 
subscripts, and designating the error term as U): 
The dependent variable is growth (g) and the measure of aid is designated by A. 
There are three vectors of other variables. The vector of conditioning variables (c) 
includes initial income, investment and human capital. The economic policy 
indicators (e) are inflation, government consumption and imports. The political 
indicator (P) is democracy. Descriptive statistics for the data are provided in 
Appendix SA 
Two core issues that characterise any empirical study based on panel data are 
endogeneity and countty-specific effects. The former relates to problems which arise 
from the time series dimension whilst the latter results from observing several 
5 1 for democratic regimes (countries with free competitive genera.l e l ~ t i o n s s with more than. 1 P,arty 
running), 2 for mixed democratic and authoritarian features (countnes W l ~ ~ s?me for:m of electIons but 
with severe limits in the competitiveness of such ballots) and 3 for authontanan regImes (COuntrIes III 
which their leaders are not elected). 
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countries together. We consider each briefly (details are in Appendix SB) before 
discussing the generated regressor technique employed in the analysis. 
A critical assumption of OLS is that there is zero correlation between the error teIm 
and any explanatory variable. If this is violated, the latter is endogenous and OLS 
estimates will not be consistent. The standard solution is to perfoIm a two stage 
procedure whereby instruments are used for the endogenous variable and obtain IV 
estimators. GMM estimators, that have recently gained popularity, present an 
alternative. Results are generally very sensitive to the choice of instruments as can 
be observed by a comparison ofBD and HT results. 
We use the Hausman test to investigate whether investment and aid terms are 
endogenous. This involves comparing the results of OLS and IV regressions (we also 
use the Sargan test for the validity of instruments). The test strongly fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that regressors and error teIm are uncorrelated (Appendix SB, Table 
SBl). Consequently, in our sample, we find no evidence of the need to use 
instruments. We report results using lagged aid, on the basis that aid via investment 
will take time to impact on growth, and this can be interpreted as an instrument (in 
the spirit ofHT). 
Another problem frequently encountered in estimation relates to outliers, values of 
the dependent variable that are unusual, given the values of the explanatory variables 
(response outliers), or unusual values of an explanatory variable (design outliers). 
The inclusion or exclusion of outliers, especially if the sample size is small, can 
substantially alter the results of regression analysis. If useful generalisations are to 
be drawn, it becomes important to ensure that the results reflect what is going on in 
the majority of the sample rather than being driven by a few outlying observations 
only. 
In the empirical literature, various approaches have been used to address the issue of 
outliers. In some cases, the regression model is re-estimated iteratively omitting one 
observation at a time with the aim of identifying that which exerts a significant 
6 The difficulty of measuring openness is recognised in the literature. This measure is however chosen 
as it also reflects a transmission mechanism. 
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influence on the set of estimates. In other cases, observations with high residuals are 
excluded from the sample. Both procedures can be seen as part of a sensitivity 
analysis after the main results have been obtained. It is also quite common to omit 
data points with extreme values of the explanatory variables. Several standard 
deviations away from the mean value can define extreme values. There is an element 
of subjectivity associated with this definition. For example, BD dropped 
observations that are five standard deviations away from the average data point 
whereas HT dropped those which are two standard deviations away. We have here 
chosen an alternative method - robust regression (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987), 
detailed in Appendix 5B. 
Gabon and Botswana are identified as outliers when the 'data points taking extreme 
values' approach is used and they both receive the lowest weights when robust 
estimation is performed. This could be anticipated as both are countries that have 
used effectively their natural resources, oil in the case of Gabon and diamonds in the 
case of Botswana. The advantage with the robust estimation procedure is that it 
minimises the influence of outlying observations on the estimated equation rather 
than omitting them altogether from an already small sample of which they are part. 
Another inherent problem in panel growth regressions is that one is observing a 
relationship across countries, hence there is potential heterogeneity. SSA countries 
are similar to each other in respect to some structural characteristics, relating mainly 
to their stage of economic and political development and climatic conditions. 
However, they comprise a heterogeneous group of countries in terms of size, 
population, level of GDP, institutional arrangements, resource endowments and so 
on. While we try to control for many of these variables (and robust estimation 
accounts for some of the problems), we cannot discount the possibility of country-
specific effects due to omitted variables. 
In a dynamic panel model, like the growth equation we consider, the basic difficulty 
with fixed (country) effects lies in the fact that the presence of the latter renders the 
lagged dependent variable (GDPO) correlated with the equation disturbance. The 
standard "within" transformation typically used in static models fails to deliver 
consistent estimators. A popular way of circumventing this problem is to remove the 
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fixed effects via first differencing and then use an instrumental variable estimation 
technique (e.g. GMM). We tried using lagged values ofGDP and other covariates as 
instruments in the first-differenced (i.e. growth rate of growth) equations in the spirit 
of Arellano and Bond (1991), but results were not robust - small changes in the 
instrumental variables set produced dramatic variations in the estimated coefficients. 
Furthermore, in addition to reducing the sample size, the first difference 
transformation seems to result in loss of most of the variation in the data (see 
Appendix 5A). It can also be argued that first differencing exacerbates measurement 
error problems in the data (by increasing the ratio of noise to signal). 
We abandoned the GMM approach on theoretical grounds also. Recently, Robertson 
and Symons (1992) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) demonstrate that standard GMM 
estimators of the type discussed above lead to invalid inference if the response 
parameters are characterised by heterogeneity7. For example, suppose that the 
response to a percentage increase in aid differs systematically across countries (a 
realistic assumption). In a pooled regression, the aim is of course to identify the 
average (across countries) effect of aid on growth. What Robertson and Symons 
(1992) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) have convincingly demonstrated is that in these 
circumstances standard panel GMM estimators will not deliver unbiased estimates of 
the mean effect. The latter went on to argue that since valid instruments are hard to 
come by for heterogeneous dynamic panels, it is better to average parameters from 
individual time series regressions. This is not feasible in our context, as the 
individual countries' time series lengths are not adequate (we only have seven time 
periods, due to the period averaging). 
Another theoretical reason why GMM is not suitable for our purpose has to do with 
the fact that we are using a generated regressor to account for the transmission 
mechanisms in the aid-growth relationship. It is not obvious how standard panel 
GMM estimators could handle generated regressors, and to our knowledge the 
problem has not yet been addressed in the econometric literature. For these reasons, 
we do not employ GMM techniques. 
7 Same applies to the system Gl\1Jv1 estimator (which uses a combination oflevel and first-differenced 
information) suggested by Blundell and Bond (1998). 
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Residual Generated Regressors 
It has become common practice to estimate regression equations in which 
constructed variables appear. The most popular method to generate regressors is to 
use predicted values or residuals from a supplementary regression (indeed, IV is an 
example of the former). Given the prevalence of such models, Pagan (1984) 
presented 'a fairly complete treatment' of the econometric issues underlying 
regressions with generated variables. As this is the method we use to incorporate 
transmission mechanisms, a brief discussion is in order. Formally, the approach is a 
special case of the following general model (in matrix form): 
y= f.1 X* + Y (X-X*) + U (S.2a) 
X= X* + 17 = co2 + 17 (S.2b) 
The expression (X-X*) represents that part of X which is explained by factors other 
than Z. Equation S.2b estimates the relationship between Z and X such that ro gives a 
measure of the strength of the link that exists between them. Pagan (1984) shows that 
the two-step procedure, of estimating Equation S.2b and using the results in Equation 
S .2a, gives asymptotically efficient coefficient estimates (p, and y ). Turning to the 
question of a consistent estimator of covariance matrix of p, and y , Pagan (1984) 
suggests 2SLS estimates will provide the correct values for the standard error of p, 
whilst OLS would produce correct estimates for the standard error of y. In our 
study, ~ ~ =0, i.e, we construct the generated regressor using only the residuals from a 
supplementary equation. This implies that OLS gives us the correct estimates of 
variance as well as efficient coefficient estimates. This conclusion is independent of 
whether Equation S.2a includes additional regressors orland the latter appear in the 
matrix Z - in our case, aid appears in Equation S.2b. Hence, the use of residuals does 
not invalidate the inferences made and coefficient estimates are efficient. 
We construct the variable representing that part of investment that is not attributed to 
aid (INVRES) using residuals from an aid-investment bivariate regression (capturing 
the transmission from aid to investment). INVRES is the estimate of 1(1 from the 
regression INV = 1(1 + 1(2 AID. We then substitute INVRES for LVV in the gro\\ 1h 
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regression. It is worth noting that this transformation affects only the estimated 
coefficient on the aid variables. This can easily be demonstrated in general terms. 
Suppose the initial regression is: 
(5.3a) 
where z is the vector of other variables, substituting X = lQ + 1(2 A: 
or 
Thus, it is clear that only the coefficient on the aid variable is altered. In cases where 
the 'transmission' variable (X) has a positive effect on growth, and aid has a positive 
effect on the variable, this method will provide for a larger coefficient on aid. If the 
variable has a negative effect on growth, and aid is a positive determinant of the 
variable, the coefficient on aid is reduced. If it transpires that aid is not a determinant 
of the variable, there is no effect and the method is not used. 
5.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Our basic specification is: 
GROWTHit = 80 + 81GDPOi,t-l + 82 PRlC15it + 83 lNVit + 8J)EMi + 85INFLit 
+ 86GCONit + 87MGDPit + 88 AIDit + &AIDSQit + Uit (5.4) 
The variables are discussed in Section 5.3 above. Three potential transmission 
variables are included (INV, GCON and MGDP). We first test if these are indeed 
transmission mechanisms for the effect of aid, and the results are reported below. It 
transpires that aid is only a significant determinant of investment and imports, among 
these variables, but only investment is a significant determinant of growth. We then 
present and discuss our :final set of results. 
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5.4.1 Transmission Mechanisms 
The investment regression is given as: 
INV it =/30 + /31 INV i,t-1 + /32 PRlC15 it + /33INFL it + /34GASTILSi + 
/3 5LNCRED it + /36 AID it +/37 AIDSQ it + £ it (5.5) 
We use INV as the dependent variable to investigate if this transmission mechanism 
is operationaL To account for the dependence of current investment levels on 
physical and human capital stock, we include one period lagged investment and 
percentage of population aged 15 or above who have completed primary education 
(PRlC15). The policy and political indicators comprise the inflation rate (INFL) and 
Gastils index of rights (GASTILS). The latter takes values between 1 and 7, where 
higher values indicate less freedom. With regards to the widely acknowledged view 
that finance is the key to investment, we include the logarithm of credit available to 
the private sector (measured relative to total domestic credit) in addition to foreign 
aid as an alternative source of finance. Table 5.1 presents the set of estimates. 
GASTILS 
PRlC15 
LNCRED 
INFL 
GRANTS 
GRANTSQ 
TAID 
TAIDSQ 
Constant 
Observations 
R-squared 
F-Stat 
Table 5.1: Pooled OLS Investment regressions 
INV INV 
0.785 0.799 
(5.51)*** (5.69)*** 
-0.902 
-0.984 
(2.59)** (2.94)*** 
0.275 0.290 
(1.80)* (1.94)* 
1.773 2.005 
(2.79)*** (3.04)*** 
-0.003 
-0.002 
(2.43)** (1.69)* 
0.333 
(2.09)** 
-0.007 
(2.77)*** 
0.528 
(3.04)*** 
-0.012 
(3.56)*** 
-2.074 -4.341 
(0.54) (1.06) 
126 126 
0.65 0.66 
27.17 22.91 
Notes'AlI regressions run in a panel of seven fom-year periods over 1970-97. ! ~ e e d ~ i e s s
. included in all regressions. Absolute t-values based on White heteroscedastlClty-conSlStent 
standard errors are reported in brackets. * Significant at 10% level. ** 5% level. *** 1% 
level. F-Stat rejects the null that all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero. 
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The regressions generate coefficient estimates with the expected signs. We obtain 
evidence of a highly significant positive effect of aid on investment. On ayerage, an 
increase in GRANTS and TAID by one percentage point raises the investment share in 
GDP by about 0.33 and 0.53 percentage points respectively. As expected, TAJD is 
more important both in terms of magnitude and significance. Results appear to 
suggest that investment is a significant transmission mechanism and therefore it is 
necessary to consider the 'double-counting' problem. 
The import regression is given as: 
MGDPit = 170 + 171 XGDPit + 172AJDit+173TOTit + 174RERit 
+175BMPit + 176 CFAi + eit (5.6) 
We use MGDP as the dependent variable. Exports are introduced as an additional 
source of financing imports, other than aid flows. Three indicators of the trade 
environment are included: terms of trade (TOT), real exchange rate (ER) , black 
market premium (BMP) and a dummy (CFA) that takes a value of 1 for countries 
which are members in CF A franc zone. 
Overall, the regressions perform well (Table 5.2). The chosen specification explains 
at least 31 % of the variation in the dependent variable. Aid flows seem to be a 
significant source of finance for imports (as would be expected). On average, a one 
percentage point increase in GRANTS increases imports by 0.9 percentage points, 
whilst each extra percentage point of TAJD adds 0.7 percentage points to the share of 
imports in GDP. Based on these estimates, it would appear that imports present a 
potential transmission mechanism. 
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Table 5.2: Pooled OLS Imports regressions 
MGDP MGDP 
XGDP 0.614 0.610 
GRANTS 
(5.51)*** (5.50)*** 
0.921 
TAID 
(3.24)*** 
0.713 
TOT 
-0.045 
(3.42)*** 
-0.049 
RER 
(2.04)** (2.14)** 
-0.003 
-0.004 
BMP 
(1.96)* 
-0.027 
(2.07)** 
-0.029 
CFA 
(2.02)** (2.07)** 
-6.236 
-6.187 
Constant 
(1.80)* (1.75)* 
22.095 25.115 
(3.16)*** (3.24)*** 
Observations 131 131 
R-squared 0.33 0.31 
F-Stat 13.36 14.01 
Notes: As for Table 5.1. 
We use government consumption as a share of GDP (GCON) as our dependent 
variable to estimate the following equation: 
GCONit= AO +A1 TRGDPit +A 2INFLit + A3EXTDEBTit + A4AIDi( 
+ A5STATEi + uit (5.7) 
Public sector decision-makers allocate revenue among vanous expenditure 
categories. Stated differently, government revenue determines government 
expenditure. Thus, we consider both domestic and foreign sources of government 
revenue as determinants of government consumption - total tax revenue as share of 
GDP (TRGDP), inflation (INFL) to represent seignorage, external debt as a share of 
GDP (EXTDEBT) and foreign aid flows (AID). Finally, in recognition of the fact that 
features of the existing political institution influences allocation of government 
resources, we introduce STATE (Englebert, 2000). The latter takes value of 1 for 
legitimate countries which are believed to have more efficient governments owing to 
the lack of clash between pre-colonial and post-colonial political institutions. 
Governments in non-legitimate countries (that is, when STATE takes value of 0) 
72 
CHAPTER 5: Aid and Growth: Accounting/or Transmission Mechanisms in sub-Saharan Africa 
tend to invest in strengthening their leadership at the expense of long term 
investment in infrastructure. Table 5.3 presents the estimation results. 
Table 5.3: Government Consumption Regressions 
GCON GCON 
TRGDP 0.524 0.516 
(8.97)*** (8.89)*** 
INFL 0.003 0.003 
(4.47)*** (4.19)*** 
EXTDEBT 
-0.001 0.000 
(0.09) (0.03) 
GRANTS 0.106 
(1.38) 
TAID 0.076 
(1.02) 
STATE -1.508 -1.296 
(1.71)* (1.56) 
Constant 4.809 5.187 
(3.12)*** (3.48)*** 
Observations 138 138 
R-squared 0.51 0.50 
F-Stat 10.89 11.51 
Notes: As for Table 5.1. 
In general, the regressions perform reasonably well. They explain about 50% of the 
variation in government consumption. All variables enter with the expected signs. 
However, the results suggest that aid flows do not tend to finance government non-
productive expenditure. Instead, it seems that governments in SSA countries rely 
quite significantly on distortionary taxes and seignorage to finance their recurrent 
spending. Consequently, we assume that the coefficient on GCON in aid-growth 
regressions does not include any substantial indirect effect of aid. Note that these 
results do not support the common assertion that aid is fungible (although the 
regressions are not a direct test of this), at least for this sample. 
5.4.2 Aid-Growth Regressions 
Having identified that investment and imports are the main transmission mechanisms 
through which aid affects growth rates, we now report the estimation results of the 
growth model as specified by Equation 5.1 Table 5.4 presents the robust aid-grO\\lh 
regressIOns. 
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GDPO 
PRlC15 
INV 
DEM 
INFL 
GCON 
MGDP 
GRANTS 
GRANTSQ 
TAID 
TAIDSQ 
GRANTS __ 1 
GRANTS __ lSQ 
Constant 
Table 5.4: Robust Aid-Growth Regressions 
Effect of current aid 
0.001 0.001 
(2.38)** (2.35)** 
0.212 0.205 
(3.09)*** (2.99)*** 
0.109 0.111 
(4.42)*** (4.49)*** 
-1.261 
-1.328 
(3.52)*** (3.69)*** 
-0.004 
-0.004 
(2.50)** (2.50)** 
-0.149 
-0.143 
(2.64)*** (2.58)** 
0.002 0.002 
(0.22) (0.21) 
0.161 
(1.89)* 
-0.003 
(1.65) 
0.174 
(1.85)* 
-0.004 
(1.69)* 
Effect of lagged aid 
0.001 
(2.22)** 
0.182 
(2.34)** 
0.105 
(4.01)*** 
-1.287 
(3.34)*** 
-0.004 
(2.55)** 
-0.151 
(2.59)** 
-0.001 
(0.12) 
0.265 
(2.59)** 
-0.006 
(2.22)** 
0.001 
(2.07)** 
0.177 
(2.27)** 
0.106 
(4.02)*** 
-1.231 
(3.19)*** 
-0.004 
(2.68)*** 
-0.134 
(2.33)** 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.242 
(2.25)** 
-0.006 
(1.99)** 
0.525 0.655 0.477 0.310 
(0.32) (0.39) (0.28) (0.17) 
Observations 149 149 135 135 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.43 
F-Stat 7.40 7.47 6.64 6.40 
Notes: As for Table 5.1 except that t-statistics are not based on White-heteroscedasticity 
consistent standard errors, as a weighting system is used for the robust regression. 
All variables enter with the expected sign except for GDPO. Since TAID excludes 
food aid (which does not directly affect growth) and technical cooperation (which 
might influence growth but with a long time lag), as expected it has a slightly larger 
impact on growth than GRANTS. An extra percentage point of GRANTS and T AID 
disbursed is estimated to increase growth rates by about 0.16 and 0.17 percentage 
points respectively. Interestingly, we find that the lagged effect of aid on grO\\1h is 
more important than its immediate impact. The negatively signed aid squared terms 
are consistent with the proposition of an aid Laffer curve (Lensink and White, 2001), 
or more generally diminishing returns to aid. 
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By including both transmission mechanisms and aid in our regressions, the total 
effect of aid on growth is spread out across the coefficients on these variables. The 
coefficient on our aid term will be an incorrect measure of overall aid effectiveness. 
Thus, we use the residual-generated regressor to overcome this problem. The results 
suggest that the significant impact of aid on imports does not translate into any 
important growth effects. Consequently, the investment term is the only relevant 
transmission mechanism. Table 5.5 reports the aid-growth regressions in which 
INVRES, which can be thought of as that part of INV which is not a function of aid, 
has been introduced. 
Table 5.5: Robust Aid-Growth Regressions with INVRES 
Effect of current aid Effect of lagged aid 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(2.38)** (2.35)** (2.22)** (2.07)** 
PRICl5 0.212 0.205 0.182 0.177 
(3.09)*** (2.99)*** (2.34)** (2.27)** 
INVRES 0.109 0.111 0.105 0.106 
(4.42)*** (4.49)*** (4.01)*** (4.02)*** 
DEM -1.261 -1.328 -1.287 -1.231 
(3.52)*** (3.69)*** (3.34)*** (3.19)*** 
INFL -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
(2.50)** (2.50)** (2.55)** (2.68)*** 
GCON -0.149 -0.143 -0.151 -0.134 
(2.64)*** (2.58)** (2.59)** (2.33)** 
MGDP 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
(0.22) (0.21) (0.12) (0.02) 
GRANTS 0.306 
(3.46)*** 
GRANTSQ -0.003 
(1.65) 
TAID 0.319 
(3.31)*** 
TAIDSQ -0.004 
(1.69)* 
GRANTS_I 0.431 (4.08)*** 
GRANTS_ISQ -0.006 (2.22)** 
0.402 TAID_I (3.66)*** 
-0.006 TAID_ISQ (1.99)** 
0.525 0.655 0.477 0.310 Constant (0.17) (0.32) (0.39) (0.28) 
135 135 Observations 149 149 
0.46 0.46 0.44 0.43 R-squared 
7.40 7.47 6.64 6.40 F-Stat 
Notes: As for Table 5.4. 
8 INVRES is recovered from the following regressions (t-ratios in brackets) :2_ 
INV=l 33GRANTS (12.78) R2=0.41; INV=1.58GRANTS_1 (13.2) R ~ O . 4 6 1 1
INV=1:30TAID (12.17) R2=0.39; INV=1.51TAID_I (12.16) R -0.4.:.. 
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The new set of coefficient estimates for aid variables are greater than in the original 
model, both in terms of magnitude and significance. This supports our hypothesis 
that the aid coefficient in a regression including an investment term will be an 
underestimate of the true effect of aid on growth. An additional percentage point of 
GRANTS and TAID disbursed is now estimated to increase growth rates by about 
0.31 and 0.32 percentage points respectively. Again, we find that the lagged effect 
of aid on growth is more important than its immediate impact. 
In line with previous studies we find evidence of diminishing returns to aid. In 
contrast to studies such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), we find no evidence that aid 
revenues are used to finance government consumption spending, although we do find 
that such expenditures have a negative effect on growth. Inflation is included as a 
(macroeconomic) policy control, and has the expected negative sign. More 
democratic regimes appear to have higher growth performance (the coefficient on 
DEM is negative). The variables with positive effects on growth are aid, investment, 
education and initial GDP (i.e, divergence in the sample as countries with higher 
incomes at the start of the period tend to have higher subsequent growth rates) 
Our results suggest that aid flows significantly stimulate growth in recipient 
countries. This continues to hold once diminishing returns are accounted for - only 
two countries in the sample received aid beyond the threshold level9 . Based on the 
point estimates obtained in previous section, Table 5.6 reports the marginal aid 
effects by bringing together all the estimates of the derivative of growth with respect 
to aid: 
dGROWTH = 8 + 28 (AID) 
dAID 8 9 
9 Based on first two regressions from Table 5.5, GRANTS and T AID would ~ a v e e to surpass 51 %. ~ d d
40% for diminishing returns to set in. Only Rwanda (in 1994/97) and GambIa (Ill 1986/89) recen ed 
aid in excess of this optimal level. 
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Table 5.6: Marginal Effect of Aid on Growth 
In Model with INV 
In Model with INVRES 
Note: t-ratios in parentheses. 
At GRANTS-8.16 
0.112 
(1.02) 
0.257 
(2.34)** 
At TAID-7.96 
0.110 
(0.87) 
0.255 
(1.96)* 
Evaluated at mean aid level, we again find that once the indirect effect through 
investment is included, the impact of aid on growth is positive and significant. We 
recognise that these effects are observed on average. We address this concern in the 
next chapter. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
Our concern has been to address the question of aid effectiveness in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Empirical studies of the impact of aid on growth fail to take into account that 
aid does not have a direct effect; it operates via transmission mechanisms, such as 
investment or government spending. The contribution of this chapter lies in 
throwing some light on this neglected aspect. 
Investment, the most important transmission mechanism, is often omitted from aid-
growth regressions. As a result, estimated aid coefficients in typical growth 
regressions suffer from omitted variable bias. However, including an investment 
term in the regression would lead to identification problems as some of aid finances 
investment (there will be double-counting). In this chapter we use the technique of 
generated regressors to address this problem. This enables us to identify that part of 
investment that is not due to aid, so that double counting and omitted variable bias 
pro blems are avoided. 
We apply this method to examine the relationship between aid and growth using a 
panel of 25 SSA countries over the period 1970 to 1997. Despite large aid inflows. 
SSA countries on average experienced only 0.7% growth in real per capita GDP per 
annum over the period. On the face of it, this may appear to be a case of aid 
ineffectiveness. Our econometric results, which are robust regarding outliers, 
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endogeneity and country-specific effects, show that aid has had a positive effect on 
growth, largely through aid-financed investment. On average, each one percentage 
point increase in the aid/GNP ratio adds one-third of one percentage point to the 
growth rate. 
One inference we draw from the results is that it may not be correct to take poor 
growth performance in SSA as an indicator of aid ineffectiveness. Aid contributes to 
growth but may not itself ensure high ( or positive) growth. One cannot ignore the 
possibility that had SSA countries not received aid they might have experienced even 
slower, or in some cases more severe negative, growth. We do not know what would 
have happened in the absence of aid, but the inference from our results is that growth 
performance would have been even worse. Africa's poor growth record should not 
therefore be attributed to aid ineffectiveness. 
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APPENDIX SA: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Definitions and sources of data 
GROWTH growth of real GDP per capita 
GDPO real GDP per capita (in the year preceding the period) 
PRlC15 population aged 15 or above having completed primary 
education.(%), at beginning of each period. Source: Barro and Lee 
Data Set, (Harvard CID-World Bank) 
INV gross domestic investment (% of GDP) 
DEM democracy index, in 1970 and 1982; values between 1 and 3 with 
lower values being more democratic. Source: Alesina et al (1992) 
INFL 
GCON 
MGDP 
XGDP 
TOT 
RER 
BMP 
CFA 
CRED 
GASTILS 
GRANTS 
TAID 
TRGDP 
EXTDEBT 
STATE 
inflation rate 
government consumption (% of GDP) 
imports (% of GDP) 
exports (% of GDP) 
terms 0 f trade 
real exchange rate, calculated from the nominal exchange rate figures 
black market premium. Source: Global Development Data 
dummy takes value of 1 for CFA franc zone member countries and 0 
otherwise 
credit available to private sector (% of total domestic credit) 
Gastils Rights index. Source: Easterly and Levine data, downloaded 
from the World Bank Data Surfer website 
ODA grants (% of GNP). Source: OECD(1999) 
ODA grants+net loans-technical cooperation-food aid (% of GNP) 
Source: OECD(1999) 
total tax revenue (% of GDP) 
external debt (% of GDP) 
dummy takes value of 1 for legitimate countries and 0 otherwise 
Source: Englebert (2000) 
Unless otherwise stated, the source for all variables is World Bank Africa Database 
(2000, available on CD-ROM). All variables refer to period averages 1970 ,3. 
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1974177, 1978/81, 1982/85, 1986/89, 1990/93 and 1994/97 except GDPO and the 
time invariant regressors. 
List of 25 countries in the sample for regressions 
Benin Madagascar 
Botswana Malawi 
Cameroon Mali 
Central Africa Mauritius 
Congo Republic Niger 
Congo Democratic Republic Rwanda 
Gambia Senegal 
Ghana Sierra Leone 
Kenya South Africa 
Lesotho Swaziland 
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Tanzania 
Togo 
Uganda 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Table SAl: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Std. Dev. 
of first difference 
GROWTH 34 0.660 3.750 -12.618 18.510 4.572 
GDPO 34 1242.382 1096.644 247 6409.000 330.913 
INV 34 19.547 10.518 3.268 84.551 6.662 
PRlC15 25 7.257 3.710 I 19.900 1.560 
DEM 32 2.656 0.644 1 3 0 
GRANTS 34 8.161 6.992 0.044 57.317 5.158 
TAID 34 7.960 7.188 -0.009 50.712 5.286 
!NFL 34 50.631 428.068 -3.574 6287.344 325.801 
GCON 34 15.461 5.749 5.859 43.938 3.855 
MGDP 34 38.317 22.411 8.333 142.697 7.984 
Note: Descriptive statistics reported for the variables in levels, unless stated otherwise. 
Table SAl shows that the standard deviation of many of the variables is quite high, 
suggesting that fixed or country-specific effects may be pronounced. Robust 
regression accounts for some, but not all, of the difficulties. In the discussion of 
correcting for fixed effects in Section S.3, we note that first differencing creates its 
own problems. This data transformation obviously reduces the sample size 
(especially if several lags are required to form instruments), but also seems to result 
in loss of most of the variation in the data. Furthermore, Table SA2 shows that the 
significance and even sign of partial correlations between growth and explanatory 
variables is altered if a first difference model is used rather than a specification of 
variables in levels. These features of the data might explain why GMM techniques 
do not give robust results. 
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Table SA2: Partial correlation of growth and first-difference growth with some 
key variables 
Level First Difference Level First 
Difference 
GDPO 0.070 -0.383 GDPO 0.063 -0.380 
(0.386) (0.00) (0.435) (0.00) 
INV 0.383 0.112 INV 0.383 0.113 
(0.00) (0.209) (0.00) (0.206) 
PRlC15 0.177 -0.100 PRIC15 0.175 -0.097 
(0.028) (0.259) (0.03) (0.276) 
GRANTS 0.004 -0.028 TAID -0.017 0.003 
(0.961) (0.755) (0.839) (0.977) 
!NFL -0.199 -0.004 !NFL -0.200 0.002 
(0.014) (0.962) (0.013) (0.979) 
GCON -0.163 -0.143 GeON -0.162 -0.137 
(0.044) (0.107) (0.045) (0.123) 
Notes: p-values for significance are reported in parentheses. Partial correlations vary when the set of 
explanatory variables is changed. The first set of columns are partial correlation with growth 
when GRANTS is the aid variable, and the second set of columns when T AID is the aid 
variable. 
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APPENDIX 5B: ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
In this Appendix we first detail the tests for endogeneity and then describe the robust 
estimation method adopted to account for outliers. 
5B.1 The Hausman test for Endogeneity 
Testing for endogeneity is essentially a test of whether a regressor (Xit) is correlated 
with the error term (Uit). If it is, the IV method will produce consistent estimates. 
Otherwise, both OLS and IV estimators will be consistent although the latter is less 
efficient, i.e, the two sets of estimates will not be systematically different. This 
forms the intuition behind the Hausman (1978) specification test which tests 
appropriateness of OLS estimates based on the difference between OLS and IV 
estimates. The hypothesis tested is formally given as: 
Ho: Cov (Xit, Uit) = 0 ~ ~ OLS consistent 
IV consistent but less efficient. 
HI: Cov (Xit, Uit)::f. 0 ~ ~ OLS inconsistent 
IV consistent 
Table 5B I presents the results obtained when the Hausman test is performed to 
investigate whether investment and aid terms are endogenous. The probability that 
the critical value exceeds the test statistic is high in all cases. The test therefore 
strongly fails to reject the null hypothesis, i.e, we can accept that regressors and error 
term are uncorrelated and OLS estimators are valid. 
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Table 5Bl: Standard OLS Growth regressions 
GROWTH GROWTH 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 
PRlC15 
(2.44)** (2.58)** 
0.201 0.197 
INV 
(2.89)*** (2.85)*** 
0.133 0.131 
DEM 
(5.33)*** (5.29)*** 
-1.556 
-1.579 
!NFL 
(4.29)*** (4.36)*** 
-0.001 
-0.001 
GCON 
(1.88)* (1.72)* 
-0.184 
-0.171 
MGDP 
(3.25)*** (3.07)*** 
0.009 0.010 
GRANTS 
(0.90) (0.97) 
0.204 
GRANTSQ 
(2.37)** 
-0.004 
TAID 
(2.04)** 
0.237 
TAIDSQ 
(2.51)** 
-0.005 
Constant 
(2.20)** 
0.695 0.347 
Observations 
(0.42) (0.20) 
150 150 R2 0.49 0.49 
F-Stat 8.48 8.56 
Testingfor endogeneity of aid: 
R20f first stage regression 0.54 0.55 
X2(k) 0.15 0.02 
Prob>X\k) 1.00 1.00 
Testingfor endogeneity of investment: 
R20ffirst stage regression 0.33 0.33 
X2(k) 7.40 9.60 
Prob>x2(k) 0.918 0.791 
Notes: All regressions run in a panel of seven four-year periods over 1970-97. Time 
dummies included in all regressions. Absolute t-values are reported in brackets. 
* Significant at 10% level. ** 5% level. *** I % level. F -Stat rejects the null that 
all the coefficients are jointly not different from zero. X2(k) represents the chi-
squared statistic for Hausman test. 
Sargan test for validity of instruments 
The comparison of OLS to IV estimates using the Hausman test assumes that valid 
instruments are used. Sargan (1958) provides a test for the validity of instruments. 
Sargan's test statistic X2 (V) follows a chi-squared distribution \\Oith V = (P-K) 
degrees of freedom, where P is the number of instruments and K the total number of 
regressors. 
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Based on the results obtained by instrumenting investment in our gro\\ th regression 
we obtain X2 (V) = 1.38 and X2 (V) = 1.45 when GRANTS and TAID are used 
respectively. Using the 1 % critical value (6.63), this statistic fails to reject our null 
hypothesis. Thus, credit available to private sectors as a share of total domestic 
credit and Gastils rights variable prove to be valid instruments for investment. We 
obtain similar support for using lagged aid terms as instruments for the aid variable. 
Breusch Pagan test (1980) 
Can we rely on the Hausman test result in the presence of country specific effects? 
As standard panel tests for fixed effects are not valid in the presence of lagged 
dependent variables we perform the test without the term GDPO. Ifwe fail to reject 
the absence of fixed effects (that is a term capturing the combined effects of omitted 
time-invariant variables), it is (almost certainly) true to say there will not be any 
fixed effects when we include the lagged dependent term. We therefore carry out the 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test of the null hypothesis that a ~ ~ is 
equal to zero. If the null hypothesis holds, it implies that Vi is always zero, that is, 
there is no serious risk of omitted country-specific effects. In this case, the Hausman 
test result is valid and we can use OLS to estimate our growth regression. This test 
produces chi-squared values equal to 3.20 and 3.32 when GRANTS and TAID are the 
relevant aid variables, respectively. The 1 % critical value from the chi-squared 
distribution with one degree of freedom is 6.63, so the statistic falls in the acceptance 
reglOn. Hence, we can safely assume that the included time-invariant control 
variables have sufficiently captured cross-country differences. Also, the result of the 
Hausman test is valid. 
SB.2 Robust Estimation to Account for Outliers 
Our results are obtained using robust regression (Rousseeuw and Leroy, 1987), a 
three-step procedure to deal with outliers. The first step involves estimating the 
regression and calculating Cook's (1977) Distance measure of influence. Cook's D 
for the i th observation is a measure of the distance between the coefficient estimates 
when observation i is included and when it is not. In the first stage, robust regression 
screens data points in search of such outliers and eliminates observations for which 
Cook's distance exceeds 1 - these are the gross outliers. Thereafter, robust 
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regression involves an iterative weighted least squares method whereby the outliers 
are identified and weights are assigned. 
We use the method proposed by Huber (1964) cases where small residuals receive 
weights of 1 while those with larger residuals (outliers) receive gradually smaller 
weights. This process of calculating weights and re-estimating regression is repeated. 
Iterations stop when weights from two consecutive iterations converge. The third 
step in robust regression involves calculating bi-weights, as proposed by Beaton and 
Tukey (1974). This assigns a weight to all cases with non-zero residuals according 
to a smoothly decreasing bi-weight function. The procedure is conducted using 
routines in ST ATA that allow robust regression to produce estimates with properties 
corresponding to 95% of the efficiency ofOLS (Hamilton, 1991). 
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FURTHER ANALYSIS ON AID AND GROWTH 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is intended to supplement the work done in the preceding one. We 
found evidence in support of aid effectiveness and investment consistently appeared 
to be the vital link between aid flows and growth. The observed poor growth 
performance in SSA may however tend to cast doubt on the legitimacy of our 
regression generated estimates. If aid has really not been ineffective then why is the 
development process in SSA slow. We here try to clarify this apparent puzzle. 
Despite our finding that aid works, we recognise that these effects are observed on 
average. Although the focus is on a sample restricted to SSA countries only (which 
are fairly homogenous in many ways), it is reasonable to believe that estimates on 
average mask both within and across country variance in aid effects. For practical 
purposes, what would hold more appeal is the extent to which our estimates are 
useful in providing information on individual country experiences. 
'A fragile inference is not worth taking seriously' (Leamer 1985: 308). Not 
surprising is the customary wariness as regards to the reliability of estimates in the 
empirical literature. This is especially the case when an inference matters, for 
example, BD results which have had an overwhelming influence on World Bank 
recommendations concerning aid allocations, has been subject to rigorous tests 
conducted by others. Testing robustness of results has consequently become a 
natural step following regression estimation. Various types of sensitivity analysis 
have been routinely employed in the empirical literature. Some are complex and 
lengthy procedures, for instance, Leamer's extreme bound analysis. Others are fairly 
straightforward and more practical - minor changes are made to the set of 
explanatory variables, specification, estimation technique and sample data. In 
general, the idea is that conclusions are robust if they do not fundamentally alter as a 
result of these changes. 
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. In Section 6.2, drawing from 
estimates obtained in the previous chapter, we explore the implications for individual 
country cases. Closely related is an exercise that estimates the growth model for two 
subsamples of SSA countries. We then address concerns on robustness of our 
findings to changes in the conditioning set of variables in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 
assesses the effect of varying the time period under study. Section 6.5 concludes 
with some final observations. 
6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL SSA ECONOMIES 
Our results pertaining to aid effectiveness have so far allowed us to comment on the 
experience in SSA as a region. However, we now want to see what can be learnt 
about individual countries as this would be of more relevance for policy debates at a 
disaggregated level. With this in mind, we calculate the predicted contribution of aid 
to growth, 88AID-89AID2, where GRANTS and TAID are the relevant aid definitions 
(Table 6.1 a and 6 .1 b). Obviously, as we are using the estimated coefficients from 
the panel regressions (Table 5.5), aid is predicted to have a positive effect on growth 
(and the magnitude will depend on the amount of aid received). We cannot estimate 
the actual effect of aid for each country (nor can we calculate significance levels). 
We can however compare cases where the regression performed well (the lowest 
residuals) with those where it performed poorly (the two panels in each table). 
In the upper panel of each table, we list the 10 observations for which unexplained 
growth is lowest in absolute terms. The idea is that our chosen set of explanatory 
variables explains reasonably well the growth experience of those countries in that 
particular period. In the bottom panel of each table, the 10 observations with the 
largest residual (unexplained growth) are listed. These are mostly countries that 
experienced negative growth. Consider the two panels in Table 6.1a. In the top 
panel, simple mean growth (excluding the Congo) is 1 % whereas aid is estimated to 
contribute 1.6% to growth as a simple mean. For the lower panel, simple mean 
growth (excluding Botswana) is -1.8% whereas the mean contribution of aid to 
growth is 1.9%. The predicted contribution of aid to growth is not very different in 
the two panels, but growth performance is dramatically different. One way of 
interpreting this is that aid was ineffective in the lower panel group of countries 
(implicitly assuming that the outcome would have been no worse in the absence of 
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Table 6.1a: Regressions with GRANTS 
Country Time Period Unexplained GRANTS Growth Contribution of Aid 
Growth (8si\Il)-89i\Il)2) 10 lowest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
South Africa 1994-1997 0.07 0.29 1.20 0.09 
Gambia 1978-1981 0.10 15.71 0.60 4.07 
Zimbabwe 1990-1993 0.12 6.75 
-1.47 1.93 
Congo l)em 1990-1993 0.13 4.41 
-12.62 1.29 
Zimbabwe 1994-1997 0.13 5.26 1.98 1.53 
Senegal 1982-1985 0.14 7.97 1.43 2.25 
Congo Dem 1970-1973 0.16 2.47 0.75 0.74 
Mauritius 1994-1997 0.17 0.97 3.62 0.29 
Togo 1974-1977 0.19 6.00 0.44 1.73 
Togo 1970-1973 0.25 6.56 0.53 1.88 
10 highest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
Botswana 1970-1973 10.99 9.82 18.51 2.72 
Togo 1994-1997 6.81 9.19 6.29 2.56 
Cameroon 1986-1989 6.38 1.90 -3.99 0.57 
Sierra Leone 1994-1997 6.23 12.20 -7.78 3.29 
Niger 1970-1973 6.01 5.69 -5.78 1.64 
Congo Rep 1994-1997 5.87 13.66 -2.07 3.62 
Senegal 1978-1981 5.84 7.25 -3.14 2.06 
Swaziland 1986-1989 5.77 6.61 7.29 1.89 
Cameroon 1990-1993 5.62 3.28 -6.69 0.97 
Mauritius 1978-1981 5.52 2.05 -0.73 0.61 
Note: Residuals are from first regression of Table 5.5. 
Table 6.1b: Regressions with TAID 
Country Time Period Unexplained TAID Growth Contribution of Aid 
Growth (8si\ID-89AID2) 
10 lowest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
Senegal 1982-1985 0.01 8.36 1.43 2.39 
Zimbabwe 1994-1997 0.02 5.02 1.98 1.50 
South Africa 1994-1993 0.03 0.14 1.20 0.05 
Togo 1970-1973 0.10 3.44 0.53 1.05 
Congo l)em 1990-1993 0.12 4.42 -12.62 1.33 
Lesotho 1978-1981 0.13 9.05 2.22 2.56 
Togo 1974-1977 0.14 4.88 0.44 1.46 
Mauritius 1994-1997 0.17 0.02 3.62 0.01 
Congo l)em 1970-1973 0.19 1.36 0.75 0.43 
Mali 1982-1985 0.26 18.70 -0.89 4.57 
10 highest absolute values of unexplained GROWTH 
4.17 Botswana 1970-1973 10.00 16.47 18.51 
Sierra Leone 1994-1997 6.74 20.90 -7.78 4.92 
Togo 1994-1997 6.67 10.10 6.29 2.81 
Swaziland 1986-1989 6.44 2.29 7.29 0.71 
Cameroon 1986-1989 6.31 1.73 -3.99 0.54 
Niger 1970-1973 6.14 4.87 -5.78 1.46 
Congo Rep 1994-1997 6.12 15.09 -2.07 3.90 
Senegal 1978-1981 5.96 7.56 -3.14 2.18 
Cameroon 1990-1993 5.82 4.09 -6.69 1.24 
Rwanda 1978-1981 5.60 8.46 5.35 2.41 
Note: Residuals are from second regression of Table 5.5. 
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aid). Another interpretation, or perhaps qualification, is that other factors undermined 
the effectiveness of aid in the poor performing countries. Although our analysis 
cannot identify these (growth-retarding) factors, it can suggest countries (and 
periods) that may warrant further investigation. Such a case study complement is 
beyond the scope of this empirical investigation. 
Estimation using subsamp/es of SSA countries 
Although conducting case studies is not feasible within this volume, we here go for 
the next best alternative - carry out inference on subsamples. Drawing on Tables 
6.1 a and 6.1 b, the point we make is that the regression model performs better for 
countries that grew than for those that did not. The hypothesis is therefore an aid 
coefficient that will vary across the group of countries that achieved a positive and 
negative growth. Difference might be in terms of sign, size orland significance. A 
positive aid coefficient in economies with good performance and an insignificant aid 
coefficient in remaining economies would seem a plausible possibility. We here 
intend to test this proposition. 
With this aIm, we split the SSA sample into two: those that have experienced 
positive growth in the period 1970 to 1997 and the others (countries belonging to 
these subgroups are listed in Appendix 6). We then re-estimate the base model for 
each of these subsamples. Table 6.2 reports the coefficient estimates. This analysis 
indirectly also serves as a sensitivity test to change in sample (countrywise). 
Results are generally consistent with our prior supposition. Aid enters with a 
positive sign in almost all regressions, though on average it is significant and larger 
in the group of economies with good growth record l . Using INVRES produces 
similar estimates. It is evident that aid is more effective in some countries and less in 
others. Insignificant aid coefficients do not necessarily imply aid ineffectiveness or 
cast doubt on the strength and validity of our prior conclusion that aid works. Rather 
I We do not use INVRES in any of the regressions r ~ o r t e d d in this chapter as it not v ~ · · clear, ~ o w w we 
can extend its use to aid interaction terms (which we mclude later). Hence, for conSistenCy \\ e use 
INV in all regressions here. 
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Table 6.2: Robust Aid-Growth Regressions for Subsamples 
Negative Growth in 1970-97 Positive Growth in 1970-97 
GDPO -0.0005 0.001 
-0.001 
-0.0002 0.001 0.001 (0.23) (0.40) (0.29) 0.001 0.001 (0.09) (1.89)* (1.84)* (2.32)** PRICl5 -0.128 -0.122 
-0.081 
(1. 73)* 
-0.072 0.273 0.272 0.325 0.305 (1.10) (0.97) (0.53) (0.47) (3.07)*** (2.98)*** (3.39)*** 
INV 0.134 0.131 0.102 0.100 
(3.12)*** 
0.075 0.083 0.041 0.065 (2.24)** (2.19)** (1.42) (1.41 ) (2.49)** (2.74)*** (1.26) 
DEM -1.266 -0.718 
-0.899 
-0.690 
(2.03)** 
-1.533 
-1.644 
-1.406 
-1.591 (1.39) (0.77) (0.79) (0.61) (3.08)*** (3.25)*** (2.70)*** (3.01)*** 
!NFL -0.003 -0.003 
-0.004 
-0.004 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.000 (2.57)** (2.35)** (2.62)** (2.52)** (0.12) (0.07) (0.27) (0.03) 
GCON -0.100 -0.100 -0.044 
-0.048 
-0.176 
-0.173 
-0.202 
-0.193 (1.06) (1.04) (0.41) (0.45) (2.45)** (2.41)** (2.87)*** (2.72)*** 
MGDP -0.010 -0.012 -0.008 
-0.004 0.001 0.002 
-0.007 
-0.003 (0.26) (0.29) (0.17) (0.08) (0.05) (0.17) (0.59) (0.28) 
GRANTS -0.161 0.232 
(0.69) (1.72)* 
GRANTSQ 0.015 
-0.006 
(1.33) (1.61) 
TAID 0.382 0.214 
(1.38) (1.54) 
TAIDSQ -0.011 
-0.005 
(1.19) (1.42) 
GRANTS_I 0.224 0.569 
(0.80) (3.11)*** 
GRANTS_ISQ -0.010 
-0.019 
(0.70) (2.66)*** 
TAID_I 0.373 0.313 
(1.12) (2.39)** 
TAID_ISQ -0.015 -0.008 
(0.99) (2.33)** 
Constant 4.221 -0.214 2.181 0.023 1.921 1.998 1.312 2.263 
(0.88) (0.04) (0.37) (0.00) (0.92) (0.92) (0.60) (0.99) 
Observations 64 64 56 56 84 84 78 79 
R-squared 0.57 0.54 0.50 0.49 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.39 
F-Stat 4.33 3.83 2.97 2.86 3.14 3.28 3.24 2.91 
Notes: All regressions run in a panel of seven four-year periods over 1970-97. Time 
dUlmnies included in all regressions. Absolute t-values are reported in brackets. 
* Significant at 10% level. ** 5% level. *** 1% level. F-Stat rejects the null that 
all the coefficients are jointly equal to zero .. 
they perhaps highlight the presence of factors (such as weak/failing transmission) 
that might be hampering positive effects of aid to translate into higher growth in 
certain countries. 
6.3 SENSITIVITY TO CONDITIONING SET OF VARIABLES 
Often, regression results are challenged as being specific to the conditioning set of 
variables. Our results may face similar reservations. We therefore address this 
concern by re-estimating our base model under various specification. First. \\'e run a 
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parsimonious version of the model. Then, we specify a second version that includes 
variables that have recently appeared in empirical work but not been represented in 
Equation 5.1 Finally, we test the robustness of our results to the introduction of aid 
interaction terms. We present each of these results in turn. 
6.3.1 A Parsimonious Model 
Advances in growth literature suggest the importance of a wide range of explanatory 
variables that are potentially important for growth. As a result, we incorporate 
political and policy variables among others in our base model. However, we want to 
demonstrate whether our findings rest on this exact specification. With this aim, we 
estimate a very simple model that will include only GDPO, PRlC15, INV and aid 
variables. Several aid effectiveness studies do not introduce investment in their 
regressIOns. While we argue that this would be an inappropriate approach as 
investment IS a principal determinant of growth, we want our results to be 
comparable to other empirical studies on aid. Hence, we estimate this parsimonious 
model with and without INV. Table 6.3 presents the estimates. 
Table 6.3: Robust Aid-Growth Regressions - A Parsimonious Model 
With INV Without INV 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
(2.68)*** (2.84)*** (2.68)*** (2.76)*** (3.39)*** (4.02)*** (3.33)*** (3.98)*** 
PRICl5 0.169 0.137 0.161 0.141 0.248 0.224 0.236 0.232 
(2.41)** (1. 74)* (2.32)** (1.80)* (3.68)*** (3.02)*** (3.49)*** (3.13)*** 
INV 0.087 0.079 0.088 0.082 
(3.53)*** (3.05)*** (3.62)*** (3.21)*** 
GRANTS 0.154 0.213 
(1.87)* 
GRANTSQ -0.003 
(1.46) 
GRANTS_I 0.261 
(2.58)** 
GRANTS_ISQ -0.005 
(1.71)* 
TAID 
TAIDSQ 
Constant -4.282 -4.826 
(3.86)*** (4.09)*** 
Observations 164 146 
R-squared 0.31 0.30 
F-Stat 6.16 5.85 
Note: Same applies as for Table 6.2 
0.171 
(1.87)* 
-0.003 
(1.51 ) 
-4.248 
(3.69)*** 
164 
0.31 
6.13 
0.257 
(2.40)** 
-0.005 
(1.65) 
(2.59)** 
-0.004 
(2.12)** 
-4.828 -3.819 
(3.92)*** (3.39)*** 
146 164 
0.30 0.25 
5.76 5.02 
92 
0.508 
(3.81)*** 
-0.015 
(2.65)*** 
-5.138 
(4.28)*** 
145 
0.28 
5.97 
0.227 
(2.45)** 
-0.004 
(2.06)** 
-3.691 
(3.12)*** 
164 
0.23 
4.63 
0.527 
(3.69)*** 
-0.016 
(2.72)*** 
-5.244 
(4.12)*** 
145 
(J.lt 
5.53 
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Aid enters with a significant and positive sign in all regressions. Note howeyer. 
coefficient on aid is on average more important both in terms of size and significance 
in regressions without INV. This result is not surprising given that our core findina 
b 
does suggest that aid impacts on growth mainly via investment. In the absence of an 
investment term, aid coefficient captures this effect. When investment is included 
together with an aid term (the first set of regressions), significant aid coefficient 
suggests that aid has an influence on growth additional to the effect through 
investment. This echoes the conclusions reached by Lensink and Morrissey (2000). 
6.3.2 An Encompassing Model 
As mentioned, there are numerous factors that may be important for growth. In spite 
of having introduced variables belonging to various dimensions of the economy, we 
do not claim to have specified a complete or 'true' model of growth. We now 
attempt to see how sensitive our results are to omitted variables. Rather than 
drawing variables from a large pool of potential determinants of growth, we prefer to 
introduce variables that are absent from our model but have appeared in recent aid-
growth regressions. For this purpose, we refer to two prominent papers in this 
literature - BD and Dalg aard-Hans en-Tarp (2002). We augment our aid-growth 
specification by regressors that have been commonly used in these two studies. 
These are ethnic fractionalisation (ETHNF), assassination (ASSASS) and institutional 
quality (INST). Table 6.4 displays the regression estimates. 
In line with Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp (2002), ethnic fractionalisation surprisingly 
enters with a positive sign, while the other additional regressors are in general 
insignificant. It would appear that these characteristics do not contribute to explain 
growth in a sample restricted to SSA countries only. Though, they are certainly 
important in wider data sets like the one used by BD and Dalgaard-Hansen-Tarp 
(2002). Turning to coefficients on aid, they are significant in some cases and 
insignificant in others. This does not necessarily have implications with regards to 
robustness of our results. Once the indirect effect on growth through investment is 
taken into account, aid enters with a significant positive sign in all regressions
2
. 
2 If lNVRES is included the coefficients on GRANTS=0.333 (t =2.28) and TAID=0.410 ( t = 2 . 9 ~ ) . .
Coefficients on their lagged counterparts are 0.392 (t=3.40) and 0.358 (2.78), respectIvely. 
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Table 6.4: Robust Aid-Growth Regressions An E . 
- ncompassmg Model 
Effect of current aid Effect oflagged aid 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 
-0.001 (0.59) -0.001 
PRlC15 
(1.00) (1.81)* (1.56) 0.254 0.283 0.299 (2.38)** (2.84)*** 0.275 (3.08)*** (2.49)** INV 0.155 0.133 0.127 0.150 (3.26)*** (2.94)*** (2.76)*** (2.89)*** DEM 
-1.442 
-1.468 
-2.240 
-2.042 (2.87)*** (3.02)*** (5.32)*** (4.40)*** INFL 
-0.002 
-0.003 
-0.004 
-0.003 (0.17) (0.31) (0045) (0.25) GCON 
-0.204 
-0.228 
-0.223 
-0.204 (2.99)*** (3.67)*** (4.14)*** (3.49)*** MGDP 
-0.012 
-0.012 
-0.014 
-0.014 (1.01) (1.05) (1.31) (1.23) ETHNF 0.030 0.037 0.027 0.023 (1.84)* (2.37)** (1.82)* (lAO) ASS ASS 6.233 7.711 0.612 0.689 (0.96) (1.23) (0.12) (0.12) 
ETHNF*ASSASSIN 
-0.113 
-0.138 0.001 
-0.002 (1.17) (1.47) (0.02) (0.02) 
INST 00424 0.510 0.549 0.541 
(1.23) (1.61) (1.76)* (1.60) 
GRANTS 0.126 
(0.93) 
GRANTSQ 
-0.004 
(1.20) 
TAID 0.237 
(1.76)* 
TAIDSQ 
-0.006 
(1.97)* 
GRANTS_l 0.192 
(1.78)* 
GRANTS_lSQ 
-0.006 
(2.31)** 
TAID_l 0.131 
(1.05) 
TAID_lSQ 
-0.005 
(1.60) 
Constant -4.532 -6.105 1.569 0.901 
{1.35) {1.74)* {0.63) (0.32) 
Observations 86 86 78 78 
R-squared 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.58 
F-Stat 5.10 6.15 6044 4.93 
Note: Same applies as in Table 6.2 
6.3.3 Issue of Aid and Policy Interaction 
BD marked a milestone in aid literature. Their work has had a profound effect on the 
perceptions of aid effectiveness, especially at the World Bank. They claim that aid 
works only in the presence of good policies. They find in support a positively signed 
aid-policy interaction term. However, HT challenge this conclusion with a rigorous 
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econometric analysis. An important issue that arises in their critical assessment is 
that aid-policy and aid-squared term act as proxy for each other. This lends support 
to their specification which includes aid, aid2 and aid-policy terms3 . BD result tends 
to be fragile across these specifications. We intend to adopt a similar specification 
here. The purpose of this analysis is threefold. First, if aid-squared is picking up 
only the effects of an omitted interaction term in our regression, we will find 
evidence for this. Second, it will allow us to examine if our regressions support BD 
conclusion. Third, it will demonstrate if our findings are sensitive to this 
specification. We explore the effect of policy on aid effectiveness by employing 
three indicators of policy regime - inflation, openness (OPEN) and a BD-type policy 
index (PI)4. Results are provided in Table 6.S 
The positive effect of aid holds on average. Aid and aid-squared terms remain 
significant in most cases, especially when lagged aid is introduced. The nature of the 
correlation between aid effectiveness and policy is however not very clear -
insignificant, positive or negative. BD conclusion may be sensitive to the policy 
indicator used. Ambiguity on this issue stresses the complexity of studying this 
transmission mechanism and therefore our resolution not to fully investigate it within 
this volume. 
3 See Chapter 3 for more details. 
4 PI= 0.47-0.001 INFL - 0.158 GOV + 0.01 MGDP 
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Table 6.5a : Robust Aid-Policy Augmented Regressions with GRANTS 
Effect of current GRANTS Effect of lagged GRA:-:TS 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (2.38)** (2.34)** (2.13)** (2.25)** (2.22)** (2.19)** (2.14)** (2.23)** PRICi5 0.212 0.207 0.134 0.220 0.182 0.180 0.155 0.182 (3.09)*** (2.91)*** (1.87)* (3.23)*** (2.34)** (2.21)** (1.89)* (2.39)** INV 0.109 0.110 0.144 0.111 0.105 0.106 0.133 0.104 (4.42)*** (4.40)*** (3.78)*** (4.54)*** (4.01)*** (3.92)*** (3.08)*** (4.02)*** DEM 
-1.261 
-1.282 
-1.496 
-1.247 
-1.287 
-1.298 
-1.285 
-1.280 (3.52)*** (3.51)*** (3.94)*** (3.52)*** (3.34)*** (3.29)*** (3.21)*** (3.40)*** INFL 
-0.004 
-0.005 
-0.003 
-0.004 
-0.004 
-0.004 
-0.003 
-0.004 (2.50)** (0.93) (2.46)** (2.77)*** (2.55)** (0.65) (2.40)** (2.98)*** GCON -0.149 
-0.151 
-0.162 
-0.249 
-0.151 
-0.152 
-0.158 
-0.302 (2.64)*** (2.66)*** (2.89)*** (2.80)*** (2.59)** (2.57)** (2.70)*** (3.34)*** MGDP 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.010 
-0.001 
-0.001 
-0.007 0.010 (0.22) (0.23) (0.01) (0.85) (0.12) (0.11 ) (0.60) (0.89) GRANTS 0.161 0.150 0.086 
-0.021 
(1.89)* (1.65) (0.97) (0.14) 
GRANTSQ 
-0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
-0.001 
(1.65) (1.64) (0.89) (0.76) 
GRANTS*INFL 0.000 
(OJ2) 
GRANTS*OPEN 0.130 
(2.12)** 
GRANTS*PI 
-0.064 
(l.40) 
GRANTS_l 0.265 0.260 0.398 -0.057 
(2.59)** (2.30)** (2.78)*** (OJ2) 
GRANTS_lSQ 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.016 -0.004 
(2.22)** (2.17)** (2.43)** (1.27) 
GRANTS_l *lNFL 0.000 
GRANTS_l *OPEN 
(0.11 ) 
0.152 
(1.97)* 
GRANTS_l*Pl 
-0.124 
(2.03)** 
Constant 0.525 0.697 1.276 0.543 0.477 0.543 -0.295 2.899 
{0.32} {0.41} {0.71} {OJO} {0.28) {OJO} {0.15} {1.45} 
Observations 149 149 133 135 135 135 121 135 
R-squared 0.46 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.46 
F-Stat 7.40 6.86 7J3 7.20 6.64 6.12 6.52 6.89 
Note: Same applies as in Table 6.2 
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Table 6.5b : Robust Aid-Policy Augmented R . . egressIOns wIth T AID 
Effect of current T AID Effect oflagged T AID 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (2.35)** (2.30)** 0.001 0.001 0.001 (2.05)** (2.18)** (2.07)** (1.98)** (2.29)** PRIC15 0.205 0.197 0.128 0.209 0.177 (2.00)** 0.168 0.144 (2.99)*** (2.77)*** (1.81)* (3.04)*** (2.27)** 0.185 (2.02)** (1.79)* lNV 0.111 0.113 0.148 0.113 0.106 (2.40)** (4.49)*** (4.48)*** 0.109 0.118 0.107 (3.87)*** (4.56)*** (4.02)*** (3.99)*** (2.75)*** DEM -1.328 
-1.355 
-1.574 
-1.321 (·U5)*** 
-1.231 
-1.279 
-1.358 (3.69)*** (3.70)*** (4.14)*** (3.67)*** -1.233 (3.19)*** (3.20)*** (3.40)*** lNFL -0.004 
-0.006 
-0.003 
-0.004 
-0.004 
(3.24)*** 
(2.50)** (1.04) -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 (2.48)** (2.62)*** (2.68)*** (0.72) (2.52)** GCON -0.143 -0.146 
-0.159 
-0.197 
(2.99)*** 
-0.134 
-0.140 
-0.128 
-0.238 (2.58)** (2.60)** (2.89)*** (2.19)** (2.33)** (2.35)** (2.20)** (2.69)*** MGDP 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.006 0.000 0.000 
-0.005 0.008 (0.21) (0.24) (0.07) (0.54) (0.02) (0.01) (0.41 ) (0.69) TAID 0.174 0.157 0.089 0.065 
(1.85)* (1.58) (0.90) (0.41) 
TAIDSQ -0.004 
-0.004 -0.002 
-0.003 
(1.69)* (1.67)* (0.99) (1.10) 
TAID*INFL 0.001 
(0.43) 
TAlD*OPEN 0.118 
(2.16)** 
TAID*PI 
-0.035 
(0.75) 
TAID_l 0.242 0.219 0.439 0.030 
TAID_1SQ 
(2.25)** (1.79)* (2.89)*** (0.17) 
-0.006 -0.006 -0.018 -0.004 
TAlD_l*INFL 
(1.99)** (1.85)* (2.78)*** (1.36) 
0.001 
(0.37) 
TAID_l*OPEN 0.192 
(2.58)** 
TAID_l*PI 
-0.079 
(l.45) 
Constant 0.655 0.871 1.454 1.554 0.310 0.670 -0.811 1.922 
{0.39} {0.50} {0.81) {0.78} {0.17) {0.342 {0.40} {0.93) 
Observations 149 149 133 149 135 135 121 135 
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.51 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.49 0.44 
F-Stat 7.47 6.93 7.56 7.01 6.40 5.87 6.64 6.32 
Note: Same applies as in Table 6.2 
6.4 SENSITIVITY TO SAMPLE PERIOD 
To test the possibility that change in sample period is the reason that BD conclusions 
do not hold in our model, we re-estimate aid-policy augmented regressions using 
data from 1970 to 1993 only. Since most of the significant aid studies are based in 
this time period (BD, HT, Durbarry et al (1998)), this exploration would also allow 
direct comparison of our results and test its sensitivity to sample period. Results are 
reported in Table 6.6. 
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Table6.6a:Robust Aid-Policy Augmented Regressions with GRANTS in 1970-93 
Effect of current GRANTS Effect oflagged GRANTS 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (2.79)*** (2.71)*** (2.55)** (2.66)*** (2.37)** (2.37)** (1.92)* (2.37)** PRIC15 0.214 0.209 0.142 0.227 0.209 0.212 0.164 0.220 (2.89)*** (2.76)*** (1.90)* (3.11)*** (2.42)** (2.39)** (1.86)* (2.60)** fNV 0.114 0.116 0.180 0.114 0.094 0.093 0.160 0.092 (3.71)*** (3.73)*** (4.22)*** (3.76)*** (2.73)*** (2.66)*** (3.06)*** (2.72)*** DEM -1.584 -1.614 
-1.583 
-1.545 
-1.444 
-1.416 
-1.222 
-1.387 (3.90)*** (3.89)*** (3.89)*** (3.86)*** (3.29)*** (3.19)*** (2.76)*** (3.21)*** fNFL 0.003 0.000 0.007 
-0.002 0.004 0.007 0.009 
-0.004 (0.29) (0.02) (0.64) (0.19) (0.35) (0.36) (0.84) (2.81)*** GCON -0.187 -0.191 
-0.206 
-0.299 
-0.178 
-0.174 
-0.185 
-0.327 (3.07)*** (3.06)*** (3.54)*** (2.96)*** (2.81)*** (2.67)*** (2.96)*** (3.37)*** MGDP 0.004 0.004 
-0.002 0.012 0.001 0.001 
-0.007 0.011 (0.40) (0.40) (0.21) (0.99) (0.12) (0.13) (0.55) (0.87) GRANTS 0.265 0.257 0.219 0.077 
(2.41)** (2.20)** (2.06)** (0.46) 
GRANTSQ -0.006 -0.006 
-0.006 
-0.005 
(2.00)** (2.00)** (2.03)** (1.55) 
GRANTS*fNFL 0.000 
(0.22) 
GRANTS*OPEN 0.153 
(2.03)** 
GRANTS*Pf 
-0.068 
(1.35) 
GRANTS_I 0.325 0.338 0.443 0.001 
(2.88)*** (2.57)** (1.97)* (0.01) 
GRANTS_ISQ 
-0.007 -0.007 -0.018 -0.004 
(2.34)** (2.30)** 0.43) 0.33 ) 
GRANTS_I *fNFL 0.000 
(0.18) 
GRANTS_I *OPEN 0.178 
(1.72)* 
GRANTS_IPf 
-0.119 
(1. 79)* 
Constant 
-1.949 -1.724 -1.997 -0.162 -1.708 -1.945 -3.206 0.674 
(1.04) (0.85) (1.00) (0.07) { 0 . 8 7 ~ ~ {0.912 { 1 . 4 4 ~ ~ {0.322 
Observations 124 124 111 124 110 110 99 III 
R-squared 0.45 0.45 0.53 0.47 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.50 
F-Stat 6.44 5.99 7.19 6.26 5.13 4.70 5.23 6.93 
Note: Same applies as in Table 6.2 
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Table 6.6b :Robust Aid-Policy Augmented Regressions with TAm in 1970-93 
Effect of current T AID Effect of lagged T AID 
GDPO 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 (2.89)*** (2.78)*** (2.87)*** (2.76)*** 0.001 
PRIC15 0.206 0.201 0.137 
(2.28)** (2.17)** (2.20)** (2.21 )** 0.212 0.189 0.183 0.158 (2.77)*** (2.62)** (1.85)* 0.204 (2.83)*** (2.13)** (2.00)** (1.77)* INV 0.122 0.123 0.191 0.123 (2.36)** 0.097 0.099 0.142 0.097 (3.94)*** (3.91)*** (4.47)*** (3.95)*** (2.75)*** (2.75)*** (2.63)** DEM -1.698 -1.726 
-1.770 
-1.684 
(2.83)*** 
-1.374 
-1.404 
-1.273 
-1.344 (4.14)*** (4.11)*** (4.34)*** (4.10)*** (3.07)*** (3.09)*** (2.85)*** INFL 0.003 -0.003 (3.06)*** 0.008 0.001 0.004 
-0.001 0.010 (0.29) (0.13) (0.73) -0.004 (0.10) (0.39) (0.02) (0.89) 
GCON -0.185 -0.190 
-0.212 
-0.230 
(2.91)*** 
-0.152 
-0.158 
-0.156 
-0.269 (3.09)*** (3.06)*** (3.70)*** (2.21)** (2.39)** (2.39)** (2.47)** (2.78)*** MGDP 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.008 0.002 0.002 
-0.005 0.009 (0.45) (0.43) (0.02) (0.63) (0.18) (0.18) (0.38) (0.75) TAID 0.302 0.283 0.288 0.218 
(2.58)** (2.27)** (2.55)** (1.23) 
TAIDSQ -0.007 -0.007 
-0.007 
-0.006 
(2.19)** (2.16)** (2.49)** (1.91)* 
TAID*INFL 0.001 
(0.31) 
TAID*OPEN 0.148 
(2.05)** 
TAID*PI 
-0.027 
(0.52) 
TAID_l 0.443 0.421 0.538 0.221 
(2.01)** (1.83)* (2.45)** (0.89) 
TAID_lSQ 
-0.016 -0.015 -0.023 -0.015 
(1.36) (1.33) (2.01)** (1.31) 
TAID_l *INFL 0.001 
(0.27) 
TAID_l*OPEN 0.235 
(2.24)** 
TAID_l*PI 
-0.086 
(1.44) 
Constant -2.121 -1.762 -2.410 -1.327 -2.451 -2.107 -4.085 -0.539 
(1.07) (0.81) (1.19) (0.56) (1.13) (0.89) (1. 75)* (0.24) 
Observations 124 124 111 124 109 109 99 110 
R-squared 0.47 0.47 0.57 0.47 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.48 
F-Stat 6.90 6.34 8.26 6.36 4.65 4.25 5.34 6.14 
Note: Same applies as in Table 6.2 
The base model performs well. Aid (as an additive term) is significant in almost all 
regressions and aid-squared turns significant in more regressions than before. This 
suggests that our finding that aid has a positive effect on growth in SSA is robust to 
sample period. With regards to the aid-interaction terms, there is no change in 
results. They enter with an insignificant coefficient in some cases and 
positive/negative in others, hence making this result difficult to interpret. It \\'ould 
therefore appear that fragility of BD conclusion is not attributed to the sample period 
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used. The nature of the interaction between indicators of policy and aid remains an 
open question. Even more so, it is yet an unresolved issue how to model this linle 
Though, it should be noted that there is yet no strong reason to prefer this 
specification. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
An inherent limitation of cross-country panel regressions is that one estimates the 
average value of a coefficient, and this might not be an estimate valid for any 
particular country. However, what one is seeking is patterns or empirical regularities. 
In this respect we identify a tendency for aid to contribute to growth through 
investment. In this chapter, we speculate on individual country experience based on 
the estimated growth regression. We also conduct a stability analysis to test how 
sturdy our findings are. 
The stability analysis in this chapter exammes how persistent our results are to 
changes in the sample. U sing different sets of explanatory variables by 
adding/deleting regressors from our base growth model and varying the time period, 
we study the robustness of our estimates. In most cases the estimated aid coefficient 
is positive and significant. In a few cases, when the specification includes an aid-
policy interaction term, the coefficient becomes insignificant. However, it is yet an 
empirical question whether such a specification is necessary (or preferable). The 
balance of the results is that aid is effective. 
Although we find aid to be effective on average, this does not imply that aid ensures 
growth. Indeed, most SSA countries have had a very poor growth performance (and 
this is one reason why they continue to be large recipients of aid). The potential 
positive effect of aid can be offset by factors that are detrimental to growth. In many 
cases this is partly due to bad policy. However, this is not the whole explanation -
our results suggest that aid can be effective even if policies are bad (we do include 
variables to capture policy). The variables in our aid-growth model capture sources 
of positive growth better than explaining the forces behind negative gro\vth 
performance. Stated differently, the negative growth in SSA countries appears to be 
due to factors other than those represented in our regressions. This supports our 
belief that the observed combination of generous aid flo\vs and slow growth in SSA 
100 
CHAPTER 6:Further Analysis on Aid and Growth 
does not necessarily imply aid ineffectiveness. Aid performance lower than could 
otherwise be possible in the absence of shocks would seem to be a more plausible 
explanation. 
This is not to claim that aid to Africa has been a success - evidently it has not. 
However, there is more than a pedantic difference between claiming that aid is 
ineffective because growth performance has not matched aid receipts and claiming 
that aid has been effective although its potential contribution to growth has not been 
fully realised. The former claim permits the policy conclusion of reducing aid 
whereas the latter does not. The latter emphasises, implicitly at least, the desirability 
of maintaining aid while identifying and addressing the factors that explain Africa's 
poor growth performance. Our conclusion is that aid has been beneficial to African 
countries, but much needs to be done to ensure that these benefits lead to growth. 
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APPENDIX 6 : DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Definitions and sources of data 
OPEN dummy takes value of 1 if economy is open at the beginning of the 
ETHNF 
ASSASSIN 
PI 
period and 0 othelWise. Source: Sachs and Warner (1995) 
ethnic fractionalisation index. Source: Easterly dataset 
assassinations. Source: Easterly dataset 
BD-type policy index. Source: constructed. 
List of countries 
Countries with negative growth over 1970-97: 
Central Africa 
Chad 
Congo Democratic Republic 
Cote D'Ivoire 
Ghana 
Madagascar 
Mauritania 
Niger 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Sierra Leonne 
Togo 
Zambia 
Countries with positive growth over 1970-97: 
Benin Malawi 
Botswana Mali 
Burkina Faso Mauritius 
Burundi Nigeria 
Cameroon Seychelles 
Congo Republic South Africa 
Ethiopia Swaziland 
Gabon Tanzania 
Gambia Uganda 
Kenya Zimbabwe 
Lesotho 
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AID AND GROWTH: 
IDENTIFYING THRESHOLD EFFECTS 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
Concerns regarding aid has undergone various distinct changes. Not only has 
allocation policy shifted from project aid to conditional aid (for structural 
adjustment) in the 1980s and to aid selectivity more recently, but the basic gro\\l1h 
theory underlying aid effectiveness studies has changed as well. An endogenous 
growth model framework has gained in popularity rather than the traditional Harrod-
Domar model. In this chapter, we are however concerned with one particular 
development in the empirical approach. 
In recent years, empirical literature on the relationship between aid and growth has 
witnessed a strong tendency towards a non-linear specification. The justification for 
this class of models is inherent in the form of the non-linear term. There have been 
two specific ways of introducing this non-linearity in aid studies. First, an aid 
squared term, which represents the novel feature of Hadjimichael et al. (1995), is 
used to capture the possibility that aid flows display djmjnjshing returns beyond a 
certain 'optimal' level. They find a significantly negative coefficient on the aid-
squared term, in support of their hypothesis. The inclusion of squared aid has since 
emerged as a tradition in aid-growth regressions (Durbarry et al.(1998), Hansen and 
Tarp(2001), Lensink and White (2001)). 
Second, interaction terms have been introduced to capture possible non-linearities in 
the aid-growth linkage!. On one hand, Burnside and Dollar (2000) rely on aid 
interacted with a policy index to argue that aid effectiveness is conditional on good 
quality of policies. On the other, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) emphasise the 
role of uncertainty - the more vulnerable a country is, the more room for 
improvement to be brought by aid, therefore the higher is aid effectiveness. Hence, 
they introduce an aid-uncertainty interaction term. Recently, Dalgaard et al (2002) 
have argued for an interaction between aid and climatic conditions. 
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Whilst the use of interaction telIDS is still a subject of debate, we here do not attempt 
to resolve disputes. Rather, we want to investigate the first category of models 
where the coefficient on aid squared term is interpreted as capturing diminishing 
returns to aid. Lensink and White (2001) have gone one step further in modelling it 
as an aid Laffer curve. In this context, the assumptions are that aid effectiveness is 
non-linear in aid and that this non-linearity takes a very specific form (inverted U-
shape). We here employ a threshold econometric model, as developed by Hansen 
(2000), to directly test these assumptions. The development of this technique is 
fairly recent and has been applied in only a few empirical studies, none of which 
covers the aid-growth literature. Its application is the novel feature of this chapter. 
We conduct this analysis for a sample of 131 aid recipents for which Effective 
Development Assistance data are available over the period 1975 to 1995. While this 
is the first demonstration of identifying regimes using the threshold model in aid 
literature, we make no claim of efficiency. Other estimators can potentially be more 
efficient, as acknowledged by Hansen (2000). However, one would appreciate that 
consistent estimation of the threshold in this class of model is still a matter of current 
research. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 briefly examines the 
concept on an Aid Laffer curve. Section 7.3 reviews the different techniques used in 
the empirical literature to address the issue of threshold effects. A preliminary data 
analysis is conducted in Section 7.4. An outline of the econometric method follows 
in Section 7.5. In Section 7.6, we discuss the estimation results. Finally, Section 7. 7 
concludes with some observations. 
7.2 AID LAFFER CURVE 
The notion of a threshold in the relationship between aid and growth was first 
formalised by an Aid Laffer curve as presented by Lensink and White (2001) (Figure 
7. 1). Their motivation to formulate this concept is that 
I See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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, . . .. aid may have not merely decreasing returns (a . . hi proposItIOn w ch everyone 
would surely accept) but that, after a certain level the returns t furth 'd . 
, 0 er ill mflO\\"s 
are negative. This idea, i.e, that a country can get "too m h 'd" b uc a.I ,can e sho\\ n by 
an aid Laffer curve ... .' (Lensink and White (2001 :48)) 
Beneficial 
Effects 
FIGURE 7.1: Aid Laffer Curve 
Aid* Aid 
In which case, they suggest that the recipient economy will be better off without any 
further aid disbursements hence prescribe the imposition of a ceiling in aid flows at 
around the top of the aid Laffer curve. They recommend that any country receiving 
foreign aid beyond this level should lose this excess which will consequently be 
redistributed to countries which are still somewhere before the maximum point in the 
Laffer curve. This result is based on an endogenous growth model where savings is 
detennined through an optimisation process2. Lensink and White (2001) finding is 
motivated by a derivative of growth with respect to aid that is predicted to be positive 
only when aid share is within a certain range. In this chapter, we also want to test 
this hypothesis of negative returns to aid. 
It is also worth noting that this conclusion is based on one critical assumption: the 
level of technology is negatively related to amounts of aid receiyed. an argument 
2 See Chapter 2 for a detailed presentation of this theoretical work. 
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prompted by Griffin (1970) who suggest that aid dampens the productivity of 
investment projects. This inverse relationship between aid and producti\1ty is 
associated with the absorptive capacity of an economy. Aid inflows are believed to 
have the desirable effect of promoting investment, however high levels of investment 
are sometimes beyond the country's 'management capability'. In other words, it is 
suggested that recipients have the ability to implement aid successfully only in a 
certain number of development projects. From these explanations, it appears that 
though aid is crucial for development in poor countries, low absorptive capacity of 
an economy may limit returns to aid flows. Consistent with these findings, a review 
by ODC
3 
'Strenthening Aid in Africa' emphasises the need for aid allocation 
decisions to take into consideration the absorptive capacity of recipient countries 
rather than focusing on some arbitrary share of GNP of donor countries. Note that 
these arguments are suggesting that only if this unfavourable effect of aid on 
productivity is substantial that aid would lead to reductions in growth rate. Lensink 
and White (2001) further argue that the recipient economy by diverting its resources 
to manage the aid programme exacerbates the decreasing returns to foreign aid 
resources. 
With respect to the increasing importance of aid-supported technological transfer 
(labour orland capital-augmenting) that has been argued to promote the quality of 
aid-financed projects (indeed an old justification for project aid, see Guillaumont 
1975), one may want to reparameterise Lensink and White (2001) model and explore 
the effects that would have on their conclusions. We leave that for future research. 
We now proceed to present the different methods used in the literature to address 
threshold effects. 
7.3 REVIEW OF THRESHOLD IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURES 
In the empirica1literature, very often we find that in order to study the relationship 
between two economic variables, the regression model needs to be estimated on 
. b 1 S t· the full sample is divided based on appropnately selected su samp es. orne mes, 
categorical variables, such as gender, age and so on. Alternatively, sample splitting 
is sometimes based on continuous variables, such as income, firm size and so on. In 
3 van der Walle and Johnston (1996:98). 
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such cases, it becomes important to determine at which point to divide the sample 
(for example, how large must the income level be to be classified as 'high'). So far, 
various methods have been used to find this unknown value of a continuous variable 
at which a subs ample is selected. We briefly review a few of these practices. 
7.3.1 Exogenously imposed data splits 
Durlauf and Johnson (1995) applied this technique to study the existence of a 
multiple steady state model. Each subgroup of countries, identified by initial 
conditions, converges to a steady state and exhibits a distinct Solow-type regression. 
This consequently produces a number of locally stable steady states. To study this 
non-linear relationship between per capita income and growth, Durlauf and Johnson 
(1995) mechanically divide the sample into two and three so that the observations 
belong to different production function and therefore converge to different steady 
states. They use level of initial per capita output (Y/L) and adult literacy rate (LR) 
as the split variables. The threshold levels have been exogenously selected as 
follows: a two-way split based on output depends on whether Y/L is below or above 
$1950 while the three-way split depends on whether Y/L is less than $1150, between 
$1150 and $2750 or exceeds $2750. For initial literacy rate, the two-way split is 
based on LR < 54% and LR>54%, while the three-way split is based on LR<26%, 
26% < LR < 72% and LR>72%. These exogenously imposed data splits are 
appealing in the sense that they represent a straightforward technique to select 
subsamples. However they face one major drawback. They do not stand on strong 
grounds since both the number of regimes and location of sample splits are arbitrarily 
selected and not based on prior economic guidance. Credible sample split would 
result if there is economic evidence suggesting, for instance, all economies with 
output per capita less than $1150 are in the low category and potentially have a 
different production function. Another serious limitation of this approach to sample 
splitting is that it is not possible to draw any inference on the location of the 
threshold as it is not determined within the model. 
7.3.2 Regression tree analysis 
This technique, as described by Breiman et at (1984), provides a non-parametric way 
of identifying different regimes based on a set of control variables. Its appeal lies in 
the fact that it is a data-sorting method which allows multiple control variables to 
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endogenously determine the number and location of thresholds rather than imposing 
these features exogenously. 
Suppose X j is the vector of control variables such that X j = (X l.j , ........ ,xr.j) . 
The support of each xi,} (where i = 1 ...... r) is given as the union of M intervals as 
follows: {ai,O ~ ~ xi.j < aU , ........... , ai,M-l ~ ~ xi.j < ai,M }. At an initial stage, for 
each control variable Xi, the sample is split into two subgroups namely S( 'J and 
a,l 
S (a' ,i) . If xi.j < a for observation}, it is assigned to sample S( a,O otherwise it is 
assigned to S ( a'.i)' This is performed for the whole range of values for a as given by 
the support of Xi' At the end of this procedure, we shall have traced out all the 
possible binary splits in the sample when Xi is used as the segregating control 
variable. Repeating this procedure for each control variable will give all the two-
way splits possible in the sample using the whole set of control variables. Using 
OLS to estimate the regression of YJ' on X J' for each subs ample S(a i) and S , , (a' ,I) 
gives the estimates t3(a i) and /3 ,respectively. The sum of squared residuals 
, (a' ,z) 
(SSR) is given as: 
I'(y j - X j /3( a ,i) Y 
jES(a.i) 
The control variable X· and value a that minimise the SSR determines the initial two-1 
way split in the dataset. TJ denotes the first set of subgroups, S2 and S3. This 
procedure is performed all over again on each subsample S2 and S3 and SSR is 
obtained for each one. The second stage splits are again identified \\'here SSR is 
minimised. Subsample S2 is accordingly divided into two new groups, S4 and S, 
while S3 is split into S6 and S7. This new set of splits are referred to as T2. This 
technique of sample splitting is performed sequentially on each subset created in 
previous iterations until the number of observations in a subgroup is less than or 
h h li . bl may \'ary across equal to twice the number of regressors. Note t at t e sp t vana e 
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iterations, The regression tree analysis can be diagram t' 11 ' 
rna lca y seen as FIgUre -: , (see Breiman et al (1984)), '-' .-
FIGURE 7.2: Regression Tree 
S5 6 7 
S8 
Node 
Sample is a nonterminal node. Sample 
number is a tenninal node 
Split variable Split variable 
Split value Split value 
This procedure has the advantage of allowing the data to uncover the number and 
location of thresholds as well as the relevant control variable to split the sample. 
However, its downside lies in the fact that it does not ha\'e any kno\\TI d i ~ t r i b l l t i o n a l l
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theory to test the statistical significance of multiple regimes. This tends to 
overshadow its contribution to identification of threshold(s) through an endogenous 
process. 
7.3.3 Use of quadratic term 
Existence of a threshold implies a non-linear relationship. One approach to account 
for this non-linearity has been to specify the relevant explanatory variable in 
quadratic term. Generally, a squared term has been used to identify the location of a 
threshold. The turning point denotes the threshold level of the control variable. This 
technique has been widely used in the aid literature (Hadjimichael et at (1995), 
Durbarry et at (1998), Hansen and Tarp (2001), Lensink and White (2001)). By 
relying on an aid squared term, they have all commonly identified the threshold in 
aid flows as given by the solution to the first order differential of growth with respect 
to aid, equated to zero. In other words, the threshold in the aid-growth link is 
perceived to occur where aid level reaches the value given by the ratio - /31 where 
2/32 ' 
f31 and f3 2 refer to the regression coefficients on aid and aid-squared, respectively. 
Easterly and Levine (1997) employ the same approach to investigate the link 
between growth and initial per capita income. 
With regards to the wide use of this approach, we find it important to draw attention 
to some of its limitations. The specification of a squared term implicitly assumes 
that the empirical link under study follows a two-regime model. Hence, even if the 
data are allowed to determine the threshold level, the number of thresholds has been 
exogenously determined. Also, a specific form of non-linearity underlying the 
relationship has been imposed on the model at the outset itself. For instance, the aid 
squared term, which is expected to be negatively signed, already perceives the 
relationship between aid flows and growth rate as an inverted V-shaped curve. In 
other words, it is presumed that the effect of aid on growth displays increasing then 
diminishing/negative returns to additional aid flows. However, various curyatures 
may be possible from different theoretical assumptions and parameterisations. Also. 
specific to the aid literature, Hansen and Tarp (2000) haye recently raised some 
doubts on the interpretation of a squared teIID. They suggest that significant 
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coefficients on an aid squared term does not necessarily imply diminishing returns to 
aid, it may instead be signalling the importance of an omitted interaction t 4 erm . 
The above discussion sheds some light on the range of techniques available to 
investigate multiple regime models. It also brings to attention both the merits and 
drawbacks of each of these techniques. What is required is a technique that satisfies 
four characteristics: the sample data are allowed to determine (1) the number of 
threshold(s), (2) the location of threshold(s), (3) the specific form of non-linearity 
and (4) it offers some asymptotic theory to test the statistical significance of the 
findings on thresholds. Consequently, we propose to use the Hansen (2000) 
econometric technique of sample splitting as it satisfies all these requirements. First, 
we want to see if our data support the use of this new approach to threshold effects. 
7.4 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
For our empirical study, we use Effective Development Assistance (EDA) as a 
percentage of GNP to measure aid flows (AID). EDA is a new database on foreign 
aid compiled by Chang et al (1998) for the World Banle EDA flows differ from 
aECD aDA flows in that it is the sum of grants and grant equivalents of official 
loans, whilst aDA includes grants and concessional loans with a grant component 
above 25%. Hence, aDA is somewhat higher than EDA. However, Hansen and 
Tarp (2000) report that using aDA or EDA does not have any substantial effect on 
estimation results, as suggested by the strong Pearson correlation between these two 
definitions. We could have used TAID as in previous chapter, but unavailability of 
data on food aid and technical co-operation would have significantly reduced the 
sample size. The composition of the sample, both timewise and countrywise, is 
determined by availability of annual data on EDA flows. Hence, the sample period 
starts in 1975, the first year in EDA series and all aid recipients are included. 
By way of a preliminary analysis, using annual data from 1975 to 1995, we plot the 
graph of aid series against growth rates of recipients countries, as provided by 
Figure7.3. The graph shows that growth experience of aid recipients varies 
considerably, and does not convey any clear indication of the form of curvature that 
characterise the aid-growth link. Also, it makes no distinction between grO\\1h that is 
4 See Chapter 3 for more details. 
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attributed to aid flows and other control variables. Our prime interest lies in the 
relationship between foreign aid and aid-induced growth. 
FIGURE 7.3: Plot of actual values 
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To uncover any underlying non-linearity we need to smooth the plot. For this 
purpose, we carry out locally weighted smoothing of growth on aid flows 
(Cleveland, 1979). The smoothed values are obtained by running a regression of 
growth rates on aid. A small amount of data surrounding a point, as can be observed 
from a scatterplot, is used for this regression. The regression is weighted such that 
the central point (Xi, Yi) gets the highest weight and points farther away receive less. 
The estimated regression then provides the smoothed predicted values of the Yi used. 
A separate weighted regression is estimated for every point in the data to obtain the 
remaining smoothed values. This smoothing technique is desirable because of its 
locality which enables it to follow the data. A global smoother would be less 
desirable since, for instance, what happens on the extreme left of a scatterplot can 
affect the fitted values on the extreme right. The amount of smoothing is affected by 
the bandwidth. For example, 80% of the data are used in smoothing each point if a 
bandwidth of 0.8 is specified. Hence, smaller bandwidths would follow the original 
data more closely. Figure 7.4 displays the graph of smoothed values using a 
bandwidth of 0.05 
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FIGURE 7.4: Plot of smoothed predicted values 
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The locally weighted regressIOn smoothing approach seems to reveal that the 
correlation between aid and growth is positive at very high aid levels. On the one 
hand, this contradicts the predictions of an aid Laffer aspect according to which high 
aid flows generate negative returns to growth. On the other, this revelation in some 
way reflects the implications of a neo-classical model - the belief that only generous 
aid flows succeed in helping economies permanently out of the poverty trap. The 
nature of this correlation is somewhat uncertain at lower aid levels. Whilst the 
smoothing approach has been helpful in suggesting that the aid-growth link may not 
necessarily be an inverted V-shaped one, one should recognise that it is only an 
exploratory tool. An empirical examination would be more informative. 
In sum, the above exploratory analysis validates our argument that use of a quadratic 
term to account for non-linearity is not entirely appropriate since the form of non-
linearity itself is still a blurred subject. Instead, the application of a threshold model 
that is allowed to endogenously uncover the curvature is desirable. 
113 
CHAPTER 7: Aid and Growth: Identifying Threshold Effects 
7.5 THRESHOLD MODEL 
Threshold regression models have been used in cases where observations fall into 
classes/regimes depending on an unknown value of an observed variable. The 
structural equation is given as: 
(7.1) 
where 1(.) is the indicator function which sorts the data to create various subsamples. 
A and Z refer to aid and other regressors, respectively. The seminal contribution of 
Hansen (2000) is to allow one to estimate and make valid statistical inference of the 
threshold. There are three statistical issues that need to be addressed in a threshold 
model: (1) how to jointly estimate the threshold value yand the slope parameters (2) 
how to test the hypothesis that a threshold exists, that is, HO: f3a] = f3a2and (3) how 
to construct confidence intervals for yand ~ . . We briefly discuss each in turn. 
7.5.1 Estimation of threshold value 
Chan (1993) and Hansen (1999)5 recommend obtaining the least squares estimate y 
- the value that minimises the concentrated sum of squared errors for Equation 7.1, 
that is, 
Notice that the sum of squared error function Sn (y) depends on yonly through the 
indicator function. Hence, the minimisation problem is a step procedure where each 
step occurs at distinct values of the observed threshold variable (Ait). Suppose Air 
takes n values. For each of these n values, the threshold regression model is 
estimated and the sum of squared errors, S n (y) , is obtained. y is the one which will 
minimise this function. As it stands, Equation 7.1 is non-linear. However, by fixing 
the value of y at each step, Equation 7.1 becomes linear, so OLS estimation IS 
appropriate. Once y is obtained, the slope coefficient estimate /3 = /3(9)· 
5 Published in Econometrica in 2000. 
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7.5.2 Testing existence of a threshold 
Having found a threshold, it is important to investigate whether it is statistically 
significant. Is aid performance effectively conditional on aid level? In other words, 
we test the following hypothesis: 
HO : f3ai = f3a2 
Hi: f3ai * f3a2 (7.2) 
Under the null, the two coefficient estimates do not differ therefore a linear 
regression model is appropriate. Under the alternative, there is a systematic 
difference between the coefficients on aid across the two regimes, hence supporting a 
threshold regression model. One complication with what first appears to be a simple 
test is that the threshold y is not identified under the null. Therefore, the classical 
tests do not have standard distributions which means that critical values cannot be 
read off standard distribution tables6 . Hence, we follow Hansen (1996) to bootstrap 
the p-value of the above hypothesis test (details in Appendix 7B). 
7.5.3 Asymptotic distribution of threshold and slope coefficient estimates 
If evidence is in support of a threshold effect (that is, f3ai * f3a2 ), what is needed is 
some certainty on i. In other words, we need to find where does y lie in the 
confidence interval that contains the correct estimate of the threshold. Usually, the 
confidence interval for a parameter is formed by inversion of the Wald or t statistics. 
However, Dufour(1997) argues that the Wald statistics have poorly-behaved 
sampling distribution in cases where the parameter is unidentified in a certain region. 
Since in our endogenous sample splitting scheme, the parameter y fails to be 
identified when f3ai = f3a2 , the asymptotic distribution of i is highly non-standard. 
To address this issue, Hansen (2000) derives the correct distribution function and 
provides the appropriate critical values to test the hypothesis that 
HO:y=yo (7.3) 
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We relect the null if the likelihood ratI'o ~ ~ statistic as gIven by 
exceeds the critical value7, c( a). Hence, the 
confidence interval of the threshold estimate y would be all those values of y for 
which the likelihood ratio statistic is less than c( a). Stated differently, it would be 
equivalent to finding the 'no-rejection' region of the test. A graphical way to find 
this region is to plot the likelihood ratio LRn (y) against y and draw a flat line at 
the critical value. The segment of the curve which lies below the flat line will give 
the confidence interval of the threshold estimate8• Hansen (2000) also shows a 
* normalised likelihood ratio statistic, LRn (y) , can be obtained using an estimable 
constant to make this test robust to heteroscedasticity. 
As far as the asymptotic distribution of slope coefficients are concerned, Chan (1993) 
and Hansen (1999) argue that even if the estimator ~ ~ depends on the threshold 
estimate r, since fi = fi (y ) , the usual asymptotically normal distribution theory can 
be used to draw inferences on estimated slope coefficients. 
So far, we have discussed a single threshold model. In some instances, there may be 
multiple thresholds. In which case, estimation and inference on higher-order 
threshold models would be a straightforward extension of the methodology discussed 
in this section. 
6 This is typically called the "Davies' Problem' (Davies, 1977 and 1987) and has been investigated hy 
Andrews and Ploberger (1994) and Hansen (1996). . . . 
7 Throughout the paper, we use the 90% critical value, tabulated m Hansen (2000) whIch IS equal to 
5.94 rd' d th 
. aainst an fln e 
8 Alternatively, one could plot the resIdual sum of squared errors S n (y) at:> 
region that lies below the flat line at S n (y) + a 2 c( a) . 
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7.6 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
7.6.1 Single Threshold Model 
In the context of aid-growth relationship, we specify the following threshold model: 
GROWTHit = {3o +{31GDPOi + {32SECi + {33INVit+ [3JJEMit + 
{35INFL it + {36 GCONit + {37 TRADEit + {38EXTDEBTit + [39BMPit+ 
{3alAID it I(AIDit <y)+ {3a2AIDit I(A1Dit> Y) + Uit (7.4) 
The dependent variable is growth in real GDP per capita. We use initial level of 
GDP per capita (GDPO) and human capital (as proxied by secondary-school 
enrolment rate (SEC)) to account for initial conditions. We introduce three additional 
regressors: external debt as a ratio of GDP (EXTDEBT), black market premium 
(BMP) and trade as a share of GDP (TRADE). A number of transmission channels9 
have been identified in the literature to explain the negative effect of large debt 
ratios. We include black market premium, BMP as an indicator of degree of trade 
distortions (Levine and Renelt, 1992). Large values are associated with higher 
degree of trade intervention. A negative sign is therefore expected since trade 
literature advocates the beneficial effects of liberalisation. We include TRADE to 
capture the effects of openness. Description of data is provided in Appendix 7 A. 
The observations are divided into two 'regimes' depending on whether the threshold 
variable, AIDit , is smaller or larger than the value y. Observations belonging to 
these two regimes would also differ in terms of the coefficient on aid. The effect of 
aid on growth is given by {3al in the sample with observations below the threshold 
level and {3a2 in the sample containing observations beyond the threshold. The 
Laffer curve would suggest that {3al is positive and {3a2 negative. 
9 First, large debts imply that a significant share of domestic resources goes into debt. servicing, 
thereby crowding out public investment. Furthermore, b e c a ~ s e e o ~ t h e e complementanty between 
public and private investment high debts also discourage pnvate mvestment. Second, the ~ x t e r n a l l
debt ratio could be indicative ~ f f a 'debt overhang'. In the presence of heavy debts, economIC agents 
anticipate future tax liabilities for its servicing, to which their response is to t n l I ~ s f e r r ~ d s . . abroad 111 
an attempt to escape the domestic tax base. This raises the domestic cost ?f c a p I ~ ~ l l WhICh 111 tum 
discourages investment. (Borenzstein, 1990a and 1990b; Eaton, 1987). Smce It I ~ ~ WIdel) 
acknowledged that investment is the engine for growth, both of these effects are expected to a d v l ' r ~ c l y y
affect growth. 
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We estimate the growth model using a sample of 131 countries with annual data 
from 1975 to 1995. Availability of data on EDA determines the choice of countries 
and sample period. As proposed by Hansen (2000), OLS is used to estimate the 
regression model (see Appendix 7B for tests of appropriateness of this technique for 
our model). We have also employed the residual generated regressor, Ilv1'RESo, as 
discussed in previous chapter so as to capture the indirect effect of aid on gro\\1h via 
investment ll . 
It is undesirable that the threshold estimation strategy categorises too fev\' 
observations into anyone of the regimes. Consequently, we restrict the minimisation 
problem to values of y such that at least 1 % of the observations lie in both regimes. 
Table 7.1 reports the results obtained when searching for Y in the grid formed by 
values of aid as a share of GNP {l, 1.5,2 ........ 50}. 
We perform 1000 bootstrap replications to test the hypothesis that a threshold 
effectively exists (Equation 7.2). We find that the test for a single threshold based on 
aid level is significant with a bootstrap p-value of 0.056, that is, the null of no 
threshold effect is rejected. We therefore conclude that there is adequate evidence 
for a threshold in the relationship between aid flows and growth rates. 
All the control variables enter with expected signs. The point estimate of the 
threshold, Y , is equal to 2%. Our results seem to suggest that if donors want aid to 
be effective they should aim to disburse amounts which are equivalent to more than 
2% of GNP in recipient country. Aid flows below this level do not appear to have 
any significant effect on growth rates. We find that each additional percentage point 
of aid flows above 2% of GNP will promote growth rate by about 0.32 percentage 
points l2 . Hence, we obtain evidence of positive returns to aid when aid levels are 
beyond the threshold estimate. These estimates seem to support the hypothesis that 
10 INVRES refers to that part of investment that is not due to aid and it is recovered from the 
following regression (t-ratio in brackets): INV=1.07AID R2=0.25 
(15.76) . . 
11 To be able to focus on threshold we have here preferred to take into a c c o ~ t t the mdmx:t ef!ec.ts of 
" . ' . kn l ~ r I I ~ ~ t b the Ino ,t Important tranSlIllSSlOD aId through mvestment only (as mvestment IS ac ow UlgUl 0 e s 
mechanism). . ' h b' h' d 
12 One may find it interesting to Dote that in Chapter 5, aid was predIcted to mcrease growt y at Ir 
of a percentage point in SSA. 
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Table 7.1: Single Threshold Model 
GROWTH 
GDPO 
-0.0005 
(3.04)*** 
SEC 0.041 
(3.00)*** 
INVRES 0.231 
(6.65)*** 
DEM 0.009 
(0.05) 
[NFL 
-0.001 
(3.52)*** 
GCON 
-0.169 
(4.61)*** 
TRADE 0.048 
(2.52)** 
AID I(AID<=2) 
-0.295 
(0.82) 
AID I(AID>2) 0.323 
(4.92)*** 
EXTDEBT -0.082 
(2.33)** 
BMP x 102 -0.002 
(0.56) 
Constant -2.096 
(2.09)** 
Observations 1115 
R-squared 0.15 
F-Stat 16.51 
Notes:The t-values in brackets are based on White heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. 
F -Stat rejects the null that all coefficients are jointly equal to zero 
there exists a non-linear relationship between aid and growth however unlike 
Lensink and White (2001) Laffer curve it seems aid becomes effective rather than 
generate negative returns beyond the threshold value. In other words, the 
relationship between aid and growth does not seem to take an inverted V-shape. 
Next, we obtain a confidence interval for the threshold estimate. As discussed in 
Section 7.5.3, this is represented by the region where L R ~ ~ (y) 5:. c( a). Following 
this procedure, we obtain Figure 7.5 which displays the graph of the nonnalised 
likelihood ratio. 
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FIGURE 7.5: Confidence Intenral for Estimated First Threshold 
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The likelihood ratio sequence hits the zero axis at the point estimate of the 
threshold, y. In our case, the estimated threshold occurs at aid share in GNP equal to 
2% with a 90% asymptotic confidence interval [1 %, 14%]. Hence, in 90 out of 100 
cases, such intervals will contain the true value of the threshold level of aid flows. 
Although, it cannot be decisively determined whether the observations in this 
interval fall into the first or second regime, it is certain (with 90 % confidence) that 
all countries with aid flows above 14% of GNP are in the second regime. 
7.6.2 Double Threshold Model 
We shall now investigate whether there exists a second threshold. Equation 7.1 is 
therefore re-specified as: 
+ f3z Zit +Uit (7.5) 
such that }'I < ~ . . For this purpose, we fix "11 at 2% (estimated first threshold) and 
aim to further split the sample of countries with aid more than 2% of GNP. A 
sample split based on aid as a share of GNP produces an insignificant p-\'a]ue of 
0.592 using 1000 bootstrap replications. In other words, the null that a second 
threshold exists on the basis of aid level is rejected. This finding suggests there is no 
evidence for diminishing returns in aid, that is, aid effectiveness does not decrease as 
120 
CHAPTER 7: Aid and Growth: IdentifYing Threshold Effects 
aid flows increase. This contradicts the aid Laffer curve but is consistent with the 
preliminary data analysis in Section 7.4 
A review of the reasons motivating the theoretical rationale for an Aid Laffer CUl';e 
(in Section 7.2) seems to suggest that absorptive capacity holds the key to multiple 
thresholds. We therefore proceed to investigate if this could be the criterion to split 
the subsample with aid above 2% of GNp13. Based on the logic that an economy 
with higher level of human capital will have a higher capacity to absorb aid flows 
and use them in an efficient manner, we select secondary school enrolment rate 
(SEeR) as a proxy for absorptive capacity. Using 1000 bootstrap replications, the p_ 
value is now significant at 0.031, suggesting a second threshold exists in the aid-
growth relationship and is triggered by human capital level. Applying the same 
technique we used earlier, we search for this second threshold in the grid {13, 13.5 . 
.. .. .. 90} of SECR values. Table 7.2 presents the results of this search. 
All the non-aid explanatory variables enter with the expected sign. The point 
estimate of the second threshold occurs at SECR equal to 45 % It would seem that 
though countries receiving aid flows more than 2% of their GNP benefit from 
positive returns, the impact on growth rate depends on whether the secondary school 
enrolment rate is below or above 45 % With aid share in GNP above 2% and 
secondary school enrolment rate less than or equal to 45%, each extra percentage 
point of aid share in GNP would on average increase growth rate by 0.3% point. For 
countries beyond the aid threshold and school enrolment rate above 45%, with the 
same increase in aid flows, the growth rate is raised by 0.2% points only. Note that 
the mean value of aid is on average higher in the second regime than in the third 
regime; hence, the lower marginal effect of aid on growth in the latter cannot be 
attributed to high aid levels. There is no obvious way to explain why aid is less 
effective in countries with higher education levels. Although, the evidence is clearly 
against Lensink and White (2001) argument that high aid inflows are detrimental to 
growth and the more general belief that diminishing returns to aid set is at high aid 
13 With respect to Burnside and Dollar results, we tried using a policy index to locate the ~ e c o n d d
threshold. The resulting threshold estimate was however very uncertain - no confidence Interval 
could be obtained. 
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Table 7.2: Double Threshold Model 
GROWTH 
GDPO 
-0.0003 
(1.91)* 
SEC 0.030 
(2.05)** 
INVRES 0.238 
(7.19)*** 
DEM 0.186 
(0.91) 
INFL 
-0.001 
(3.35)*** 
GCON 
-0.144 
(3.71)*** 
TRADE 0.071 
(3.96)*** 
AID I(AID<=2) 
-0.508 
(1.24) 
AID I(AID<=2/SECR<=45) 0.340 
(5.35)*** 
AID I(AID<=2/SECR>45) 0.200 
(2.32)** 
EXT DEBT 
-0.117 
(3.73)*** 
BMP 
-0.00001 
(0.57) 
Constant -3.372 
(3.03)*** 
Observations 720 
R-squared 0.18 
F-Stat 18.55 
Notes: Same applies as in Table 7.2 
levels. Our estimates suggest that aid is most effective when aid is high and human 
capital low . 
Again, we want to attach some degree of certainty to this estimate for the second 
threshold. Hence, we plot the likelihood ratio sequence and find the 'non-rejection' 
region. The graph of the normalised likelihood ratio statistic is displayed ill 
Figure7.6. The 90% confidence interval of the threshold estimate is {16, 90}. 
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FIGURE 7.6: Confidence Interval for Estimated Second Threshold 
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Table 7.3 reports the number of occurrences which fall m each reglille 
quinquennially and provides some summary statistics. 
Table 7.3: Descriptive summary statistics by regime and variable 
Percentage of observations in each regime by year 
REGIME 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Aid/GNP < 2% 57.1 45.6 46.3 38 48.2 
Aid/GNP>2% and SEeR <45 39.3 38 35.4 35.2 30.1 
Aid/GNP>2% and SEeR> 45 3.6 16.5 18.3 26.8 21.7 
VARIABLE Mean Value by year 
Aid/GNP (%) 3.936 5.760 5.572 9.868 6.424 
SEeR 29.672 49.752 52.434 53.413 55.832 
It is observed from this table that aid-recipients have been mostly in the first and 
second regime, where foreign aid flows (according to our estimates) are ineffective 
and have a high positive effect on growth, respectively. The mid-nineties has 
witnessed an increase in the number of cases which fall in the third regime where aid 
is found to be less effective but continues to be growth-conducive. The mean \'alues 
indicate that increases in average secondary-school enrolment rate have mostly 
contributed to this shift. 
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7.7 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we address concerns of non-linearity that seem to characterise the 
relationship between aid inflows and growth rates. The common approach in aid 
effectiveness studies has been to introduce an aid-squared term. This routine 
unfortunately has limitations. With regards to the importance attached to a threshold 
effect in aid literature, we have here therefore made an attempt to shed some light on 
this aspect. 
The use of an aid squared term has been based on the assumption that a non-linearity 
in aid and growth relationship is triggered by aid level and it specifically takes an 
inverted V-shape. Lensink and White (200 I) have gone one step further in 
modelling it as an aid Laffer curve. In this chapter, we have directly tested these 
assumptions by applying a newly developed sample splitting technique to aid 
literature. This process allows the data to endogenously determine both the number 
and location of threshold(s), as well as offers appropriate inference tests. 
We conduct this analysis on a sample of 131 aid recipient countries over the period 
1975 to 1995. A preliminary data analysis casts doubt on the proposition of aid 
Laffer curve and the appropriateness of using an aid squared term. Our empirical 
investigation suggests an initial sample split based on aid share in GNP and a second 
split based on secondary school enrolment rate. We find that aid is effective in 
promoting growth only after a certain critical level which occurs at aid equal to 2% 
of GNP. This effect gets stronger ifhuman capital is high. We obtain no evidence of 
diminishing returns in aid but do find that impact of aid on growth declines when 
secondary school enrolment rate exceeds 45%. 
Our estimates tell the same story as aid Laffer curve, in the sense that they both show 
that the returns on aid flows are not constant. However, while the aid Laffer curve 
proposed by Lensink and White (2001) starts from the point where positive returns 
on aid flows are generated, our first threshold estimate indicates that there is a phase 
prior to this point where aid flows are so low that they are ineffective. Stated 
differently, our study seems to point to an aid-growth relationship characterised by 
three stages rather than two as in the Laffer curve. Our finding that high aid levels 
bring additional boost to economic performance is in accord with the theoretical 
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predictions of growth models - the belief that generous aid inflow is a necessarY 
condition for sustained growth. 
We also find that aid continues to be effective at high aid levels, that is, we find no 
evidence of diminishing returns in aid. Hence, our results are not consistent with the 
proposition of an aid Laffer curve. We do find that aid does eventually have a 
smaller effect on growth however this is triggered by human capital level rather than 
aid level. In conclusion, aid is most effective in countries where aid is high and 
human capital low. 
The general implication of our conclusion is that aid-growth link is indeed non-linear 
but aid-squared term is not an appropriate representation of this non-linearity. 
Hence, a negative coefficient on such a term is not necessarily indicative of 
diminishing or negative returns to aid. It may instead be signalling the importance of 
an omitted interaction term as suggested by Hansen and Tarp (2001). It may be 
capturing the negative effects of volatility in aid flows as identified by Lensink and 
Morrissey (2000) 
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APPENDIX 7A: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Definitions and sources of data 
GROWTH growth in real GDP per capita 
GDPO initial GDP per capita 
SEC initial secondary school enrolment rate 
SECR 
INV 
DEM 
INFL 
GCON 
TRADE 
AID 
EXTDEBT 
BMP 
secondary school enrolment rate 
gross domestic investment (% of GDP) 
democracy index, taking values between 1 and 3 with lower values 
being more democratic. Source: Alesina et al (1992) 
inflation rate 
government consumption (% of GDP) 
total trade (% of GDP) 
Effective Development Assistance. Source: Chang et al (1998) 
external debt (% of GDP) 
black market premium. Source: Easterly and Levine data set 
Unless otherwise stated, the source of all variables is World Development Indicators 
(2000) and they represent annual series over the period 1975 to 1995. 
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List of countries 
Albania Congo, Rep. Honduras Morocco St. Vincent and the Grenadin{ 
Algeria Costa Rica Hungary Mozambique Sudan 
Angola Cote d'Ivoire India Myanmar Swaziland 
Argentina Czech Republic Indonesia Nepal Syrian Arab Republic 
Armenia Djibouti Iran, Islamic Rep. Nicaragua Tajikistan 
Azerbaijan Dominica Jamaica Niger Tanzania 
Bangladesh Dominican Jordan Nigeria Thailand 
Republic 
Barbados Kenya Kazakhstan Oman Togo 
Belarus Ecuador Korea, Rep. Pakistan Trinidad and Tobago 
Belize Egypt, Arab Rep. Kyrgyz Republic Panama Tunisia 
Benin El Salvador Lao PDR Papua New Guinea Turkey 
Bhutan Equatorial Guinea Latvia Paraguay Turkmenistan 
Bolivia Eritrea Lebanon Peru Uganda 
Botswana Estonia Lesotho Philippines Ukraine 
Brazil Ethiopia Liberia Poland Uruguay 
Bulgaria Fiji Lithuania Romania Uzbekistan 
Burkina Faso Gabon Madagascar Russian Federation Vanuatu 
Burundi Gambia, The Rwanda Sao Tome and Venezuela, RB 
Principe 
Cambodia Malawi Malaysia Senegal Vietnam 
Cameroon Georgia Maldives Seychelles Yemen, Rep. 
Cape Verde Ghana Mali Sierra Leone Zaire 
Central African Rep Grenada Malta Slovak Republic Zambia 
Chad Guatemala Mauritania Solomon Islands Zimbabwe 
Chile Guinea Mauritius Somalia 
China Guinea-Bissau Mexico Sri Lanka 
Colombia Guyana Moldova St. Kitts and Nevis 
Comoros Haiti Mongolia St. Lucia 
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Table 7 At: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. :Min 
-'lax 
GROWFH 2239 0.798 6.667 
-53.250 35.520 
GDPO 2247 2035.738 1605.061 306 7990 
SEC 2478 36.617 31.204 1.200 126.600 
JNV 2237 23.521 9.803 
-5.740 83.l86 
DEM 1764 2.517 0.809 1 3 
!NFL 1769 78.143 759.601 -36.740 23773.l30 
GCON 2210 15.730 7.318 0.897 63.549 
TRADE 2215 69.756 39.275 3.147 282.402 
AID 2232 6.718 1O.l27 -0.209 108.421 
EXTDEBT 2209 39.558 23.538 1.930 148.580 
BMP 1605 124.046 1290.645 -57.360 49990 
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APPENDIX 7B: ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
7B.l Constructing P-value for Hypothesis Testing 
Having found a threshold, it is important to investigate whether it is statistically 
significant. Is there really a threshold effect in aid effectiveness? As mentioned, t ~ ~
involves the following hypothesis test: 
HO : f3aj = f3a2 
Hj : f3aj * f3a2 (7.2) 
Given that the threshold y is not identified under the null, this test would have a non-
standard distribution. Hence, critical values cannot be read off standard distribution 
tables. Hansen (1996) therefore suggests bootstrapping to obtain the p-value of this 
test. 
First, the model is estimated under the null and alternative. This gives the actual 
value of the likelihood test ratio, Fj . 
where 
Then, a bootstrap sample is created by drawing from the normal distribution of the 
residuals of the estimated threshold model (Equation 7.1). Note that Hansen (2000) 
recommends that the regressors are held fixed in repeated bootstrap samples. Using 
this generated sample, the model is estimated under the null (of no threshold) and 
alternative (threshold occurs at the estimated value of y) to obtain the likelihood 
ratio F j . This procedure is repeated a large number of times. The bootstrap 
estimate of the p-value for Fj under the null is given by the percentage of draws for 
which the simulated statistic Fj exceeds the actual one. According to Hansen( 1996). 
this procedure provides asymptotically correct p-values for the above hypothesis test. 
We perform 1000 bootstrap replications throughout the chapter. 
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7B.2 The Hausman test for Endogeneity 
The theory of estimation and inference used in this chapter is confined to regression 
models that have exogenous explanatory variables. As a way to verify that this 
technique is applicable to our aid-growth specification, we test for endogeneity. 
First, we check the validity of the instruments used by conducting Sargan test 14 . The 
1 % critical value from the chi-squared distribution with one degree of freedom is 
6.63, so the Sargan test statistic fails to reject the null that the instruments are valid. 
We therefore use lagged aid and a regional dummy for SSA to instrument for aid and 
credit available to private sectors and Gastil rights for investment. The 1 % chi-
squared critical values when aid and investment are instrumented in Equation 7. -l is 
equal to 23.21 In both cases, as shown in Table 7B 1 the Hausman test fails to reject 
the null that regressors and error term are uncorrelated. Note that this does not imply 
that aid and growth or investment and growth have not got a bi-directionallinlc The 
Hausman test result rather suggests that having controlled for factors like initial GDP 
per capita, education level and government consumption, aid and investment in our 
model are not correlated with the unexplained part of growth. Consequently, we find 
support for the appropriateness of a threshold model to our specification and data. 
14 See Appendix 5B for details on Hausman and Sargan tests. 
130 
CHAPTER 7: Aid and Growth: Identifying Threshold Effects 
GDPOx 1(1 
SEC 
INV 
DEM 
!NFL 
GCON 
TRADE 
AID 
EXTDEBT 
BMPx 102 
Constant 
Observations 
R-squared 
F-Stat 
Table 7Bl : OLS Growth Regression 
GROWTH 
-0.0004 
(3.40)*** 
0.041 
(3.38)*** 
0.231 
(10.08)*** 
-0.0l3 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(3.46)*** 
-0.163 
(4.73)*** 
0.045 
(3.10)*** 
0.094 
(2.72)*** 
-0.078 
(3.26)*** 
-0.002 
(0.21) 
-2.346 
(2.87)*** 
1115 
0.15 
19.63 
Testing for endogeneity of aid: 
R2 of first stage regression 
Hausman X2k 
Sargan X2v 
0.84 
10.18 
2.62 
Testingfor endogeneity ofinvestment: 
R2 offirst stage regression 0.45 
Hausman X2k 3.88 
Sargan X2v 4.17 
Notes: Absolute t-values are reported in brackets. *Significant at the 10% level. 
** 5 % level. *** 1% level. F-Stat rejects the null that all coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero 
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AID AND WELFARE OF THE POOR 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
Aid is an important source of finance for most of the developing countries. It has 
helped to lay the foundations for growth and development, even if it is no guarantee 
that anything solid is built. In recent years, the range of aid policy and objectives has 
widened. On the policy front, donors have adopted aid conditionality for several 
decades. Conditionality has prevailed in various forms. However, it is now 
emergmg that conditionality may not be the best aid policy. Divergence in 
viewpoints of donors and recipients has largely contributed to explaining failures of 
conditionality, and that partly explains the eagerness with which selectivity aid has 
been favoured by some. The World Bank Report (1998), which is principally based 
on Burnside and Dollar (2000), propagates the idea that aid be allocated to countries 
with favourable policies since it is most effective in that environment. Whether the 
allocation policy is one of conditionality or selectivity, the truth remains that what is 
important is what constitutes a favourable environment to make aid work. 
On the objective front, the traditional ann of promoting econOIll1C growth 
undoubtedly remains a desirable aspiration as well as economic justification for aid. 
The conventional way to evaluate aid effectiveness in this respect is to examine if aid 
inflows improve growth performance on average. On balance, empirical evidence 
has been optimistic. In recent years, the objective of reducing poverty (and targeting 
aid to benefit the poor) has gained increasing emphasis. Assessing effectiveness of 
aid against a poverty reduction criterion is however a problematic exercise. How can 
one measure poverty and the effect of aid on the poor? Whilst there are various 
existing measures, internationally comparative data on poverty over time are 
extremely scarce. Consequently, we use Human Development Index and infant 
mortality rate as indicators of deprivation or welfare of the poor. Promoting welfare 
helps alleviate poverty but this is not necessarily equivalent to reducing income 
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poverty and may not show on income poverty measures 1. Our results are hence 
interpreted as the impact on welfare rather than poverty. 
The dual purpose of this chapter is therefore to shed some light on how can one 
capture effects of aid on welfare of the poor and at the same time identify factors that 
will enhance effectiveness of aid in this respect. Only in rare cases, such as aid-
financed rural works programme, would one expect to see any direct effect of aid on 
incomes of the poor. Aid may indirectly benefit the poor by promoting gro\\1h that 
reduces income poverty. Alternatively, it is possible to directly aim at reducing non-
income dimensions of poverty by adopting appropriate government policies. For 
example, by financing expenditures that improve access to education and health care, 
aid improves the welfare of the poor. Thus, we try to capture the effect of aid on the 
poor via its effect on government spending. At the same time, we posit that certain 
types of government spending are most likely to improve the welfare of the poor 
(Verschoor, 2002, provides a discussion). Hence, aid would be more effective in 
promoting welfare in economies that are characterised by these specific allocations 
of government spending. 
Our methodological approach is to estimate cross-country regressIOns of aid 
effectiveness, where an indicator of welfare is the dependent variable. This analysis 
is conducted for the 57 countries included in the World Bank Poverty Monitoring 
Database over the period 1980 to 1998. It is useful to note that our approach is not 
without problems. In fact, the difficulties encountered in aid-growth studies are 
exacerbated when aid-welfare is the link under study. First, if regressions fail to 
account fully for all determinants of the dependent variable (growth or welfare), the 
estimated coefficient on aid will be biased. This difficulty is inherent in aid studies 
given that aid flows to countries that are characterised by features that retard 
development and, most importantly, are hard to completely specify. When welfare is 
the dependent variable, this problem is even more pronounced. Second, it is difficult 
to identify that share of aid that is directed to the poor; usually the aid variable is 
. . d ld b . 1 ded a' imputed income for households. I In principle conswnptIOn of publIc goo s cou e mc us. .. 
' ... . t tl ered m the hou-;ehold survC\ ~ ~ on However, such consumptIOn IS not wllformly or conSlS en y COy ~ ~ -
which money metric measures ofpoyerty are based. 
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overestimated and estimates would be biased. Both observations taken together 
imply that it is quite likely to incorrectly draw the conclusion that aid is ineffective. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the various routes 
through which aid can affect welfare of the poor. The empirical approach is outlined 
in Section 8.3, with a discussion of the choice of welfare indicators and a full 
description of the construction of the index of pro-poor expenditures. Section 8.-4 
reviews some estimation issues and discusses the econometric results. Quantile 
regressions are presented in Section 8.5, they allow us to examine aid effectiveness at 
different points of the welfare distribution. In Section 8.6, we make an attempt to 
map effects of promoting welfare on growth performance. Section 8.7 concludes 
with some observations. 
8.2 AID AND WELFARE 
Empirical literature on aid effectiveness in promoting growth is based on a fairly 
clear theoretical framework and wide availability of data. However deficiencies in 
both areas make it difficult to evaluate effectiveness of aid against the criterion of 
promoting welfare (or reducing poverty). Nonetheless, a number of studies have 
investigated the link (Boone, 1996; Kalwij and Verschoor, 2002; Mosley et ai, 
2002). Our approach is in line with the more recent studies. 
Early literature focussed on capital market imperfections to explain how aid flows 
could alleviate poverty. Owing to immobility of capital, poor countries are bound to 
have a set of potentially profitable investment projects that would not be undertaken 
due to a shortage of domestic savings. Aid resources could promote national 
savings, investment and growth and indirectly promote welfare. It is plausible that 
enhanced growth has high potential for reducing poverty. That would explain why a 
focus on factors that are conducive to growth may be the right direction to take even 
if the objective is to promote welfare (Dollar and Kraay, 2001). As foreign aid is 
largely disbursed to government, concentrating on public expenditure (which 
represent the direct measures taken to address poverty issues) as a transmission 
mechanism is only natural. Figure 8.1 summarises the potential linkages between aid 
and welfare/poverty reduction. 
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FIGURE 8.1: Links between Aid and Welfare 
FOREIGN 
AID 
ECONOMIC 
G R O W T H ~ ~
PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE 
WELFARE 
It is generally accepted that high growth facilitates promoting welfare. However, the 
notion that increased welfare can enhance growth possibilities (as represented by the 
bi-directional arrow) has not received much attention. Investigating this possibility 
in depth is beyond the scope of this chapter. We however do try to shed some light 
on this aspect. 
Just as aid does not affect growth directly, aid may not affect welfare directly. One 
(indirect) mechanism through which aid can affect welfare is pro-poor public 
spending. Reference is made to those government expenditures that target the non-
income dimensions of poverty. While we acknowledge possibilities for poverty 
reduction arising from higher growth rates, our hypothesis is that by financing these 
pro-poor public spending patterns, aid is more likely to increase welfare of the poor. 
Growth has a potential to promote welfare only with a long time lag (and especially 
if aid-induced, since growth itself will then take time to appear). Whilst pro-poor 
expenditures that are directly targeted to areas of deprivation (for example, access to 
education and health services) may not necessarily have a positive effect on gro\vth, 
they can enhance welfare in a more effective manner. This is not to suggest that the 
non-poor do not benefit even more. We abstract from issues of policy incidence. We 
now proceed to formalise the framework within which we shall im'estigate how aid 
flows may promote welfare levels. 
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8.3 EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
We assume that at a national level, welfare is determined by m' come, 
pro-poor 
expenditures and aid. Our specification can be outlined as folio 
ws. 
where W is a measure of welfare. 
Y is a measure of income. 
Gp is an indicator of pro-poor public expenditures. 
A is level of aid. 
As discussed, aid inflows influence welfare levels by determining the composition of 
public expenditures. Thus, we posit that pro-poor expenditures may be a function of 
aid flows as well as other sources of government revenue (G
r
) and income. 
One way to approach the hypothesis that public spending channels aid to enhance 
welfare is to estimate Equation 8.1 and examine the aid coefficient. However, as 
revealed by Equation 8.2, aid influences PPE. Hence, we use a constructed regressor 
(G p) rather than Gp . and estimate the following: 
where G p represents pro-poor public expenditures that are not financed by aid. 
There are a number of different categories of public spending recognised in the 
literature as being pro-poor (for a review see Verschoor, 2002), and we include the 
main ones although our choice of variables is dependent on data availability. \Ve 
include public expenditure on social services2, education, health and agriculture 
2 Public expenditure on social services includes expenditure on housing, c o m m u n i ~ ~ , d e \ ' e l o p m ~ t , ,
sanitation services, care for the aged, disabled, unemployed and chIldren as well a:-. L X p . e n d l t u r e ~ ~
relevant to environmental defense (eg pollution abatement, water supply, refuse collectIon). 
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(each of them expressed as a share of GNP). These data, which are mainly from 
various issues of Government Financial Statistics, is available for all the 57 countries 
included in the World Bank Poverty Monitoring Database over 1980 to 1998. \\'e use 
four four-year and one three-year period averages to create a panel. For each type of 
government spending, there will be a constructed regressor. In practice, it is difficult 
to estimate all these coefficients with accuracy. For this reason, we prefer to 
construct a public expenditure index as the basis for a single generated regressor. 
We now briefly discuss the choice of dependent variable before elaborating on the 
construction of this index. 
8.3.1 Welfare Indicators 
Research on poverty is impeded by the paucity of time series data on poverty. Most 
studies rely on monetary poverty measures, namely percentage of the population 
living on less than $1 a day (corrected for purchasing power) and percentage of 
population that lies below the national poverty line. While claimed as internationally 
comparable, one can question how reliable these measures are. Would a person 
earning over a dollar per day be better off than someone who earns less but has free 
access to efficient health, education and other social services? Income level is a 
means to better life, it indicates the possibilities open to a person but not the use the 
person makes of those possibilities - 'it is the lives that [human beings] lead that is 
of intrinsic importance, not the commodities or income they possess' (Anand and 
Sen, 1992). Also, substantial conceptual flaws associated with construction of 
poverty lines have recently been brought to attention (see Reddy and Pogge (2002) 
for a fuller discussion). 
Ideally, one would complement these poverty measures with non-monetary 
indicators, such as the infant mortality rate, that capture the material hardship aspect 
of poverty. We use the infant mortality rate as data availability is good. Note also 
that the correlation between infant mortality and the $1 a day measure is as high as 
0.78 in the subs ample for which we have poverty data, suggesting an oyerlap in 
informational value (infant mortality may be a correlate of poverty incidence). 
An alternative measure is given by the Human Development Index (HDI), an 
d 1) f Of a country's relative distance unweighted average (between 0 an . 0 measures 
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from the theoretical optimum of different dimensions of quality of life, notably 
longevity, education and income. Longevity as measured by life expectancy at birth 
is intended to capture the capability of leading a long and healthy life. Adult literacy 
rate (and mean years of schooling from 1991 to 1994 and secondary school 
enrolment rates thereafter) is an indicator of educational attainment and a proxy of 
the capability of acquiring knowledge, communicating and participating in 
community life. Real per capita GDP in purchasing power parity dollars represents 
access to resources needed for a decent standard of living. The inclusion of this 
monetary component suggests that the HDI will be inversely correlated with income 
measures of poverty (to the extent that welfare is lower in countries with higher real 
GDP). Note that the inappropriateness of PPP measures to develop poverty lines, 
which is the backbone of Reddy and Pogge (2002) paper, can to some extent be 
carried over to HDI though it is not of as critical importance since HDI is also based 
on measures of deprivation. In fact, the nature of components that comprise HDI 
make it an indicator of welfare rather than poverty. Hence, making this chapter an 
empirical exercise on welfare of the poor rather than poverty. 
8.3.2 Constructing A Pro-Poor Public Expenditure Indicator (PPE) 
• Unweighted PPE 
The first step to construct such an indicator is to determine what constitutes a pro-
poor expenditure - that effectively has an impact on welfare. For each category of 
public social expenditure, we estimate a simple regression of welfare indicator on 
income per capita and government expenditure. Note that what is of prime interest is 
the percentage increase in welfare due to a one-percent increase in social 
expenditures. Stated differently, we focus our analysis on estimation of elasticity of 
welfare to public expenditures which is given by: 
. . h rnment spendin ll cateoorv In this respect, we regress welfare mdicators on eac gove ~ . . ~ ~ .-
(in logarithms). The larger the absolute size of this elasticity, the more responSive is 
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welfare to the corresponding public expenditure. Table 8.l presents the estimation 
results3 . 
The regressions perform rather well. Income per capita and government spending 
explain at least 53%> of variation in welfare indicators. Higher income is consistently 
associated with improved welfare levels, irrespective of the indicator used. Also, 
higher expenditure on social services, education and health do have a significant 
favourable impact on welfare - although each percentage increase in public social 
expenditure has a less than proportionate effect on welfare level. As one would 
expect, infant mortality rates are more responsive than HDI to changes in public 
expenditure on health services. Each extra percent of health public expenditure 
reduces infant mortality rates by over twice its positive effects on HDI. 
h 'ions using poverty hcadcount as 
3 See Appendix 8B (Table 8B4) for a re-estimation oft ese regress 
dependent variable. 
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Table 8.1: Welfare Regressions to determine weights 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on Social 
ServiceslGDP) 
R2 
Observations 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on 
EducationlGNP) 
R2 
Observations 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on first-level 
EducationlGDP) 
R2 
Observations 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on 
Health IGDP) 
R2 
Observations 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on Primary 
Health IGDP) 
R2 
Observations 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on 
AgriculturelGDP) 
R2 
Observations 
GDPO 
0.0001 -0.0003 
(4.41) (7.51) 
0.055 -0.152 
(2.60) (1.98) 
0.60 0.69 
65 65 
0.0001 -0.0003 
(7.75) (7.79) 
0.213 -0.174 
(3.39) (3.04) 
0.60 0.64 
186 231 
0.0002 -0.0003 
(6.88) (6.23) 
0.031 -0.117 
(0.69) (1.49) 
0.59 0.63 
100 130 
0.0001 -0.0002 
(7.08) (7.04) 
0.179 -0.416 
(2.84) (4.28) 
0.58 0.78 
145 145 
0.0001 -0.0003 
(3.10) (5.75) 
0.036 -0.073 
(1.37) (2.06) 
0.65 0.78 
33 43 
0.0001 -0.0003 
(7.27) (7.35) 
0.052 -0.009 
(1.60) (0.17) 
0.58 0.57 
125 157 
0.0001 -0.0003 
(7.81) (10.46) 
Log(public expenditure on 0.047 0.019 
MilitarylGDP) (1.13) (0.34) 
R2 0.53 0.63 
Observations 149 150 
Notes: Regional Dummies and constants included in all OLS regressions. Absolute values of \Vhite-
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in brackets. 
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In the light of these findings, we construct a pro-poor expenditure index (PPE) 
composed as follows: 
where Ps is public expenditure on social services (share of GDP) 
Pe is public expenditure on education (share of GNP) 
Ph is public expenditure on health services (share of GDP) 
This index has the merit of being constituted of only those expenditures that have a 
statistically significant impact on welfare. However, it tends to imply that the effect 
of public expenditure on welfare is uniform across the three public expenditure 
components. This would be a naIve assumption and is not supported by Table 8.1 so 
our unweighted index is an inadequate representation of effective social policies. A 
weighting system is therefore in order. 
• Beta Coefficient weighted PPE 
We intend to assign weights to each component of this index based on their relative 
importance in enhancing welfare. We therefore propose to use beta coefficients, 
which are unit-free, as weights. We recover these weights from a regression of each 
welfare indicator on social services, education and health expenditure and obtain two 
beta-weighted PPEs, PPEbh and PPEbm, where HDI and infant mortality are the 
respective dependent variables. The beta coefficient of expenditure category X is 
obtained by multiplying the regression coefficient on X by the standard deviation of 
X and then dividing this product by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. 
PPEbh = 0.1276 Ps + 0.1084 Pe + 0.2177 Ph 
PPEbm = 0.1036 Ps +0.1569 Pe + 0.2290 Ph 
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• First Principal Component Weighted PPE 
According to Putnam (1993), the most 'reliable and valid' means f b" . o com mmg multIple 
indicators into a single index is principal component analysis This t hni 
. ec que produces a 
linear combination of correlated variables such that it m ~ v ; " " ' ~ " e e th . . . . ~ ~ s e Jomt vanance of Its 
components. In a sense, it extracts from a matrix of indicators only a small number of 
variables that in some sense account for most of the variation in that matrix. \Ve 
therefore generate the first principal component of the three types of public expenditures. 
Table 8.2 shows the scoring coefficient of each component, that is, its individual weight 
in the index. 
Table 8.2: Weights for PPE 
Policy Indicators 
Public Expenditure on Social Services (share of GDP) 
Public Expenditure on Education (share of GNP) 
Public Expenditure on Health (share of GDP) 
Scoring coefficients 
0.5782 
0.5285 
0.6216 
Note: Scoring coefficient is the weight assigned to each expenditure and is based on first 
principal component. 
8.4 ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
In an attempt to capture the extent to which a government pursues pro-poor policies, 
as discussed we include various categories of social public spending as a share of 
domestic resources. We also include government spending on military expenditure 
as a fraction of GDP (Gm). Income, an important argument in welfare improvement 
objective, is measured by real GDP per capita in the year preceding the period. 
Finally, we express total aid flows (net aDA) as a share of GNP. All control 
variables are expected to be positively associated with the welfare indicator. The 
sign on military expenditure is unclear. It captures spending diverted from 
productive or pro-poor uses, and is also associated with high instability, but can enter 
positively as it represents maintaining security. Our data set covers a panel of four 
four-year and one three-year period averages over 1980 to 1998 for all the 57 
countries included in the World Bank Poverty Monitoring Database. Descriptl\'e 
statistics and list of countries are provided in Appendix 8A. 
We do not incorporate any other macroeconomic variables like openness and 
inflation because these indicators are of more direct relevance when growth rather 
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than welfare of the poor is the objective of interest. Any impact they rrught haye on 
welfare would be through growth performance and this is already represented by 
income per capita. 
Country specific characteristics are of importance in explaining variations in the 
level of welfare. In this respect, we include three regional dummies - sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) and Asia. We also carry out the 
Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier test of the null hypothesis that d v is 
equal to zero where Vi is the country-specific error term. The chi-squared statistic 
rejects the null (absence of fixed effects) in all regressions, suggesting that OLS 
estimates would be biased. The Hausman (1978) specification test further suggests 
that a random effect specification would be most appropriate to study the relationship 
between aid and welfare (details in Appendix 8B). We therefore report the random 
effect coefficient estimates in Table 8.4. 
Endogeneity concerns arise with regard to the aid variable as one expects that more 
aid resources are allocated to poorer countries. Following Hansen and Tarp (200 1), 
we therefore use one-period lagged aid levels (on the basis that lagged aid IS 
predetermined with respect to current welfare levels). 
We estimate the following model 
where the various measures of the pro-poor public expenditure index will be used in 
tum. First we want to test the hypothesis that public expenditures are potential 
transmission mechanisms through which aid inflows operate to influence welfare 
levels (see results in Appendix 8B). Having obtained supportive evidence, we now 
proceed to the random effect estimates of Equation 8.4. 
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Table 8.4: Welfare Regressions with PPE 
Unweighted Index 
Log(HDI) re,,-essions 
Beta coefficients F i r ~ t t principal componenb 
weighted index ODPO 0.0001 WeIghted index 
(2.41)** 0.0001 0.0001 (1.98)** LN(PPE) 0.072 0.148 (2.46)** 
(1.35) (2.30)** 0.065 
LN(AIDGNP _1} 
-0.004 
-0.015 
(1.28) 
(0.11) (0.49) -0.003 
LN(G m} -0.072 
-0.070 
(0.09) 
-0.072 (l.40) (1.41) (1.39) SSA 
-0.400 
-0.375 
-0.399 (3.16)*** (3.09)*** (3.15)*** ASIA 
-0.078 
-0.004 
-0.082 (0.62) (0.03) (0.66) LAC 0.003 0.020 0.001 (0.03) (0.19) (0.01) Constant 
-0.742 
-0.287 
-0.719 (3.16)*** (0.881 (2.93)*** Observations 81 81 81 R-squared 0.57 0.60 0.57 
Wa1d X2k 66.66 76.33 66.75 
. Log(INFANT MORTALITY RATE) regressions 
Unwelghted Index B e ~ a a c o e ~ c i e n t s s First principal components 
ODPO 
weIghted mdex weighted index 
-0.0002 
-0.0002 
-0.0002 (5.68)*** (5.12)*** (5.79)*** 
LN(PPE) 
-0.198 
-0.305 
-0.186 
(3.18)*** (3.91)*** (3.14)*** 
LN(AIDGNP _1) 0.031 0.042 0.029 
(1.06) (1.43) (1.00) 
LN(G m} 0.117 0.111 0.119 
(2.48)** (2.34)** (2.51)** 
SSA 0.840 0.801 0.840 
(3.68)*** (3.81)*** (3.68)*** 
ASIA 0.207 0.181 0.212 
(0.88) (0.85) (0.90) 
LAC 0.412 0.396 0.417 
(1.94)* (2.04)** (1.96)** 
Constant 3.746 2.958 3.670 
(13.09)*** (7.60)*** (12.32)*** 
Observations 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.63 
Wa1d X\ 115.60 130.67 115.02 
Notes: Random effect estimates reported. Regional Dummies in all regressions. Absolute values oft-
ratios in brackets. Wa1d chi-squared statistics test the joint significance of all coefficients. They 
reject the null that all the coeffcicients are jointly not different from zero. 
All the regressions perform reasonably well as shown in Table 8.4. The selected 
explanatory variables explain up to 68% of the ,"ariation in welfare indicators. Both 
the unweighted and weighted PPE indices have a highly significant positive effect on 
welfare in most cases. 
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As shown in Figure 8.1 (and supported by Table 8B3), public spencling can be 
perceived as mediating the effects of foreign aid on welfare. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that PPE indices are capturing the beneficial effects of aid 
flows, which could explain the insignificance of the latter in the regressions. To take 
account of this effect, we re-estimate the welfare regressions using PPEres (G p ) 
rather than PPE, that is, we include only that fraction of public expenditures that is 
not financed by aid4 • Table 8.5 presents the new set of results. 
Table 8.5: Welfare Regressions with PPEres 
Log(HDI) regressions 
Unweighted Index Beta coefficients First principal components 
weighted index weighted index 
GDPO 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
(2.41)** (1.98)** (2.46)** 
LN(PPEres) 0.072 0.148 0.065 
(1.35) (2.30)** (1.28) 
LN(AIDGNP _1} 0.037 0.127 0.042 
(1.02) (2.17)** (1.08) 
LN(G m} -0.072 -0.070 -0.072 
(l.40) (1.41) (1.39) 
SSA -0.400 -0.375 -0.399 
(3.16)*** (3.09)*** (3.15)*** 
ASIA -0.078 -0.004 -0.082 
(0.62) (0.03) (0.66) 
LAC 0.003 0.020 0.001 
(0.03) (0.19) (0.01) 
Constant -0.742 -0.287 -0.719 
(3.16)*** {0.88} {2.93)*** 
Observations 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.57 0.60 0.57 
Wald X,2k 66.66 76.33 
66.75 
. f h PPE index on lagged aid . 
.. G is generated from the residuals of a regresSIOn 0 eac 
p 
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Log{INFANT MORTALITY 
Unweighted Index Bet ffi' RATE). regressions 
. ~ ~coe . Ctents FIrst principal components 
GDPO -0.0002 
wet ted mdex weighted index 
-0.0002 -0.0002 
(5.68)*** (5.12)*** (5.79)*** 
LN(PPEres) -0.198 
-0.305 
-0.186 (3.18)*** (3.91)*** (3.14)*** 
LN(AIDGNP _1) -0.080 
-0.239 
-0.099 
(2.03)** (3.46)*** (2.23)** 
LN(G m) 0.117 0.111 0.119 
(2.48)** (2.34)** (2.51)** 
SSA 0.840 0.801 0.840 
(3.68)*** (3.81)*** (3.68)*** 
ASIA 0.207 0.181 0.212 
(0.88) (0.85) (0.90) 
LAC 0.412 0.396 0.417 
(1.94)* (2.04)** (1.96)** 
Constant 3.746 2.958 3.670 
{13.09)*** {7.60)*** {12.32}*** 
Observations 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.63 0.68 0.63 
Wald x\ 115.60 130.67 115.02 
Notes: As for Table 8.4 
This new set of estimates provides a significant coefficient on lagged aid in 4 out of 
the 6 regressions reported. The coefficient estimate on aid which now includes its 
indirect effects through public pro-poor spending suggests that an additional 10% of 
foreign aid promotes welfare by about 1 %. Initial GDP per capita consistently 
displays its positive contribution to welfare. Public expenditure on military services 
as a share of GDP enters with a significant positive sign in all infant mortality 
regressions, suggesting that this variable captures insecurity and conflict. We also 
find that welfare of the poor is lower (HDI is lower and infant mortality rates higher) 
in SSA economies, ceteris paribus. 
8.5 QUANTILE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
As the descriptive statistics show, the welfare indicators vary widely across 
countries. In the presence of such heterogeneity, it is insightful to examine the effect 
of aid and social expenditures at different points of the distribution. Usually, 
variables are included as uncentred regressors. Quantile regression allows us to 
center the regressor around different quantiles (for example, regressors are centred 
around the median at the 0.5 quantile). This adds value to estimation results. 
especially that distribution of welfare over countries is likely to be skewed. It can be 
reasonably assumed that the extent to which aid can promote welfare would vary 
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depending on whether this effect is being observed at the lowest or highest leyel of 
welfare. On one hand, owing to lack of basic social infrastructure aid may be less 
effective in cases where poverty is severe While if the econom' . d . h 
. Y IS eqUlppe WIt 
the appropriate infrastructure, the same aid flows (by financm' g bli pro-poor pu c 
expenditures) may prove to be more effective in reducing pove11y or imprO\ ing 
welfare. On the other, aid may have a larger impact on welfare in countries with 
lowest welfare levels as there will be more scope for aid to bring improvements. 
We investigate this hypothesis by using the semi-parametric technique of quantile 
regression analysis introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). Standard OLS or 
GMM techniques concentrate on estimating the mean of the dependent variable 
subject to the values of the independent variables. Given a set of explanatory 
variables, quantile regression estimates the dependent variable conditional on the 
selected quantile. For example, it allows us to evaluate how far aid flows have been 
successful when we examine observations centred around the 5th percentile of 
welfare distribution. The resulting coefficients give an estimate of the impact on 
countries with relatively low welfare indicators. By estimating the model at 
different quantiles, one can trace the entire conditional distribution of welfare rates 
given a set of regressors. A further advantage of employing this estimation method 
is that the regression coefficient vector is not sensitive to outlying values of the 
dependent variable, since the quantile regression objective function is a weighted 
sum of absolute deviations. Provided error terms are homoscedastic, the Koenker 
and Bassett (1982) and Rogers (1992) methods would be adequate to calculate the 
variance-covariance matrix. However, Rogers (1992) reports that in the presence of 
heteroscedastic errors, this method would understate the standard errors. 
Consequently, we report the bootstrapped estimator of standard errors, as he 
suggests. Table 8.6A and 8.6B present the HDI and infant mortality regression 
estimates at five different quantiles, namely, 5th, 25 th, 50th (median), 75 th and 95
th 
percentile of the welfare distribution. 
We can see from both tables that income per capita, social expenditures and aid 
al "fi t \Ve inflows help improve welfare at all quantiles, albeit not ways Slgru can . 
however note the distinct features across the quantiles. Pro-poor public expenditure 
and aid resources have a larger positive impact on HDI at the lower end of its 
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distribution, irrespective of the PPE index used (although effects are stronger for the 
'-' 
beta-weighted PPE). On average, each extra percent of public social expenditure and 
aid improves HDI by about 0.2% in the lower 0.05 quantile. In the 0.95 quantile 
regression, it appears that these benefits amount to only about 0.03% increase in 
HDI. It would therefore seem that the lower the human development in the recipient 
economy, the more effective aid and social expenditure are in promoting welfare as 
there is more room for improvement to be brought by aid and pro-poor spending. 
Hence, these estimates do support our hypothesis that effectiveness of aid does vary 
across economies depending on where they are located in the welfare distribution. 
Additional support is obtained by the F-test statistics. The null hypothesis of 
equality of aid coefficients across quantiles is rejected in most cases hence making a 
case to allow for heterogenous aid effects across the welfare distribution. 
Using beta weights in infant mortality regressions, we find each extra percent of PPE 
reduces mortality rates by at least 0.6% and each extra percent of aid has a positi\'e 
effect of at least 0.5%, for all quantiles. Using unweighted and first principal 
component weighted PPE, pro-poor expenditures and aid again appear to be effective 
at reducing infant mortality (although significantly so only in above median 
quantiles). Overall, responses to PPE or aid do not seem to vary over the distribution 
of infant mortality rates in a distinct manner and generally the null hypothesis is not 
(or weakly) rejected. Income per capita has a consistent positive effect on welfare 
enhancement across the quantiles. 
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Table 8.6A: Ln (lIDJ) regressions 
5% T25% 50% 75% 95% 
Using unweighted PPE 
GDPO 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 0.00004 0.0001 (2.99)** (2.74)** (1.71)* (1.79)* (2.33)** LN(PPEres) 0.178 0.151 0.106 0.033 0.027 (1.82)* (2.18)** (2.77)* (0.98) (1.09) LN(AIDGNP 1) 0.088 0.061 0.016 
-0.006 0.009 (1.78)* (1.94)* (0.47) (0.26) (0.43) 
LN(GM) -0.100 -0.045 
-0.020 0.029 
-0.060 (0.86) (0.64) (0.32) (0.54) (0.96) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.46 0.45 0.42 0.36 0.29 
Testing equality of aid coefficients: F-Stat (Prob>F 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
5% Cl,73) 0.20(0.658) 1.34(0.251 ) 3.11(0.082) 2.14(0.148) 
25% 2.04(0.158) 1.18(0.280) 0.84(0.363) 
50% 0.78(0.380) 0.06(0.813) 
75% 0.69(0.408) 
UsinJ7 beta coefficient weighted PPE 
GDPO 0.0001 0.0001 0.00002 0.00003 0.00005 
(1.74)* (2.42)** (0.96) (2.82)*** (2.09)** 
LN(PPEres) 0.342 0.234 0.159 0.064 0.052 
(2.88)*** (2.80)*** (3.05)*** (2.00)** (1.94)* 
LN (AIDGNP 1) 0.288 0.194 0.111 0.035 0.040 
(2.92)*** (2.44)** (2.17)** (1.08) (1.55) 
LN(GM) -0.041 -0.035 -0.030 0.032 -0.011 
(0.36) (0.64) (0.58) (0.84) (0.14) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.45 0.38 0.30 
Testing equality of aid coefficients: F-Stat (Prob>F 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
5% (1,73) 0.74(0.393) 3.30(0.073) 5.78(0.019) 5.91(0.018) 
25% 1.37(0.245) 4.08(0.047) 3.14(0.080) 
50% 2.75(0.101) 1.42(0.238) 
75% 0.01(0.909) 
Using first principal component weighted PPE 
GDPO 0.0001 0.0001 0.00003 0.00005 0.0001 
(2.77)*** (2.71)* (1.68)* (2.39)** (2.35)** 
LN(PPEres) 0.168 0.161 0.106 0.032 0.024 
(1.28) (2.72)* (1.96)* (0.80) (0.76) 
LN(AIDGNP 1) 0.102 0.087 0.030 -0.003 0.011 
(1.01) (1.82)* (0.69) (0.11) -(0.47) 
LN(GM ) -0.100 0.052 -0.019 0.030 -0.062 
(0.91) (0.63) (0.32) (0.70) (0.97) 
Observations 81 81 81 81 81 
R squared 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.36 0.29 
Testing equality of aid coefficients: F-Stat (Prob>F 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
5% (1,73) 0.03(0.855) 0.58(0.447) 1.30(0.257) 0.89(0.345) 
1.33(0.252) 2.45(0.122) 1.66(0.202) 25% 
0.83(0.365) 0.22(0.639) 50% 0.32(0.573) 
75% 
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Table 8.6B: Ln (INFANT MORTALITY RATE) regressions 
5% 125% 50% 75% 95% 
Using u n w e i ~ ~ hted PPE 
GDPO 
-0.0001 
-0.0002 
-0.0002 
-0.0003 
-0.0003 (0.74) (1.84)* (1.97)* (4.01)*** (3.34)*** LN(PPEres) 
-0.153 
-0.292 
-0.462 
-0.225 
-0.314 (1.52) (1.25) (2.18)** (1.08) (2.14)** LN(AIDGNP 1) 
-0.085 
-0.108 
-0.100 
-0.159 
-0.263 (1.08) (0.72) (0.61) (1.88)* (2.04)** 
LN(GM ) 0.016 -0.040 
-0.016 0.050 
-0.056 (0.12) (0.32) (0.16) (0.50) (0.56) 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.49 0.46 
Testing equality of aid coefficients: F-Stat (Prob>F) 
0.46 0.44 0.47 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
5% (1,72) 0.03(0.860) 0.01(0.9171 0.31(0.582) 2.05(0.157) 
25% 0.00(0.957) 0.13(0.721) 1.06(0.30M 
50% OJ 7(0.547) 1.16(0.286) 
75% 0.86(0.356) 
Usin!! beta coefficient weighted PPE 
GDPO -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0003 
(0.88) (2.43)** (1.74)* (1.65) (2.32)** 
LN(PPEres) 
-0.690 -0.781 -0.678 -0.583 -0.553 
(2.74)*** (4.89)*** (2.90)*** (1.71)* (1.97)* 
LN(AIDGNP 1) -0.544 -0.603 -0.464 -0.518 -0.574 
(4.24)*** (4.29)*** (2.10)** (1.94)* (2.78)*** 
LN(GM) 0.021 0.030 0.049 -0.034 -0.007 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.51) iO.34) (0.07) 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.59 0.57 0.52 0.46 0.50 
Testing equality of aid coefficients: F-Stat (Prob>F 
5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
5% (1,72) 0.18(0.669) 0.16(0.688) 0.01(0.915) 0.02(0.894) 
25% 0.85(0.359) 0.11(0.736) 0.02(0.897) 
50% 0.05(0.823) 0.19(0.664) 
75% 0.07(0.796) 
Using first principal component weighted PPE 
GDPO -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 
(0.81) (1.91)* (1.72)* (2.41)** (4.62)*** 
LN(PPEres) -0.128 -0.245 -0.454 -0.226 -0.303 
(0.51) (0.95) (1.93)* (0.96) (1.74)* 
LN(AIDGNP 1) -0.108 0.092 -0.143 -0.195 -0.293 
(0.74) (0.56) (1.08) ( 1.19) (2.21)** 
LN(GM) 0.015 -0.071 -0.032 0.053 -0.056 
(0.09) (0.74) (0.39) (0.71) (1.02) 
Observations 80 80 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.47 
Testing equality of aid coefficients: F-Stat (Prob>F 
95% 5% 25% 50% 75% 
5% (1,72) 0.02(0.897) 0.05iO.816) 0.24(0.626) 1.07(00305) 
0.15(0.704) 0.34(0.564) 1.16(0.285) 25% 0.81(0.371) 
50% 0.24(0.629) OJ 7(0.547) 
75% 
, lute values of hoots trapped t , Notes: Constant and regIOnal dUllllll1es mcluded 10 all regresslOns. Abso 
ratios in brackets 
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8.6 WELFARE TO GROWTH 
So far, we have looked at promoting welfare as the central objective and treat 
growth, government pro-poor spending and aid flows as important instruments. \\'e 
now briefly consider whether improved welfare is just an end in itself or can be a 
means to promote growth possibilities? It is conceivable that as people become say 
healthier and more educated, they are capable to make more significant contributions 
to growth. 
To investigate this possibility, we specify a growth model that is similar to the one 
employed in Chapter 5. We here prefer to concentrate on lIDI rather than infant 
mortality rates as the former can arguably be the more relevant welfare indicator 
when looking at effects it might have on economic growth. As a result, no education 
variable is included as it is one of the components of lID!. We run the Breusch 
Pagan (1984) test to find whether OLS would be appropriate. The test produces a 
chi-statistic of 1.97 with one degree of freedom. Using the 1 % critical value from the 
chi-squared distribution (6.63), the test statistic fails to reject the null therefore 
suggesting OLS would produce consistent estimates. We introduce one-period 
lagged HDI as it is not likely to have an immediate impact on growth. This would 
partly address concerns on endogeneity. 
The aim here is to demonstrate that improved welfare might be good for growth. 
rather than making any assertive claim (which would be a topic in its own right). 
This exercise is just intended to provide a promising line of research. Table 8.7 
presents the results. 
As discussed in Chapter 5, introducing both investment and aid in growth regression 
results in underestimation of aid effectiveness as investment coefficient would 
capture part of the indirect effects of aid on growth. Using residual-generated 
. nl h f . t t that IS· not due to aid so that the regressor, we mcluded 0 y t at part 0 fives men 
aid coefficient would give an estimate of its total effect on growth. Using the same 
methodology, we here want to obtain an estimate of aid effectiveness in promoting 
growth that would include its indirect effects through investment and welfare (HOI). 
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GDPO 
HDLI 
HDLlres 
INV 
INVres 
DEM 
INFL 
MGDP 
AIDGNP_I 
SSA 
ASIA 
Table 8.7: Link from Welfare to Growth 
-0.0004 
(1.71)* 
5.905 
(2.95)*** 
0.196 
(5.24)*** 
-0.008 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(3.34)*** 
-0.067 
(3.43)*** 
13.253 
(1.39) 
0.929 
(0.80) 
2.748 
Growth in Real GDP Per Capita (%) 
-0.0004 
(1.71)* 
5.905 
(2.95)*** 
0.196 
(5.24)*** 
-0.0004 
(1.71)* 
5.905 
(2.95)*** 
0.196 
(5.24)*** 
-0.008 -0.008 
(0.07) (0.07) 
-0.002 -0.002 
(3.34)*** (3.34)*** 
-0.067 -0.067 
(3.43)*** (3.43)*** 
27.194 53.314 
(2.17)** (3.69)*** 
0.929 0.929 
(0.80) (0.80) 
2.748 2.748 
(3.24)*** (3.24)*** (3.24)*** 
LA C 1. 096 1. 096 1. 096 
(1.48) (1.48) (1.48) 
Constant -4.662 -4.662 -4.662 
(2.90)*** (2.90)*** (2.90)*** 
Observations 144 144 144 
R-squared 0.39 0.39 0.39 
F-stat 7.83 7.83 7.83 
Notes: Regional dummies included in all regressions. Absolute values of White-heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors in brackets. F -Stat rejects the null that all the coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero. 
Results are in favour of our hypothesis. HDI does effectively make a significant 
positive contribution to growth. This finding may act as an incentive to allocate aid 
for welfare enhancement purposes as it indirectly also helps in stimulating growth 
process. Again, aid appears to be a positive determinant. Also, taking account of its 
effects through mediators of growth (HDI and investment) enhances the contribution 
of aid. Each extra percentage point of aid in GNP increases growth (partly through 
investment) by 0.3% points on average with one year lag. However, once its effect 
through increased welfare is taken into account, it would appear that on average it 
improves growth rate by a further 0.2% points. 
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8.7 CONCLUSION 
Our objective is to test the hypothesis that aid flows have an inclirect effect on 
welfare levels. One way is by promoting growth. Alternatively, clirect measures 
aimed at improving the non-income dimensions (for example, consumption of health 
and access to education) of poverty represent a potential transmission channel. The 
latter route is believed to be more effective in terms of promoting welfare. 
Investigating this link therefore motivates our study. 
We concentrate on public expenditure on social services, education and health as the 
relevant direct measures, based on their significance in welfare regressions. To 
accumulate the effects of aid on welfare into the coefficient on aid, we use residual 
generated regressors. This allows us to obtain an aid coefficient that includes its 
indirect effects through public sector resource allocation. For this purpose, we 
construct four alternative PPE indices such that high values indicate progressively 
pro-poor budget. We also hypothesise that while evaluating aid effectiveness in 
improving welfare, it is important to take into consideration that these effects can 
vary depending on which part of the welfare distribution is examined. We estimate 
quantile regressions to take account of this observation. 
We examine the relationship between aid flows and indicators of welfare (HDI and 
infant mortality) based on a pooled panel of 57 countries over the period 1980 to 
1998 using a random effect model. Results obtained are in support of our hypothesis 
that public social expenditure is associated with higher welfare and that aid improves 
welfare of the poor by financing such expenditures. Estimates also support our 
hypothesis that effectiveness of aid does vary across economies depending on their 
location in the distribution of welfare - the positive effect of aid on welfare via PPE 
is stronger at the lower end of welfare distribution (when HDI is the rele\'ant 
indicator). 
Our estimates therefore seem to suggest that one way to address welfare issues is to 
. .. if I ctivity is the criteria target governments with pro-poor policy asprrauons se e . 
Should conditionality be the preferred criteria then recipient econorrues should be 
encouraged to invest significant proportions of aid resources into 
Hence, whether the allocation policy is one of conditionality 
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composition of public spending would appear to hold the key to promote welfare of 
the poor (and non-poor). In general, our results suggest that aid is effective in 
improving welfare in the presence of pro-poor public spending including expenditure 
on social services, education and health. It also appears that targeting aid at 
enhancing welfare stands more than just on humanitarian grounds. It can also be a 
means to enhance growth process in developing countries. 
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APPENDIX 8A: DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. ~ 1 i n n ~ I a x x
Human Development Index 219 0.587 0.215 0.0'+:1 0.944 
Infant Mortality Rates 284 59.68 37.52 5.7 181 
Poverty Headcount: 
% below national welfare line 59 33.234 17.10 1.6 70 
% of population earning less than $1 a day 125 20.699 18.527 0 70.24 
GDPO 262 2290 1562 299 8092 
Pub Exp on Social Services/GDP 85 0.034 0.043 -0.041 0.153 
Pub Exp on Education/GNP 246 0.043 0.019 0.008 0.106 
Pub Exp on first-level EducationlGDP 133 0.016 0.008 0.000 0.040 
Pub Exp on HealthlGDP 158 0.025 0.015 0.002 0.013 
Pub Exp on Primary Health1GDP 44 0.002 0.003 2.8ge-
06 0.011 
Pub Exp on AgriculturelGDP 161 0.017 0.014 0.001 0.088 
Pub Exp on Military Services/GDP 153 0.032 0.028 0.005 0.156 
AID/GNP 255 0.060 0.077 
-0.002 0.463 
Total Tax RevenuelGDP 201 0.182 0.086 
0.038 0.475 
PPE 85 0.101 
0.063 0.002 0.272 
PPEbh 85 
0.014 0.009 0.002 0.037 
PPEbm 85 
0.016 0.009 0.004 0.038 
PPEpc 
85 0.058 0.036 0.001 0.156 
Growth in Real GDP Per Capita (%) 277 0.894 3.812 -15.618 
22.250 
INV (Investment as % of GDP) 274 23.125 9.116 
4.331 79.195 
INFL (Inflation Rate) 252 86.236 499.765 
-4.379 6351.45 
MGDP (Imports as % of GDP) 267 34.707 21.315 
5.860 137.843 
Note: All data refer to period averages 1980/1983,1984/1987, 1988/1991, 1 9 ~ 2 / 1 9 9 5 5 ~ d d 1996/1998 
except initial GDPPC. Data from Verschoor (2002) have been extended for thIS analYSIS. 
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List of countries 
Algeria Ghana Moldova Sri Lanka 
Bangladesh Guatemala Morocco Tanzania 
Bolivia Guinea Nepal Thailand 
Botswana Honduras Nicaragua Tunisia 
Brazil Hungary Niger Turkmenistan 
Bulgaria India Nigeria Uganda 
Chile Indonesia Pakistan Venezuela, RB 
China Jamaica Panama Zambia 
Colombia Jordan Peru Zimbabwe 
Costa Rica Kenya Philippines 
Cote d'Ivoire Kyrgyz Republic Poland 
Czech Republic Lesotho Romania 
Dominican Rep. Madagascar Rwanda 
Ecuador Malaysia Senegal 
Estonia Mauritania Slovak Republic 
Ethiopia Mexico South Africa 
156 
CHAPTER 8: Aid and Welfare of the Poor 
APPENDIX 8B: ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
Table 8Bl: OLS Welfare Regressions 
PPE Indicator Unweighted Index 
Log(HDI) regressions 
Beta coefficients First principal componenb 
GDPO 0.0001 
weighted index weighted index 
0.0001 0.0001 (3.53)*** (3.23)*** 
LN(PPE) 0.052 0.149 
(3.52)*** 
0.049 (1.25) (3.41)*** 
LN(AIDGNP _1) -0.028 
-0.045 
(1.22) 
-0.028 
LN(G m} 
(1.09) (1.86)* (1.09) 
-0.024 
-0.026 
-0.024 
(0.37) (0.42) (0.37) 
Constant -0.749 
-0.250 
-0.725 
(3.60)*** (1.09) (3.34)*** 
Observations 81 81 81 
R-squared 0.59 0.62 0.59 
F-Stat 12.94 13.99 12.94 
BreuschPagan X2k 8.46 6.60 8.37 
Hausman X2 k 5.19 4.54 4.94 
PPE Indicator UnweIghted Index B e ~ a a c o e ~ c i e n t s s First principal components 
weIghted mdex weighted index 
GDPO -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
(3.98)*** (2.98)*** (3.98)*** 
LN(PPE) -0.254 -0.694 -0.240 
(1.93)* (5.20)*** (1.87)* 
0.043 0.081 0.042 
(0.71) (1.53) (0.69) 
0.004 0.022 0.003 
(0.06) (0.32) (0.04) 
Constant 3.544 1.331 3.433 
(7.96)*** (2.11)** (6.91)*** 
Observations 80 80 80 
R-squared 0.66 0.74 0.66 
F-Stat 33.38 36.33 33.37 
BreuschPagan X2k 44.90 38.29 44.86 
Hausman X2k 1.92 10.41 1.96 
Notes: Regional dullllllies included in all OLS regressions. Absolute values of White-heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. F-Stat rejects the null that all the coeffcicients are 
jointly not different from zero. 
The above tables report the OLS estimates of welfare regressions. The Breusch 
Pagan (1980) Lagrange Multiplier tests the null hypothesis that country-specific 
disturbance term (Vj) is always zero, that is, the absence of omitted fixed effects. \\'e 
take the 1 % critical value from the chi-squared distribution \\'ith one degree 0 f 
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freedom which is equal to 6.63. In all regressions the test stat' t' . h 11 
' IS IC rejects t e nu 
therefore suggesting the inappropriateness of OLS coefficient estimates. The only 
exception is when beta-weighted PPE is used in HDI regressI'ons H . 
. owe\'er, smce 
the Breusch-Pagan test statistic only just falls in the acceptance region. we treat it as 
a rejection case. 
Note however, that OLS results overall lead to conclusions similar to the ones drawn 
from Table 8.4. Use of residual generated regressor, PPEres, again produces a 
measure of total effect of aid on welfare which is along the same lines as those in 
Table 8.5. In a sense, our results are fairly robust across the estimation techniques. 
Hausman (1978) Specification Test 
Hausman(l978) tests the validity of random-effects estimator based on the difference 
between random and fixed effect estimators. Under the null, there is no correlation 
between the country-specific disturbance (Vi) and the regressors. Both random effect 
and fixed effect estimates would be consistent although the former would be more 
efficient (hence preferable). If this hypothesis does not hold, then a random effect 
model would produce biased estimates whilst a fixed effect model (which eliminates 
country-specific effects through data transformation) would still give consistent 
estimates. In other words, the coefficient estimates across these two models will be 
systematically different. At 1% critical value with 4 degrees of freedom which is 
equal to 13.28, the Hausman test statistic falls in the acceptance region for all 6 
regressions. Hence, we report random effect estimators to analyse effects of aid on 
welfare of the poor. 
Aid and Pro-Poor Expenditures 
With the aim to test the hypothesis that government expenditure transmits any effect 
aid may have on welfare, we have here estimated Equation 8.2. Total tax re\enue as 
a share of GDP (TRGDP) is included as a source of government revenue. 
h . T bl 8B'" All explanatory In general the regressions perform well as s own mae .). 
variables enter with the expected sign and have high t-ratios. Irrespective of the PPE 
. . ' d pecially aid flows are significant mdex used, tax revenue, mcome per capIta an es ~ ~
. . diture Hence it appears that determinants of the compOSItIOn of government expen . , 
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Table 8B3: Pro-Poor Public Expenditure (PPE) regressions 
TRGDP 
GDPPC X 104 
PPE 
0.158 
(2.59)** 
0.564 
(8.94)*** 
0.055 
0.023 
(2.90)*** 
0.078 
(8.92)*** 
0.009 
P P L ~ ~
0.022 0.092 
(2.69)*** (2.66)*** 
0.073 0.326 
(8.62)*** (8.96)*** 
0.009 0.032 
(3.39)*** (3.55)*** (3.81)*** (3.39)*** 
Constant -0.030 -0.004 -0.001 -0.019 
(2.18)** (1.96)* (0.57) (2.32)** 
Observations 83 83 83 83 
R-squared 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83 
F-Stat 84.19 82.82 79.82 84.46 
Notes: Regional dummies included in all OLS regressions. Absolute values ofWhite-heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors are given in parentheses. F - Stat rejects the null that all the coeffcicients are 
jointly not different from zero 
these findings support our hypothesis that PPE expenditures represent potential 
channels through which aid impacts on welfare. 
Quantile Regression 
The quantile regression model, first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978). can 
be viewed as a location model. Suppose, 8 is the quantile to be estimated. Then if W 
and X refer to welfare levels and a vector of control variables, for each observation i, 
the residual would be given as: 
r. = W - '/3.x .. 
, ,£..J J !! 
j 
{
28 
and the weight as Wi = 2(1- 8 ) 
ifr>O 
1 
otherwise 
Thus, quantiles other than the median are estimated by weighting the residuals. The 
regression coefficients for the 8th sample quantile (0<8<1) of W are estimated by 
solving the following minimisation problem: 
159 
CHAPTER 8: Aid and Welfare of the Poor 
Thus, quantile regressions would allow us to evaluate aid effectiveness by focusing 
on specific parts of the welfare distribution. As one increases 8 continously from 0 
to 1, one can trace the entire conditional distribution of welfare levels given the set of 
regressors. Our hypothesis is that economies would respond differently to social 
expenditures and aid resources depending on where they lie on the welfare 
distribution. The elasticity of the 8 th conditional quantile of welfare due to a change 
in aid inflows would be given by the partial derivative of the conditional quantile of 
welfare with respect to aid flows (A), that is, dQuante (W; \ Xi) / dAi . 
Using Monetary Poverty Indicators 
With respect to the widespread use of income poverty measures, we here extend our 
analysis to these indicators. We re-estimate the regressions using these measures 
which allow us to find elasticity of each type of government social expenditures with 
respect to monetary poverty indicators. Table 8B4 reports the estimation results. 
One can notice the consequent reduction in sample size. Initial income per capita 
consistently appears to reduce the percentage of population that fall below the 
poverty line. The share of various public expenditure in GNP does not perform well 
in most of the regressions. In the cases that they are significant, they appear to 
suggest that public expenditure on first-level education and primary health are 
harmful to the poor. Poor data coverage does not allow us to conclusively interpret 
these findings. Owing to these ambiguous and weak results, it becomes uncertain 
what would constitute a pro-poor public expenditure index if these monetary poverty 
indicators were to be used. 
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Table 8B4: Regressions Using Poverty Headcount Measures 
Log(Poverty head-count) 
(%below national welfare line) Log(Poverty head-count) 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on Social 
ServiceslGDP) 
Observations 
R-squared 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on 
EducationlGDP) 
Observations 
R-squared 
GDPO 
Log(public expenditure onjirst-
level EducationlGDP) 
Observations 
R-squared 
GDPO 
Log(public expenditure on 
HealthlGDP) 
Observations 
R-squared 
GDPO 
Log(public expenditure on 
Primary HealthlGDP) 
Observations 
R-squared 
GDPO 
Log(Public expenditure on 
Agrz'cultureIGDP) 
Observations 
R-squared 
GDPO 
-0.0001 
(1.19) 
-0.006 
(0.05) 
19 
0.61 
-0.0003 
(2.74)*** 
0.023 
(0.15) 
53 
0.54 
-0.0003 
(2.11)** 
0.093 
(3.28)*** 
31 
0.54 
-0.0002 
(2.16)** 
-0.021 
(0.10) 
45 
0.43 
-0.0006 
(5.78)*** 
0.277 
(% below Sl/day PPP) 
-0.0003 
(3.04)*** 
-0.311 
(1.67) 
36 
0.44 
-0.0003 
(4.18)*** 
-0.326 
(1.46) 
96 
0.59 
-0.0003 
(2.53)** 
-0.180 
(0.70) 
56 
0.51 
-0.0003 
(4.92)*** 
-0.235 
(1.31 ) 
79 
0.55 
-0.0003 
(1.94)* 
-0.105 
(7.83)*** ( 1.73) 
10 19 
0.93 0.91 
-0.0004 -0.0002 
(3.26)*** (3.25)*** 
0.090 -0.044 
(0.54) (0.26) 
40 66 
0.56 0.51 
-0.0003 -0.0003 
(2.28)** (3.48)*** 
Log(public expenditure on 0.153 -0.102 
MilitarylGDP) (1.65) (0.49) 
Observations 45 76 
R-squared 0.49 0.49 
Note: Regional Dummies and constants included in all OLS regressions. Absolute values of Whitc-
heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors in brackets. 
We prefer to concentrate on HDI and mortality rates rather than the monetary 
measures of poverty for conceptual reasons as well. Reddy and Pogge (2002) 
highlight three significant flaws in measures of income poverty. First they make 
explicit reference to the fact that global (and domestic) poverty lines are not based on 
a clear conception of welfare that specifies the goods that must be commanded tl\ 
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avoid being poor. Second, it is difficult to get a meallingful international and 
intertemporal comparison of these global poverty lines since by construction they 
rely on an inappropriate measure of purchasing power parity. And finally incorrect 
extrapolation from limited data is an inherent feature of the methodology used to 
construct income poverty measures. In fact, Reddy and Pogge (2002) recommend 
using poverty estimates based on infant mortality, amongst other measures of 
deprivation/welfare, while an appropriate and much needed global measure of 
income poverty is developed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this collection of essays, we address three pertinent issues that we identify while 
reviewing the literature on aid effectiveness. First, treatment of transmission 
mechanisms in estimating an aid-growth model. Second, the nature of non-linearity 
that appears to characterise the relationship between aid and growth. Finally, \\'e try 
to shed light on how to capture the effect of aid on welfare of the poor and what 
would make it more effective. We now briefly give an overview of these issues how , 
they are addressed and the conclusions we reach before summarising the implications 
drawn. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of this study together with 
some suggestions for future research. 
9.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Various developments in the aid literature have resulted in a shift from the limiting 
Harrod Domar growth model to more recent endogenous models thereby coming 
closer to modelling the growth process as is now experienced. At the same time, 
emphasis has been on econometric sophistication and use of panel data. HO\\'e\'er, it 
has still been unclear how to treat the indirect routes that channel effects of aid on 
growth. Investment, imports, public sector have been identified as mediators of aid 
effects from theoretical work. Recently, policies have been added to this list owing 
to the emphasis on aid conditionality. Empirics might recognise that aid \\'orks 
indirectly to impact on growth, however this has not been explicitly expressed in 
specifying a model. Few studies have even acknowledged that investment is one of 
the most crucial link between aid and growth. On these grounds, they include aid but 
not investment in their growth regressions. Since investment has been established as 
the engine for growth, the resulting model misspecification is likely to give biased 
estimates. In this study, having identified investment as the transmission mechanism 
operational in SSA countries, we include both aid and investment in our regressions. 
Although, this approach does circumvent the problem of misspecification, it creates 
problems of its own. Aid coefficient in such a model is likely to underestimate aid 
effectiveness as investment coefficient would be capturing part of the effects aid has 
on growth. Using a residual generated regressor, \ye are able to introduce only that 
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share of investment that has not been aid-financed As a r I 
. esu t, we O\'ercome model 
misspecification and are still able to produce an aid coefficI'ent th t . . a gIves an estImate 
of the total impact of aid on growth. 
Growth in SSA may not be reflecting the predictions based on aid allocations, This 
does not necessarily imply that aid did not work. In fact, our estimates consistently 
indicate aid has been effective. Prevalence of factors that are detrimental to gro\'1h 
are quite important in that region and would tend to be a more likely explanation of 
the observed correlation of high aid and low growth. These characteristics act as a 
barrier to the full realisation of aid effects. We are more inclined to believe that had 
donors not been generous to SSA, this region would have been worse off than it is. 
Recent work on aid effectiveness has been marked by the introduction of non-
linearity either in the form of aid squared or aid interaction terms. While the use of 
interaction terms has been questioned, in this thesis we do not seek to resolve that 
debate. Instead, we concentrate on validity of using an aid squared term and test the 
proposition of an aid Laffer curve. The main limitation with specifying an aid 
squared term is that the number of threshold (one) and form of non-linearity 
(inverted V-shape) is exogenously imposed. Using a threshold model, we allow the 
data to determine both the number of threshold and type of regime as well as the split 
variable. The possibility to draw inferences on the thresholds identified adds appeal 
to our finding. Application of this technique is the novelty of that chapter. Our 
estimates suggest that the relationship between aid and growth is effectively non-
linear and it appears that aid is effective at high aid levels. In other words, we find 
no evidence of diminishing returns in aid. The marginal impact of aid on growth 
does eventually decline but it occurs only after human capital stock rather than aid 
surpasses a certain level. Based on our results, it seems that an aid-squared term is 
not an appropriate way to capture the non-linearity in aid-growth link. 
Although poverty reduction is attracting increasing consideration as an objective of 
aid, there is little empirical analysis of the relation. One of the constraining factor 
has been lack of data on poverty, and even the limited data - the monetary poverty 
indicator which has been most widely used - are not without conceptual tla\\"s. 
Another difficulty encountered in measwing aid effectiveness in reducing poverty is 
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that it is hard to specify a model. Bearing in mind these pitfalls, we have here sought 
to contribute to this limited literature. F this or purpose, we use non-monetar\' 
.; 
poverty indicators to avoid further complication owing to the doubts raised on 
validity of poverty line based measures. Hence, our results are interpreted as 
estimates of effect on welfare of the poor rather than on poverty. Note however that 
increases in welfare alleviates poverty although this effect may not show on 
measured income poverty. We specifically emphasise the role of public sector in 
determining how effective aid flows are in promoting welfare. Our estimates are 
supportive of the hypothesis that aid makes a more significant contribution to 
improving welfare of the poor (and non-poor) if the recipient government engages in 
pro-poor spending patterns. This would involve public expenditure that can directly 
be targeted at reducing non-material hardship, for example through increased 
sanitation, health and education services. These actions may additionally indirectly 
enhance the economy's growth potential. Finally, quantile regression estimates is in 
support of our hypothesis that the positive effect of aid varies depending on the 
location of the recipient in the welfare distribution - aid is more effective in 
promoting welfare in economies at the lower end of this distribution (i.e, with low 
HDI) 
In general, based on our findings, the implications are twofold. First, some 
consequential notes can be drawn for future empirical work. Most importantly, it 
would be recommended to account for transmission mechanisms in assessing aid 
effectiveness. Neglecting to do so is likely to give an inaccurate picture of how 
successful aid flows are. Also, careful thought has to be given to the use and 
interpretation of an aid squared term. It does not appear to be an appropriate 
representation of the non-linearity in aid and growth relationship. Also, a significant 
coefficient on such a term does not necessarily indicate diminishing returns in aid. It 
may be signalling to the effect of an omitted interaction term as suggested by Hansen 
and Tarp (2001). Finally, useful insights can be obtained from aid studies that allow 
for effects of aid to vary across the welfare distribution. 
Second, policy-wise the need for continued support of aid to deyeloping countries as 
b al d O
ur findings show that aid has been effectiye 
well as SSA cannot e overv ue . 
and suggest that additional flows would be beneficial. Howeyer. aid will not so Ive 
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all of SSA's economic problems. Aid may be a necessary but it is not a sufficient 
condition for growth and enhanced welfare Sustam· bl d nh d 
. a e an e ance effects 
depend on other factors as well - for example, independent and transparent legal 
system, strong government institutions, diversified production sector and 
development of infrastructure (that would foster growth of the priYate sector). 
Finally, an effective way to use aid to promote welfare would be to encourage 
recipient governments to adopt a pro-poor budget. Whether the aid allocation policy 
is one of selectivity or conditionality, this proposition can be catered for. 
9.2 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
One important limitation we face in this empirical study is data availability. Most of 
the recent significant work done in aid literature covers the period from 1970 until 
1993. Our sample is extended to more recent years but data on all variables were 
available until 1998 only at the time the sample was constructed. One possible way 
to develop this work would be to use more recent data as they become available. 
That would allow an updated evaluation of aid performance. 
We have emphasised the need to recognise the role of transmission mechanisms in 
mediating effects of aid on growth. We duly take into consideration the importance 
of investment, imports and government in that regard. Exploring the links through 
policy would have completed the study. However, it has been difficult to extend the 
analysis to policy owing to several factors. Most importantly is the lack of clarity 
regarding how to model the interaction between policies, aid and growth. 
Enlightening on these matters would be a topic in its own right. Future research in 
this direction would be vital especially with respect to the recent assertion that aid 
works only if accompanied with good policies and hence should be allocated to 
economies with good policy environments only. 
mechams· ms m· assessmg aid To be able to focus on treatment of transmission 
effectiveness, we have adopted a growth specification that is in line with recent 
work. Although it embraces multiple dimensions of an economy - initial conditions, 
political institutions and policies - there still are some aspects distinct to SSA that we 
had to neglect. Close examination of regression results did show that our model is 
limited in the sense that it cannot fully capture the negative forces on gro\\1h in SS:'\.. 
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An extension to this work would be to account for these addit' al C • Ion lactors uruque to 
this region. Morrissey and Lensink (2000) highlight the adverse effect of aid 
instability, Dehn (2000) focuses on commodity price uncertainty and Sen:en (1998) 
presents results using a wider range of factors that captures macroeconomic 
uncertainty. An aid-growth model like the one we employ if augmented by a 
combination of aid and economic uncertainty factors could be insightful. Finding 
innovative ways to construct these uncertainty measures would be an important 
element. 
Results regarding transmission mechanisms have been helpful in understanding ho\Y 
aid works and what can be done to enhance its effectiveness. However, these 
findings are based on panel data growth regressions. Hence, the estimates give an 
idea on average aid performance. This may be masking individual country 
expenence. Analysis of the regression estimates does suggest a selective set of 
countries that warrants further investigation. Case studies that would incorporate 
additional information we gained on the workings of aid would refine our 
conclusions. 
One shortcoming of our work regarding aid and welfare is the limited sample. 
Although the sample is based on 57 countries over the period 1980 to 1998, it would 
be worthwhile extending this data set both countrywise and timewise. Another 
possible refinement would be to gather data on a wider range of public expenditures. 
For example, as welfare is likely to be poorer in rural areas, it would be advisable to 
incorporate information on public spending on rural transport and communication. 
Finally, a formal theoretical model of the relationship between aid and welfare or 
poverty alleviation will provide a rich environment to pursue research in this area. 
As it currently stands, the few empirical studies examining this link are fairly ad hoc. 
An approach, that would be based on strong theoretical work to capture positive 
effects of improved welfare or poverty reduction on growth performance would also 
be invaluable. 
Throughout this thesis, we have studied aid effectiveness by concentrating on the 
recipient country. This seems a natural approach as \\'hether aid \Yorks or not 
. . t s it Ho\Yever. the ro Ie depends to a large extent on how the reCIpIent govenunen use . 
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of donors is not without relevance. Our preliminary data analysis does provide 
guidance as to who are the predominant donors by region. Developed countries 
disburse aid for a range of reasons other than on moral and humanitarian grounds 
only. The mix of motives driving aid allocation would most likely vary across 
donors and over time. This leads us to believe that incorporating donor-related 
factors is as important as giving consideration to individual recipients in studying aid 
effectiveness. Future empirical work that would be donor-specific or at least allow 
for aid from various donors may help find out about a possible linkage between 
source of aid (and donors' interests) and its probability of being successful. 
Most of the developing countries have and continue to rely heavily on foreign aid to 
withstand the forces that prevent them from growing. The overwhelming literature 
on how aid works has indeed provided invaluable information to both donors and 
recipients as well as academics. Yet, new issues are bound to appear and would need 
to be addressed. We hope this thesis provides insights that would be useful for future 
research. 
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